Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA2032
2005-07-26 13:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SALEH'S WITHDRAWAL: TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN?

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002032 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM KMCA KMPI YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: SALEH'S WITHDRAWAL: TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN?

REF: A. SANAA 1910

B. SANAA 1571

Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002032

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM KMCA KMPI YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: SALEH'S WITHDRAWAL: TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN?

REF: A. SANAA 1910

B. SANAA 1571

Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. President Saleh shocked many with his July 17
announcement that he would not be a candidate for reelection
in 2006. His statement came days before the ROYG's decision
to implement unpopular economic reforms resulting in hikes in
oil and gas prices of over fifty percent. While recent riots
have detracted attention from the President's surprise
announcement, the question in political circles around the
country remains whether or not Saleh is really serious and,
if not, what is he up to? End Summary.

--------------
Can Saleh Be Serious?
--------------


2. (C) During a speech commemorating his 27 years in power,
President Saleh stunned an audience of 1200 ministers,
officials, tribal leaders and foreign diplomats on July 17 by
announcing that he would not be a candidate for reelection in

2006. "It is time for the youth to step forward, proclaimed
Saleh. "I will support any person from any party who believes
he is able to rule the country but I will not nominate
myself." CDA, present at the event, described the audience's
murmurs of dissent with one man shouting out "No, this can't
be! You can't leave us!" (ref A). Western diplomats chatted
afterwards, and their consensus was that Saleh was bluffing.

--------------
Probably Not, So What's He Up To...?
--------------


3. (C) Serious political observers are skeptical, as was Post
when Saleh told the Ambassador last month that he was old and
tired and might not run in 2006. "Yemen is not an easy
country to govern," complained Saleh, "it is like dancing in
a circle of snakes." (ref B). While Saleh can certainly be
unpredictable, it is highly unlikely that he would step down
from power at a time when he is still very healthy and very
much in charge. So, what is he up to?

-------------- --------------
...Deflecting Blame For Painful Economic Measures
-------------- --------------



3. (C) The timing of Saleh's announcement, not long before
the lifting of oil subsidies and ensuing unrest, may suggest
that he was trying to distance himself from the reform
package. From the beginning, the ROYG has refused to take
ownership of the IMF-WB recommended reforms, failing to
properly lobby Parliament for passage or to explain the
long-term economic benefits to the Yemeni people. Many
observers suggest that Saleh hopes to blame others for the
painful measures, and use the public outcry to get rid of
unpopular Prime Minister Bajammal, and possibly other
ministers.

--------------
...Setting The Stage for His Son
--------------


4. (C) Saleh's reference in his speech to handing over the
reigns to Yemen's youth has led some to claim his motivation
is to lay the groundwork for his son, Commander of the
Republican Guard Ahmed Ali Saleh, to assume the Presidency.
Ahmed Ali figures strongly into any succession scenario, but
this theory does little to explain Saleh's recent move.
Ahmed Ali will be 36 in September 2006, but the Yemeni
Constitution stipulates a President must be 40 years of age
or above. In a non-emergency situation, the Yemeni
opposition and public would probably oppose strongly a
constitutional amendment simply to allow for a Ahmed Ali
candidacy in 2006. If Saleh is indeed intent on installing
his son in power, he is not likely to set him up with such a
divisive and inauspicious beginning.

--------------
...Calling the Opposition's Bluff
--------------


5. (C) Although the ROYG may have been caught off guard by
the violence and looting, significant public protest of the
price hikes was anticipated. It is possible Saleh's
announcement was meant to call the opposition's bluff to run
its own candidate, pressing home the point(by stopping the
violence and then partially acceding to popular demands) that
not only is he the only viable leader, but the only one
capable of restoring and maintaining order in a crisis.


6. (C) Saleh's surprise announcement also coincides with the
anticipated release of the opposition's Joint Meeting Party
(JMP) coalition reform program, promised to be the first step
in announcing a JMP candidate for President. By withdrawing
from the race 14 months before the elections, Saleh may be
trying to cripple his already weak opposition by calling
their bluff, knowing full well they will be unable to
nominate a viable candidate. What Saleh and many local
observers expect is that rather than fielding their own
candidate, that the opposition will actually nominate Saleh
(as Islah did in the last election).

--------------
...Rising Above Politics and Saving the Day
--------------


7. (C) The public lacks trust in the ROYG and fears
additional public revenue gained by lifting subsidies will be
lost to official corruption. Saleh, we are told, has already
succumb somewhat to public and tribal pressure, having
decided, we believe, to partially rescind the price hikes.
Some suggest he would do well to resign from the ruling GPC
party and run as a populist candidate.

--------------
The Opposition Responds
--------------


8. (C) Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) representative to the JMP
opposition coalition Abdul Ghani Khader shared his view with
Emboffs on July 24. Khader pointed out that Yemen lacks the
institutions necessary for a democratic transition. "Saleh
knows this," he said. "He is sending a message to the people
that it is either me or the flood. This whole thing is a
lie," continued Khader. "Saleh knows there is no real
opposition."


9. (C) Islah's JMP representative Mohammed Qahtan also shared
with us his party's thinking. "It was a surprise and we are
still making up our minds as to why he did it," said Qahtan,
adding that some within the party believe the President is
sincere. "Regardless of Saleh's motive and sincerity,"
Qahtan explained, "Islah is looking for anything we can do
to make it real." As for JMP prospects for 2006, Qahtan
confided that the coalition has yet to find a candidate, but,
"Even if we did, and he won, the state (read: military) would
not obey him."

--------------
Shaming Saleh into Making Good On His Word
--------------


10. (C) The ray of hope for pro-democracy advocates is that
Saleh will be pressured into standing by his statement.
Egyptian opposition "al-Ghad" leader Aiman Noor reportedly
telephoned Saleh urging him not to retract his decision as it
would "close all doors for peaceful reform." Other Yemeni
and Arab journalists are trying to embarrass Saleh into
standing by his statement by commending him as a "historical
Arab leader" and urging him not to nominate his son in his
place. A Kuwaiti liberal columnist wrote, "Mr. Saleh, please
give us the Arab World's first former president!"

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Saleh is most likely motivated by a desire to force
the opposition into nominating him. He is likely weary from
the Saada conflict, pushing through economic reforms and
opposition media criticism. In our view, however, Saleh has
another presidential term left in him -- time he could use to
properly groom and prepare his son to succeed him in 2013.
End Comment.
Khoury