YEMENIS REMAIN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT GTMO DETAINEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002880

SIPDIS

FOR S/WCI AMB PIERRE PROSPER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KAWC YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMENIS REMAIN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT GTMO DETAINEES

REF: PROSPER-KRAJESKI E-MAILS OF 9/27 AND 9/28/2005

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS KRAJESKI, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh and his Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and Interior have made clear in recent
meetings that the ROYG will not accept repatriation of
detainees from Guantanamo Bay who are designated as "enemy
combatants." Yemeni officials have stated that the ROYG has
enough problems dealing with the terrorists who are already
in Yemen. These officials do not readily believe USG
assurances that we will not criticize the ROYG if it decides
to release the returnees, or that we will not ask that they
be detained indefinitely. It may be necessary to contemplate
third-country resettlement of Yemeni detainees. Post
welcomes further thoughts on the issue, and will support the
visit of a high-level delegation to talk with President
Saleh, but it appears that his mind is made up on this
matter. END SUMMARY


2. (C) During a discussion with Homeland Security Advisor
Fran Townsend in early September, President Saleh said that
the ROYG "did not want" repatriations of Yemeni detainees at
Guantanamo Bay who are designated as enemy combatants because
Yemen was "full up with terrorists now." In subsequent
meetings with FonMin al-Qirbi and MinInt al-Alimi, Ambassador
discussed the inappropriateness and unacceptability of that
response, stressing that the USG required an immediate
written response from the ROYG about whether or not it would
accept Guantanamo Bay detainees. Thus far, post has not
received a response from either ministry. (NOTE: Yemen
accepted one detainee in August who was designated as a
"no-longer enemy combatant" and may be willing to accept
further such detainees, but there have been no clear
indications from the ROYG to that end. END NOTE)


3. (C) In addition to Saleh's concern about bringing
terrorists back to Yemen, al-Qirbi and al-Alimi added that
they did not fully trust the USG's assurances that we would
not demand that the ROYG indefinitely detain returnees from
Guantanamo. They were equally apprehensive about dealing
with possible criticism from the USG if they released the
detainees, and international criticism if they kept them in
detention without trial.


4. (C) COMMENT: It is not clear to us at this point how to
change Saleh's mind on this issue. Post is not optimistic
that a high-level USG delegation would allay the Yemenis'
concerns and convince them to accept repatriation of their
own countrymen. At this point, it may be worthwhile to
contemplate third-country resettlement options in the event
that we are unable to move President Saleh off of his
position. END COMMENT
Krajeski