Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA269
2005-02-08 15:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

COMBATING YEMEN'S GRAY MARKET IN SMALL ARMS AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000269 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: COMBATING YEMEN'S GRAY MARKET IN SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS

REF: A. STATE 04 169075

B. STATE 04 155749

C. STATE 04 153555

D. SANAA 04 2346

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000269

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: COMBATING YEMEN'S GRAY MARKET IN SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS

REF: A. STATE 04 169075

B. STATE 04 155749

C. STATE 04 153555

D. SANAA 04 2346

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (S) Summary. Yemen has one of the highest per capita rates
of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in the world. It has
been reported that, as a result of leakage or diversion,
Yemeni weapons procured officially by the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) have ended up in terrorist caches. In the past year,
Post demarched President Saleh and senior officials numerous
times on ongoing negotiations by Yemeni arms dealers to buy
large amounts of SA/LW that exceed any legitimate defense
procurement strategy. Our message has gone largely ignored.
President Saleh and his top Generals use SA/LW as a currency
to supplement personal fortune, dispense patronage to tribal
leaders, compensate government officials, reward supporters,
and appease potential contenders for power. Arms procured
legitimately through the MOD acquisitions are parceled out to
dealers, tribes, and local bazaars that feed the illicit arms
flow north by land across the Saudi border and south by sea
to Somalia and the Horn.


2. (S) Summary continued. Since the forging of the
U.S.-Yemen GWOT partnership, the ROYG has logged important
cooperative and unilateral successes, the value of which
should not be minimized. Nevertheless, ROYG CT cooperation
runs parallel to influxes of USG military and development
assistance. Any attempt to control the flow SA/LW into and
through Yemen will be painful for Saleh who, to date, is
convinced he can compensate for shortcomings in SA/LW
control, with cooperation in other areas. The intent of this
message is to provide options to demonstrate otherwise --
that the ROYG's poor control of its SA/LW and the resulting
proliferation into terrorist hands is incongruent with the
U.S.-Yemen partnership. Ultimately, the success of our CT
cooperation with Yemen, and the seriousness of Saleh's
friendship may well be tested. End Summary.

-------------- -
A Love of Weapons and A Tradition of Smuggling

-------------- -


3. (S) Neither weapons nor smuggling are considered taboo in
Yemen's gun-loving culture. Deputy Foreign Minister
al-Dhabbi, for example, in response to demarche points on the
dangerous proliferation of Yemeni SA/LW, cautioned that the
right for households to own multiple AK-47s is as deeply
entrenched as the right to bear arms is in the United States,
and confided that he himself owns fourteen. Smuggling is
considered a legitimate and prestigious career, and most
common goods and electronics found in Yemeni shops are
smuggled from Saudi Arabia. Ownership and smuggling of
weapons are deeply rooted in Yemen's culture and provide
Saleh with an effective currency to dispense patronage and to
gain and maintain the loyalty of powerful tribal leaders,
particularly those located in the northern region along the
Saudi border who depend on income from arms smuggling.

--------------
An Acquisitions Process The Leaks
--------------


4. (S/NF) Yemen legitimately procures weapons through a list
of about 29 certified, independent arms dealers who shop the
world with open-ended end-user certificates EUCs to buy
weapons on behalf of the Yemen MOD. We are aware of numerous
negotiations by such authorized brokers to purchase types and
amounts of materiel that make no sense in terms of the size
and requirements of the Yemen Armed Forces. Many of these
deals involved large quantities of small arms and ammunition
in excess of any logical national defense requirements.
(Note: In August 2004, Yemeni traders attempted to buy
SA-14s from Bulgaria (ref A). This information was
particularly alarming given that this weapon is favored by
terrorists in attacks against civil aviation, and the fact
that Saleh told visiting PM A/S Bloomfield that Yemen did not
require this class of weapons for its national defense. End
Note).


5. (S/NF) Everyone from President Saleh to high-level MOD
officials, powerful generals, field commanders, and
multitudes of tribal Sheikhs receive a cut from these
'legitimate' arms sales. We believe that only about 25
percent of total weapons bought under Yemeni EUCs actual end
up in official military stock, and that the arms broker's cut
for each deal in an additional 25 percent. The remaining
weapons are skimmed by senior MOD officials, military
commanders, and parceled out to the tribes, eventually making
their way into the black and gray market.


6. (S/NF) The 2003 Small Arms Survey placed the number of
small arms in Yemen at six to nine million, many of which are
fully-automatic assault rifles ideal for terrorist use.
These are far more weapons that the 60,000-strong Yemen armed
forces and other paramilitary and security forces reasonably
require. Nevertheless, last month a prominent Yemeni dealer
with a long history of diversion was discovered to be in the
final stages of negotiating a deal to buy 10,000 AKMs
(kalishnikov family weapons) from Serbia and Montenegro.
Given Yemen's grand-scale corruption, armed tribal society,
and already large existing stocks of SA/LW loose in Yemen,
there continues to be a high risk that Yemeni-origin arms are
readily available to private users including terrorist
organizations.

--------------
A Motive to Act?
--------------


7. (S/NF) In the past year, Post and visiting senior U.S.
officials have argued to President Saleh that preventing
terrorists from acquiring SA/LW is a key element in the
U.S.-Yemen GWOT partnership. There is some evidence that
Saleh is beginning to see that a failure to better control
the flow of SA/LW into and through Yemen could be dangerous
to his regime. Recent confrontations between security forces
and tribesmen in the Marib region over the public carrying of
weapons shows that the ROYG is making some effort to address
this issue.


8. (S/NF) Unexpectedly high casualties, and the difficulty of
government security forces to quell quickly last summer's
al-Houthi rebellion, shed new light on the dangers of a
heavily armed society for Saleh. The President was
reportedly enraged to discover that al-Houthi's forces were
better equipped with more advanced weapons than government
troops. It is also likely that Saleh now grasps the
disastrous efforts on Yemen's international reputation and
its aid prospects should Yemeni weapons be used in a major
future terror attack. Judging from his lack of action,
however, it is clear that in Saleh's cost-benefit analysis,
regulation of SA/LW constitutes the greater threat to his
political future.


9. (S/NF) Post has made clear that the USG is prepared to
help with assistance in such areas as inventory control,
border security, and defense acquisitions reform. The ROYG
has indeed responded to offers of assistance in developing
the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG) and the Central Security
Forces-Counter Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU),both important CT
assets that, given the political will, could be used to
combat arms smuggling. In areas where Saleh does not see a
confluence of interests, cooperation is less than
forthcoming. For example, the Minister of Defense rejected
500,000 USD in FMF funding to provide a defense inventory
control system. In the case of a major USG border security
assistance program, the ROYG has refused to share CT-related
information it garnered from USG provided technology.

--------------
Who Controls Licensing?
--------------


10. (S/NF) In response to USG concerns about the reliability
and validity of Yemeni end-user certificates (EUCs),in 2003
the ROYG announced to visiting Ambassador Bodine and NSC
Deputy Townsend a new policy to cancel all current EUCs and
transfer the responsibility of issuance to the MFA (ref D).
Although this is now official ROYG policy, there is no
evidence that any licenses were actually canceled, and MFA
involvement, to the extent it exists at all, is merely a
rubber stamp. Yemeni Embassies abroad, for example, are not
allowed to have anything to do with arms procurement. The
ROYG has not responded to several attempts by Post to elicit
a response to a non-paper requesting information on Yemen's
arms import/export system (ref C).


11. (S/NF) In an example of widespread corruption in the
issuance of EUCs, Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman
relayed an incident in which he received an envelope intended
for the Deputy Foreign Minister for Administration. Inside
was an EUC for an MP who chairs the Human Rights Committee
allowing him to purchase ammunition and ready for MFA
signature.

--------------
Solutions: Long Term
--------------


12. (S) A Long term solution to the SA/LW problem in Yemen
would require a comprehensive strategy including fully
developed maritime and land border security and tight control
on official weapons stocks. Both these objectives present
geographic and technical difficulties, ultimately
surmountable with USG help. A comprehensive strategy,
however, is doomed to failure unless Saleh is convinced it is
in his interest. Denying the tribes their weapons requires a
combination of cajoling, threatening and compensating for
lost income. Without such a plan, there remains a of
instability, tribal warfare, and ultimately a breakdown of
national unity. Saleh will not develop the will to
significantly alter course unless he is convinced that the
cost of maintaining current practices outweighs the benefits
currently being reaped.

--------------
U.S. Options
--------------


13. (S/NF) The ROYG is understandably fearful of a weapons
embargo. Imposing an arms embargo as a first step, however,
lowers a heavy stick without having benefited first from its
use as a deterrent. An embargo also runs counter to USG CT
assistance programs in Yemen, focused currently on the
training of the YCG and the CTF-CTU. Both forces are
equipped appropriately for their mission and are not major
beneficiaries of weapons related corruption. Particularly in
terms of Maritime Security, the YCG is in a position to
increasingly partner with CTJF-HOA's CTF-55 and CTF-150 in
patrolling coastal waters and deterring and interdicting
illicit weapons smuggling.


14. (S/NF) To develop an arms embargo as a deterrent, the USG
could demonstrate its willingness to shut down a deal, such
as the Serbian deal for 10,000 AKMs, accompanied by a
discussion with President Saleh on what has happened and why.
Ambassador might present information on another potential
deal and test Saleh's resolve to turn it off before we do
(having already demonstrated that the U.S. will follow
through). In such a exchange it would be hard for Saleh to
continue to claim plausible deniability, as he has in
previous demarches on particular weapons deals.


15. (S/NF) Interdiction of a ship smuggling illicit Yemeni
SA/LW is another option to be pursued, with or without ROYG
cooperation, by CTJF HOA. Scrupulous enforcement of
international regulations governing what constitutes legal
cargo could be employed to convince the ROYG we will not
stand by and watch dangerous and destabilizing diversions.
If the ROYG fully cooperates, the YCG (which on paper already
owns this mission) could become a partner in enforcement,
especially after the completion of a comprehensive radar grid
around Yemen's coastal waters and the establishment of a
joint U.S.-Yemen ops center to monitor shipping in the
straits. Without ROYG cooperation, however, monitoring
weapons smuggling whether by land or sea could prove a
formidable, in not impossible task for the USG.


16. (S) Final Comment: As a friend and ally in the GWOT,
Yemen leaves much to be desired. With a long history of
fiercely independent tribes who thrive on smuggling and arms
trades, Saleh has survived thus far by wheeling and dealing
with friend and foe alike - a game he has mastered with
remarkable skills. Adapting to the demands of a new powerful
friend, the USG, and the exigencies of globalization and the
GWOT, require of him a serious change in perspective. Our
mission is to convince Saleh that his political well being
requires that he adopt a brand new approach.
Krajeski