EXBS ADVISOR VISIT AND PROGRAM STRATEGY JULY, 2005

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 SANAA 002317

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SUBJECT: EXBS ADVISOR VISIT AND PROGRAM STRATEGY JULY, 2005

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (U) SUMMARY. During the period July 9-19, 2005, Export
Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) Advisor met with
Yemeni officials and principal Embassy staff to discuss the
current state of EXBS in Yemen. Advisor met with senior
representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the Yemen and
Aden Free Zone Public Authority, the Coast Guard, the Border
Guards, the National Atomic Energy Commission and the port
officials in Aden and Hodeidah. The Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG)
provides excellent support to the traditional EXBS program.
Other Yemeni organizations would like to replicate the
success of the YCG and are anxious to receive EXBS assistance
in training and equipment procurement. END SUMMARY.

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MEETING SUMMARIES
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2. (U) On July 9-19, EXBS Advisor met with principal US
Embassy staff to discuss the state of EXBS in Yemen. Salient
points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

As in other countries of the region, EXBS infrastructure is
lacking in Yemen. Border Guards and Customs are undermanned,
ill equipped, and generally poorly trained. These
deficiencies are exacerbated by prevalent corruption.

Due to the long-term presence of a US Coast Guard Liaison
Officer, (CAPT Robert D. Innes, USCG, US Maritime Advisor
Southwest Asia/East Africa,) the YCG has developed into a
professional service that forms the backbone of the Yemeni
Export Controls System. The YCG has traditional missions of
maritime security, safety, protection of the environment,
movement and development of maritime traffic, and a coastal
national defense role. The YCG differs from the USCG in five
ways: (1) it has no ice breaking mission, (2) it is not the
lead agency for search and rescue (this is the charter of the
Ministry of Transportation),(3) it has no repair or
maintenance role with respect to buoys and light houses, (4)
it has no regulatory role and (5) it has no customs role.

The YCG is under the Ministry of Interior and as such has
arrest authority. Its officers and sailors are law
enforcement officers with responsibilities and authorities
that end at the shoreline.

The YCG has received significant support from the US as well
as European and Asian allied states.

The success of the YCG is the envy of the Yemeni government.
Current discussions among various Yemeni officials are
exploring the possibility of facilitating the replication of
this success with a specialized Border Guard element and a
cleaned-up and modernized customs service. Yemeni officials
are aware one of the main reasons the YCG was effective in
developing into a professional service was because a resident
USCG expert helped prepare a detailed and realistic ten year
development plan with achievable milestones.

Country team believes similar development among the border
guard and customs elements of Yemen can be enhanced by the
presence of a resident subject matter expert (perhaps from
DHS-CPB) who will work with the Yemenis on a day-to-day basis
as CAPT Innes did with the YCG.


3. (U) On July 12, EXBS Advisor met with the following
officials of the Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior:
Brigadier General Ali A. Rasa,a, Chairman (Commander);
Brigadier General Saleh A. Mujally, Vice Chairman (Deputy
Commander); Colonel Ali M. Alsubhi, General Operations
Manager and Colonel Fouad S. S. Ba-Suliman, Director of
Communications. Salient points of subsequent conversation
were as follows:

The Yemeni ports are the &door to the world8 for Yemen and
its citizens. Maritime controls will have the most immediate
effect in terms of creating a viable and effective export
controls system. Once maritime controls are in place then
Yemeni officials should give attention to creating similar
capacity to secure land borders and then commercial land
portals. An integrated national maritime operations network
will provide the best means to monitor the majority of
movements of both cargo and persons into and out of Yemen.

The Yemen government expects to create similar systems of
control for Yemeni airspace and land borders.

The YCG has received substantial support for the US and other
allied naval and coast guard services.
The YCG still needs assistance in the following areas:
a. Communications Equipment
b. Classroom furniture and teaching Aids for YCG Academy
c. Spare parts and tools for fleet maintenance
d. Portable buildings for offices and billeting at
existing and future operational bases
e. Computer network for operations center in Sana,a and
the planned district operations centers in
Hodeidah Aden, Mukalla, Al-Salif, Al-Mokha, and Bir
Ali
f. Permanent piers at select operational sites

The YCG has adopted the USCG doctrine of making engineering
and logistics the driving force and basis for design of force
structure and operations. To continue their export controls
mission, the YCG will need additional logistical support in
terms of upgraded boats/ships and maintenance equipment to
maintain inventory and prolong operational life of the fleet.
In addition to equipment, tools and perishable supplies, the
YCG needs experienced enlisted technicians, mechanics,
machinists and supply specialists to come to Yemen on
extended assignment to teach their enlisted counterparts the
practices and procedures that will lengthen the serviceable
life of the fleet.

The Yemeni government is using the YCG as a model for export
controls and related security organization on a national
level and with regional allies such as Kenya, Djibouti and
Eritrea.


4. (U) On July 12, EXBS Advisor met with Brigadier General
Abdul Illah Atif, Director (Commander) of the Border Guards,
Ministry of Defense. Salient points of subsequent
conversation were as follows:

The Border Guards (BG) is a 1700 man paramilitary unit
charged with patrolling and securing the land borders and
select coastal regions. Effectiveness in the north and
northeast tribal areas is problematic due to the influence
and control of tribal leaders and the ruggedness of the
mountain and desert terrain.

Some cooperation with Saudi officials occurs along common
land borders.

In the past, the BG recruited members from the tribal areas
to assist in improving their operational success in the
tribal regions. This practice has now stopped. The BG does
not have a professional recruitment process.

The BG requested assistance in the following areas:

a. Prefabricated buildings for Border posts
b. Generators for power at border facilities
c. Communications Equipment
d. Patrol vehicles
e. Optic, including binoculars, night vision and static
sensors, and
f. Training for border operations




5. (U) On July 13, EXBS Advisor met with the following
officials of the National Atomic Energy Commission (NATEC),
Dr. Moustafa Yahia Bahran, Science and Technology Advisor to
the President and Chairman of the NATEC and Eng. Khaled
Abdullah Al-Ahmed, Director General Registration, Licensing
and Radiation Inspection Directorate. Salient points of
subsequent conversation were as follows:

The Yemeni government is currently reviewing a law to
transfer the charter for radiological and nuclear licensing
from the Ministry of Health to NATEC. Most of these sources
are medical and dental in nature. A few sources are resident
in the physics laboratories of Sana,a University.

NATEC has 13 personnel certified by an IAEA sponsored program
resident at the University of Damascus.

IAEA has chosen Yemen as a regional center for its programs
and nonproliferation initiatives. In May, NATEC hosted the
first workshops for &RIAS III,8 the IAEA Regulatory
Authority Information System.

Yemen claims to have an &excellent8 control system for
radiological sources since there are only 200 sources in
country. Yemen has no graveyard, for depleted sources.
All depleted sources are re-exported to original suppliers.

The Yemen Government and NATEC are currently reviewing a
proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Department
of Energy concerning the placement of specialized monitoring
equipment at the ports of Aden and Hodeidah, the
international airports of Sana,a and Aden and the northern
land border crossing with Saudi Arabia located at Harath.
According to a scientific study conducted by NATEC, placement
of proper equipment at these sites will address &80% of the
problem.8 (NOTE: Although NATEC assertion of 80% coverage
of the problem may be true, this is only 80% of the potential
radiological, problem since the sensors in question will
not detect other substances of concern and the current border
security and customs elements appear, according to country
team, to be ineffective and inconsistent in their assigned
roles.)

NATEC had a detailed and phased plan for development and
implementation of a national radiological detection
infrastructure. Officials of NATEC are willing to discuss
this plan in detail with US officials of the Department of
Energy subsequent to appropriate request and approval of
official exchange of information.

NATEC is concerned about the possibility of storage and/or
transshipment of radiological/nuclear items or related
dual-use technology in or through Yemen. Officials of NATEC
believe there is troubling &linkage8 between the illicit
drugs trade, scam marketing of Red Mercury, and smuggling
infrastructure that could be used to smuggle radiological
materials or other WMD or related technology.

At some point in the future as Yemeni oil reserves are
depleted, Yemen may need to invite representatives from the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Yemen to discuss
policies and procedures for peaceful use of nuclear power for
generation of electricity.


6. (U) On July 13, EXBS Advisor met with Brigadier General
Ahmed Al-Sunidar, Director General of the Office of the
Interior Minister, Ministry of Interior. Salient points of
subsequent conversation were as follows:

The national priority is to complete the plan for coastal
security begun by the YCG.

The Ministry is considering creation of an elite Border Guard
element to replace the existing Ministry of Defense Border
Guards. Should the ministry stand up this unit, it intends
to use the YCG model to create a professional, trustworthy
and efficient border element to mirror the maritime success
of the YCG. The Ministry may want to begin with a 100-man
unit and deploy to select sites along the border as a proof
of principle.,

(NOTE: Should the Ministry of Interior proceed with this
plan to create an elite land-based law Enforcement element to
mirror the YCG, EXBS support can be leveraged if an
appropriate U.S. subject matter expert is assigned to Yemen
for two to three years to assist in the establishment of a
viable border protection element from the ground up.)


7. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured the port of Aden and
met with the following officials of the Aden District, Coast
Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior: Staff Colonel Lotf A.

H. Al-Baraty, General Director (Commander); Major Shugaa,
Operations Officer and other select staff members not
identified by name or title. Salient points of subsequent
conversation were as follows:

At present, YCG patrol zones generally extend to ten miles
but the YCG would like to increase that distance to monitor
maritime smuggling more effectively. To increase the patrol
zone, the YCG needs larger vessels than those now in inventory

The YCG needs logistical support, both in terms of equipment
and resident technicians, mechanics and machinists to train
the YCG enlisted cadre.

Some Evinrude outboard engines have proven to be consistently
unreliable, while Yamaha model 200 outboard motors have
endured the operational requirements well. (Note: EXBS
Advisor will provide photographs of respective motors to
NP/ECC under separate cover.)

Some basic search and rescue equipment is available in
inventory but personnel need additional training in S&R
operations.


8. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured the Aden container
terminal and met with the following officials: Mr. Kor Ler
Hian, General Manager/Senior Manager (Engineering),OPM Aden,
Aden Container Terminal and Mr. Adnan M. O. Al-Kaff, Director
for Corporate Affairs and Senior Manager-Human Resources, OPM
Aden, Aden Container Terminal. Salient points of subsequent
conversation were as follows:


No checks on transshipments currently exist. Yemeni Customs
seals the container before entry into the terminal and no one
opens them again. The Container Terminal operations
personnel only check for unbroken seals and correct paperwork.

Less than 1% of the terminal cargo goes to the United States.
The U.S. provides no significant imports to Yemen via the
terminal. Most of the terminal traffic is imports to Yemen,
much of which is foodstuffs and textiles.

Most truckers belong to small and privately owned companies.
Yemeni and port security screen all truckers before they
enter the port facility and then again before they enter the
container terminal. Companies with multiple trucks apply for
driver passes for their employees. Private truckers apply on
their own.

Night security at the container terminal includes lights,
cameras, a two-meter fence, and roving unarmed guards.

Existing protocols for handling a &problem container8 are
written and practiced. The specific problem or alert, on
the container dictates if the terminal officials contact the
YCG or other specialized elements of the Ministry of Interior
and the Yemeni security services.
Occasionally jurisdictional confusion in the port and the
terminal complicates operations since the Free Zone Security
reports to the Free Zone Manager and other governmental
elements, including the YCG, report to the Ministry of
Interior and the office of the Governor of Aden.

There is little incentive for authorities to invest in the
Free Zone since investment undermines profitable smuggling
activity.

The terminal needs to improve its security in terms of an
ability to scan containers for illicit radiological, chemical
and biological materials and related technology or components.

(NOTE: The Container terminal is modern. Equipment is new.
Design of the Terminal lends itself to application and
installation of chokepoint sensor arrays.,)


9. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured met with the
following officials of the Yemen Free Zone Public Authority
(YFZPA),located in Aden: Dr. Mohammad Hamood Alwadan, Vice
Chairman, YFZPA and Mr. Mohammad M. Zemam, Manager, Port
Cities Development Program, YFZPA. Salient points of
subsequent conversation were as follows:

Dubai Ports International (DPI) out of Dubai, United Arab
Emirates is the developer of YFZPA. Development plans exist
to link the container terminal to the international airport
to improve processing of air cargo.

Aden is not off the &ports at risk list.8 (NOTE: YFZPA
did not identify the exact list referenced, but given the
context of their comment it is probably a port/shipping risk
list prepared by shipping insurance companies such as Lloyds
of London.)

YFZPA is seeking individual investors to handle development
of specific sectors of the free zone to include tourism,
heavy industry and manufacturing, shipping, recycling and
petro-chemical storage and refinement.

The steel recycling plant is due to open in late August 2005.

(NOTE: Dr. Alwadan provided Advisor an English copy of the
Free Zone law No 4 of the year 1993 and a copy of the YFZPA
2004 Aden Free Zone Facilities and Incentives/Investment &
Development Opportunities Brochure.)


10. (C) On July 18, EXBS Advisor met with Mr. Basher
Bashaheel, Operating Manager, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, (the only
independent daily newspaper in Yemen.) Salient points of
subsequent conversation were as follows:

Smuggling of diesel fuel is big business in Aden. According
to investigative reporting, smugglers typically buy fuel at
$120 per ton and sell it for $425 per ton.

An organized criminal element controls all facets of the
supply chain in the port of Aden.

English-Arabic translation of shipping documentation is a
&magnet8 for corruption. Pay the right person and the
documentation can say anything it needs to say. There are
few existing checks and balances for translation verses
reality of cargo.

Many are of the opinion that the Yemeni Customs is the single
worst obstacle to foreign investment due to their rampant
corruption.

The commercial courts need a "major overhaul." Citizens need
to have the right to sue government officials and Ministers
need to be accountable to institutions and the public.

Omani officials are willing to work closely with Yemeni
officials to improve border security. Perhaps the Yemeni
government could use future success along the Omani-Yemeni
border to build a model for border operations and improve the
security along the northern border with Saudi Arabia in the
Harath region.


11. (U) On July 19, EXBS Advisor toured the port of
Hodeidah and met with the following officials: Colonel
Abdulla Al-Hamadani, Director General of Security ) Hodeidah
Port, Hodeidah District, Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of
Interior and Mr. Musa Dal Mohneg (sic),Yemeni Governmental
Manager of the Hodeidah Container Terminal and other select
staff members not identified by name or title. Salient points
of subsequent conversation were as follows:

Cargo entering the port is mainly grain, wood and iron for
internal Yemeni consumption.

(NOTE: Port facilities appear to be 15-20 years old and in a
general state of disrepair and visible decline. Advisor saw
no evidence of recent capital improvement in the port or its
facilities.)


12. (C) On July 19, EXBS Advisor intended to tour the
Harath border crossing, but the trip was cancelled due to a
country-wide ROYG ban on diplomatic travel for security
reasons. (NOTE: On July 20, 2005, riot erupted at several
locations in Yemen due to government cessation of fuel
subsidies.)

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EXBS COUNTRY STRATEGY
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13. Following meetings, tours and extensive discussions with
Yemeni and U.S officials, Advisor recommends the following
strategy for EXBS in Yemen:

A. (U) Fund acquisition and installation of computer
equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard National Operations
Center at its headquarters in Sana,a. This project would
cost around $100,000 and would cover approximately 100
workstations, 6 servers, situation monitors and related
cabling or wireless connections. The six servers would be
dedicated to classified and unclassified nodes of the
operation center,s communications, email and applications.
Embassy has identified a trusted and competent contractor,
which has done excellent work on behalf of the Embassy on
other projects. This operations center would provide the
automated infrastructure for the YCG to perform its EXBS
mission. The existence of this center would then provide the
Yemen government a model on which to build an effective
land-based export controls and related border security
element.


B. (C) Due to existing complications of jurisdiction and
localized control in the northern tribal areas. EXBS should
insist border monitoring sensors be placed on the Saudi side
of the border where they are more likely to be protected from
damage or theft. Assistance programs can augment a
Saudi-side sensor array system with a mid-size and non-lethal
unmanned remote piloted vehicle system such as the Hunter
vehicle on the Yemeni side of the border. After appropriate
training, an appropriate element like the border guard/law
enforcement unit the Ministry of Interior is considering
could operate and secure the system. The system could
effectively monitor corridors of ingress and regress
identified with smuggling operations. The product of such a
system could be linked to a Yemeni Quick Reaction Law
Enforcement unit empowered to respond, seal a localized area,
seize as appropriate and extract before smuggling or tribal
forces could mass and respond. The product of this system
could also easily be rendered omni-directional, ensuring
U.S. capability to monitor the take.,

C. (U) Due to the unique challenges of the Yemeni land
borders, success in the creation of a land-based export
controls and related border security element will be enhanced
by the long-term presence of a resident subject matter expert
familiar with border operations and state-of-the art
technology such as the Hunter system. Advisor recommends the
interagency group seriously consider funding such a position.
Advisor also recommend such an individual be capable and
willing to spend extended periods in the field with Yemen
units. Advisor further suggests this expert be someone who
has successfully performed in the EPIC/JTF6 environment and
who is familiar with both the technological and human
challenges of maintaining effective border security
operations along an extensive and rugged land border.


D. (C) Some training for Yemen elements may be more
effectively and efficiently conducted via Jordanian
joint-training facilities. Advisor recommends EXBS explore
this option.


E. (C) Cooperation between Saudi and Yemeni officials has
historically been difficult, but, it may be possible to
engage Saudi Arabia in the EXBS arena by proposing they erect
a border monitoring sensor array and share the take, with
Yemeni officials in return for the Yemeni officials sharing
their take, from the Hunter)type system. Perhaps, Yemen
can make similar arrangements with Oman, i.e., have the
Omanis place static sensor arrays on their side of the border
and then exchange the product of both the static and URPV
systems between relevant EXBS elements in Oman and Yemen.


F. (U) Facilitate U.S. Department of Energy CORE/SLD Program
and MEGAPORTS Initiative engagement with Yemen and its NATEC.

G.(U) Once the YCG is established, a mirror land-based EXBS
element in place and the NATEC monitoring infrastructure up
and running, Embassy officials can develop appropriate policy
discussions with Yemeni officials on the reform of the
Customs service and EXBS can stand ready to support a
reformed Customs service, providing relevant training and
equipment to control the commercial portals of Yemen.


14. (U) Any questions or comments can be directed to Joseph

C. Irvine, EXBS Advisor to Jordan & the Middle East,
Telephone:(962 6) 590-6550/6558, Fax: (962 6) 592-7653,
Email: IrvineJC@state.gov.


15. (U) Cable cleared by Joseph Irvine, AMEMBASSY Jordan.
Krajeski