SANAA EAC MEETING 02/06/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000268

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 02/06/2005

REF: TD-314/07236-05

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and
(d).

1.(S/NF) Begin Summary - The DCM convened a core EAC meeting
on February 6, 2005, to review current threat conditions.
RMAS noted recent threat reporting (REFTD) focused on the
Sheraton Hotel and Tourist City located adjacent to the U.S.
Embassy and used by American TDY personnel and contractors.
As part of the EAC discussion, members reviewed security
arrangements at temporary lodging to include Tourist City and
the Sheraton Hotel. Based on available information, EAC
members recommended that the RSO immediately review the
security situation at Tourist City and the Sheraton Hotel
with Ministry of Interior contacts to ascertain whether MOI
has new threat related information and ensure a heightened
focus on life safety at these facilities. Key offices and
personnel represented included: DCM, FPD, CCE-Y, RMAS,
POL/ECON, DAO, LEGATT and RSO. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) RMAS briefed the EAC about current threat concerns
in Sanaa, followed by EAC recommendations that the RSO seek
further clarification regarding what MOI knows about possible
threats to Tourist City, the Sheraton Hotel or any other
location where Americans may cluster in soft-target sites.


3. (S/NF) The following issues were discussed or decided
upon during the EAC meeting:

- RSO will review with MOI and PSO, ROYG's current commitment
to protect the Sheraton Hotel, where USG TDY personnel
cluster. RSO last visited security at the Sheraton with the
hotel manager and his staff in December 2004, loaning the
hotel a walk-through metal detector with training: Hotel
management now screens hotel staff when they report to work
as they enter the hotel staff entrance. EAC members also
noted the relative hardness of the Sheraton Hotel, which has
more then 100 feet of standoff, armed sentries on the
perimeter and chemical explosive and walk-through metal
detector screening of guests and employees. RSO advised EAC
members that he last met with MOI regarding the Sheraton,s
perimeter security in October 2004, to discuss improvements
in internal security and vigilance on the part of ROYG at the
Sheraton Hotel. Additionally, EAC members were made aware of
recent upgrades to the perimeter wall to include
re-stationing of a 10 man crew manning a Toyota truck mounted
heavy machine gun on the perimeter and repairs that have been
made to gaps in the hotel perimeter wall reducing the threat
of intruders.

- Based on RMAS and EAC concerns, RSO will emphasize the
maintenance of alert and aggressive MOI elements on the
Sheraton hotel's perimeter as well as ask for continued
scrutiny by senior ROYG officials on the training, equipping
and competence of PSO security personnel working within the
interior of the hotel, to prevent unauthorized vehicles from
approaching the hotel and intruders in the interior. (RSO
Comment: The RSO currently works with the hotel management,
Sheraton Guards and MOI elements to provide explosive
detection screening of vehicles and packages approaching the
hotel perimeter and augments spot patrols of the hotel
grounds to detect security anomalies. Additionally, RSO met
with hotel management in November to discuss the hiring and
screening practices of hotel staff focusing on long-term
employees with good records as well as vetting of recent
hires with the goal of preventing criminals, access to
internal hotel operations).

- EAC members discussed Tourist City and noted that a
non-governmental development program contracted by USAID
operates out of office space on the compound and three
individuals reside on the compound. RSO briefed EAC members
about problems with current perimeter security at Tourist
City, created by property management's use of three gates
from where numerous persons enter and exit throughout the day
to include: Residents, health club members, and person
patronizing the bar and disco known as the Russian Club.
(RSO Comment: Tourist City is a Ministry of Defense property
and gate guards are from the MOD not the MOI, limiting RSO's
ability to conduct low level liaison with MOD officials
responsible for the compound. Post policy has prevented
clusters of USG personnel from residing on Tourist City for
the past year, requiring RSO concurrence to reside in Tourist
City, due to the inability of the MOB to properly screen the
public coming and going from the Tourist City compound.
USAID contracted office space at Tourist City recently posted
a guard and installed metal, locking doors at the entrance to
reduce the possibility of an intruder - however, no stand-off
currently exists on the office space perimeter).


4. (SBU) RSO briefed the Core EAC about a more formalized
procedure, per COM guidance, that will be forthcoming
requiring a written request, RSO survey and COM approval for
anyone wishing to hold a large event at a soft-target site
off of the Embassy compound. This procedure will ensure a
carefully documented review and appropriate MOI participation
of soft target events preventing haphazard clustering of
Americans that could result in a mass casualty.


5. (S/NF) RSO briefed the EAC on a recent incident in which
the Surveillance Detection Team spotted a suspicious vehicle
using Saudi plates, following an Employee shuttle after the
van departed the Embassy compound. The suspicious vehicle
followed the shuttle for a few miles down the road before
dropping off. EAC members were informed that RSO
Surveillance Detection assets have focused on the Embassy
shuttle van since November 2004, with only the above reported
incident. (RSO Comment: The information was provided to MOI
for investigative follow-up but RSO has received no results
from the MOI. RMAS has been informed.)


6. (S/NF) DCM inquired as to whether Hadda Compound used an
itemizer chemical explosive detection system. RSO informed
the EAC that Hadda Compound did have an "itemizer" owned by
an International Oil Company that was purchased for
protecting Hadda Compound. However, the system was not
functional until last week when the Diplomatic Security
Engineering Security Officer provided technical advice, which
has made the system operational again. RMAS suggested the
post look into the possibility of using sniffing dogs as
explosive detectors.


7. (SBU) EAC members were informed that measurements were
ongoing for the installation of heavy-duty safe haven doors
in each house (bedroom or other designated internal area).
Also, the RSO is surveying each residence to provide upgrades
where necessary, in locking hardware on external doors as
well as safe-haven doors. EAC members discussed the fact
that westerners that do not have a 24/7 guard presence, as do
American Embassy officers, suffer a high degree of crimes to
include breaking and entering against their residences. The
EAC expects crime to rise in Yemen as oil prices raise as a
result of planned removal of subsidies on fuel prices and a
continued decline in national oil revenues.


8. (S/NF) EAC members were advised that an Embassy committee
was meeting on February 8th, to address ongoing concerns
about the lack of operational radios for the LGF in Sanaa.
(RSO Comment: MO is pursuing with difficulty UHF radio
frequencies for a LGF radio upgrade to support 117K USD in DS
funded radio hardware. Currently, the LGF radio program is
on an unauthorized VHF system that is not functioning for
most residents). Radio operations in Sanaa are extremely
difficult due to ROYG paranoia and harassment regarding the
placement of repeaters within Sanaa.


9. (S/NF) The DCM and EAC tabled, for an upcoming EAC
meeting, a review of security surrounding the Russian Club, a
bar and disco located at Tourist City and frequented by the
international community; Also tabled for an expanded EAC
meeting was a review of the use of diplomatic CD 7 tags by
American Embassy officers. Embassy policy had restricted use
of diplomatic tags on American Embassy vehicles, but ongoing
difficulty in getting private/local "blue" tags has put
pressure on the Management Office to release cars to officers
with diplomatic tags while waiting for ROYG to issue private
plates. EAC members noted that diplomatic license plates may
have drawn the attention of Ali Hasan Al-Mas, the Yemeni man
who attempted to carry out an attack at a residence where
U.S. diplomats were gathered, during his casing activity.


10. (S/NF) Based on RMAS and EAC threat concerns, RSO will
request a meeting with MOI and PSO officials over the next
week to review security programs for the Embassy community
focusing especially on the Sheraton Hotel, Tourist City,
locations off the Embassy compound where large numbers of
Americans gather as well as the employee shuttle.


















Krajeski