Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA2414
2005-08-21 10:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

WHERE DOES ISLAH'S HEART LIE?

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER KISL KDEM KMPI KMCA YM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002414 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

PINR: C-NE5-00281

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KISL KDEM KMPI KMCA YM
SUBJECT: WHERE DOES ISLAH'S HEART LIE?

REF: A. SANAA 1723

B. SANAA 542

C. SANNA 1782

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002414

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

PINR: C-NE5-00281

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KISL KDEM KMPI KMCA YM
SUBJECT: WHERE DOES ISLAH'S HEART LIE?

REF: A. SANAA 1723

B. SANAA 542

C. SANNA 1782

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: With the 2006 Presidential and Local Council
elections fast approaching, the Yemeni Congregation for
Reform, or "Islah" is taking center stage in Yemeni politics.
Islah is a coalition of northern tribal interests and the
Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB). The party boasts the
highest membership of any other political party in Yemen,
including the ruling General Peoples Conference (GPC). As
both tribal and Islamist, it is difficult to pinpoint where
Islah lies on the ideological spectrum. Insiders point out
that Islah's moderate characteristics come from the
traditionally peaceful Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB). The
YMB's more radical elements also affect party behavior from
time to time. Many observers maintain that Islah is
motivated more by tribal and political interests than
religion. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Islah holds 45 out of 301 seats in Parliament.
Although difficult to confirm, the party's leadership claims
to have between 800,000 to one million members. The party's
support is steadily growing among the young, religious
conservatives, moderate, reform-driven intellectuals, women
and (quietly) even from GPC party members. Geographically,
the party's support is strongest in the industrial city of
Taiz, the central region surrounding the towns of Ibb and
Jibla, and in powerful tribal pockets of the north.
Recently, the party has gained members from the Yemen
Socialist Party (YSP) in Aden, most likely a result of
Islah's social programs and the southward migration of
Islahis. Islah lacks strong support from Yemen's Zaydi
population, concentrated in the north and west of the country
(ref. A).

-------------- -
The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood: Mostly Moderate
-------------- -


3. (SBU) Islah was formed in 1990 as a coalition of northern
tribal leaders led by the Hashid tribal confederation and its

paramount chief, Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Abdullah
al-Ahmar and the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB). Sheikhs
Yassin Abdullah and Abdul Majid Zindani founded the Yemeni
Muslim Brotherhood (YMB) twenty years earlier in Taiz. In
its early years, the YMB was funded by Saudi Arabia and
spread it ideas through the Yemeni educational system,
heavily reliant on Egyptian teachers, many of whom were
affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The YMB has
always officially rejected violence, advocated democratic
change and believed that any political system chosen by a
Muslim community is religiously acceptable. Nevertheless,
there are Islahis associated with the YMB who espouse a more
radical and militant brand of Islam.


4. (C) Within Islah today, the emerging, though not
controlling, faction consits of the moderate reformers.
Their influence can be seen in Islah's platform that mandates
"democracy bound by Islamic teachings," as well as in the
opposition coalition Joint Meetings Party (JMP) whose Islah
representative is Political Director Mohammed Qahtan.
Discussions with influential Islahis always center on the
need for a "peaceful struggle" to achieve a democratic and
non-corrupt state (ref. B). In addition to Qahtan, leading
Islahi moderates include the current SYG Mohammed Abdullah
Yadoumi, Assistant SYG Abdul Wahab al-Anisi, Economic Chief
Mohammed al-Affendi, Planning Chief Mohammed al-Saidid and
journalist Nabil as-Sufi. They are not, however, party Chief
al-Ahmar's inner circle responsible for Islah's relationship
with President Saleh and the ROYG.


5. (C) Islah's moderate reformers are usually well-educated
technocrats who espouse a more moderate ideology than Islah's
core leadership. Although not social liberals, their
positions are left of al-Ahmar and his inner circle on
economic reform, political freedoms, human rights and women's
issues. They also repeatedly express outright rejection of a
strict application of Sharia Law. Most recently, the
moderate reformers were responsible for Islah's block vote in
Parliament favoring a bill limiting al-Ahmar's tenure as
Speaker (Ref C). Leading moderate Islahi MPs include French
educated Dr. Abdul Rahman Ba Fadhl, Abdul Razak al-Hajri, Ali
Ashal and Ali Annsi.

--------------
Is Secularism a Front?
--------------


6. (C) Radical fundamentalism permeates Islah through a small
but vocal faction. During the 1994 Civil war, Islahi Shura
Council member Imam Abd al-Wahab al-Dailimi issued a Fatwa to
northern troops sanctioning the pillage of "secular,
anti-Islamic" southern cities. Deputy Chairman of the
Supreme Committee, Yassin Abdul Majid al Qubati, the
reclusive spiritual head of Islah, is also a religious
fundamentalist. In the countryside, particularly around Ibb
and Jibla, residents regularly complain about religious
Islahis pressing the authorities to enforce a stricter
interpretation of Sharia. They also recall how, when the
Islahis controlled the educational system, fundamentalist
teachings were mandated in schools.


7. (C) Some believe that the YMB's fundamentalist side
extends to more than just a small faction of the party. Dr.
Saif Asali, a former Deputy Minster of Finance who left Islah
in 2003, claims that the YMB (and by extension Islah's
leadership) ultimately aims to establish an Islamic
government in Yemen. He asserts Islah's leadership practices
a carefully orchestrated "dualism," speaking of moderation to
the West while preaching radical doctrine in the mosques.
NDI Democratic Development Director Dr. Saad Talib disagrees
with Asali. Talib contends that that while there may be a
radical element within Islah, it is not the controlling
faction.

--------------
Zindani and the Salafis
--------------


8. (C) Another Islahi fundamentalist faction is led by Sheikh
Abdul Majid al-Zindani, a charismatic anti-American Salafi
Imam designated as a terrorist financier by the US Department
of Treasury and UN Security Council. Zindani is the Chairman
of the Islah Shura Council, the body responsible for forming
Islah's platform and confirming its leadership. Many claim
that this position gives him veto power over party policy.
Talib disagrees. He claims that the emerging moderates have
clearly eroded Zindani's power in the Shura Council and
points to Islah permitting women's participation in the Shura
Council over Zindani's objections as an example. Moderate
Islahis confide in private that Zindani is a "burden" on the
party.


9. (C) Conservative Salafi Islam rejects Islamic
interpretations formulated three generations after prophet
Mohammed's death. Salafis also vehemently oppose Shi'a
Islam. The number of Salafis in Islah is unknown, although
Asali estimates that they compose less than one percent of
the party's membership. Sufi concurs, holding that the
Zindani faction's influence on Islah is negligible.

--------------
Islah's Secular Politics
--------------


10. (C) Although it is Yemen's primary Islamic party, its
day-to-day dealings appear driven by practical politics and a
secularly based democratic and economic reform agenda. "The
biggest secret about Islah," says UN Advisor to the Ministry
of Human Rights El-Obaid el-Obaid, "is that just like the GPC
it is driven by political and tribal interests and, also like
the GPC, on most issues has no ideology at all." Sufi agrees
noting, "If you look at our platforms and papers, you will
see that religion really has nothing to do with the
decision-making process. We are purely a political machine."
Indeed, Islah's positions on economic and legal reform never
mention religion or Sharia. In Parliament, Islahi MPs rarely
turn to Sharia as a basis for their arguments.


11. (C) Islah's interest-based pragmatic politics can
ultimately be attributed to Party Chief al-Ahmar and Yemen's
tribal traditions. Al-Ahmar heads the party's fifteen-member
Supreme Committee and has the final say on much of the
party's agenda. Many also say that al-Ahmar, who clearly
does not belong to any of Islah's Islamist camps, balances
the party. Talib calls al-Ahmar the "hypocritical" side of
Islah. "The Brotherhood needs al-Ahmar's protection from a
possible crackdown, so you will never hear Islah condemning
the well-known corruption of the tribes or al-Ahmar's sons
who run his lucrative businesses despite Islah's
anti-corruption platform." Insiders overwhelmingly agree
that al-Ahmar is not popular among the party's rank and file,
who see him as President Saleh's tribal Sheikh and ultimately
part of the regime.

--------------
Moderate Reformers: Islah's Best Hope
--------------


12. (C) Although a more cohesive party than the GPC, Islah is
still more a marriage of convenience between the YMB and
tribal (including regime) interests. For now, Islah's
different factions are united in their focus -- to strengthen
their position in order to become a more effective opposition
in upcoming elections. The moderate reformers, who in a
short time have managed to effectively lobby for their agenda
within the party, have been the most successful element in
this effort of late. These moderates oppose al-Ahmar, whom
they accuse of allowing Saleh to control the party. However,
they need al-Ahmar for the moment to provide both
constituents and protection against an outright political
attack by the ROYG.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Islah's moderate reformers are currently the only
group with the potential to create an effective,
democratically run political party with any hope of being
elected to power. That this group is seen as Islah's best
hope is reflected in the quiet support they receive from
moderates within the GPC. Reform-minded, western educated
technocrats within the ROYG (and therefore members of the
GPC),show their subtle support by pressing their western
interlocutors to get to know these Islahi progressives.
Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman, a strong supporter of
reform and a key embassy contact, has repeatedly pressed us
to seek the participation of Islahi moderates in USG-funded
regional training and conferences on democratic reform. That
Noman would make such suggestions, despite President Saleh's
continued protestations to Ambassador on emboffs frequent
meetings with opposition elements, demonstrates the strength
of his belief that moderates within Islah can play an
important role in implementing the democratic and economic
reforms necessary for Yemenis to have a better future. End
Comment.
Krajeski