ROYG RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO ACCEPT GTMO RETURNEES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001570

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER YM KWAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: ROYG RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO ACCEPT GTMO RETURNEES

REF: A. STATE 105271

B. STATE 95828

C. STATE 92662

D. SANAA 1532

E. SANAA 1516

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (C) Despite several demarches, the ROYG continues to stall
on giving full assurances that it will accept the return of
Yemeni GTMO detainees. The purpose of this message is to shed
light on ROYG reluctance to provide requested official
guarantees for the Deputies Committee on Detainees. Ref A
demarche will be delivered on June 12.

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Message Delivered Repeatedly
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2. (C) Ambassador delivered ref B demarche to Foreign
Minister Qirbi on May 18 (ref E). The FM said he would
consider our request for ROYG commitments on accepting
returning Yemeni GTMO detainees determined to no longer pose
a threat to U.S. national security and to guarantee their
human treatment. When the MFA failed to respond, Ambassador
repeated ref B demarche as well as delivered ref C demarche
to Qirbi June 1, emphasizing the need for a timely reply.
Qirbi went so far as to say, "If the U.S. has nothing against
them, we have nothing against them," but refrained from
official acceptance of the return of Yemeni GTMO detainees.
Pol/Econ Chief followed up June 5 with Deputy Foreign
Minister Mustafa Noman who could not elaborate on Qirbi's
statement (ref D).

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If they are Yemeni...
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3. (S) Throughout the GTMO notification process, the ROYG has
repeatedly asked for additional information on Yemeni
detainees, complaining that providing names in English is
insufficient to confirm their Yemeni nationality. Pol/Econ
Chief routinely delivers notification to MFA on individuals
scheduled to go before the ARB to determine their status. On
almost every occasion, the MFA has requested passports or
other documentation, pictures, and especially names in Arabic
in order to confirm they are Yemeni. In order to settle this
issue, a delegation of Yemeni security officials was granted
approval to travel to GTMO to interview Yemeni detainees and
confirm their citizenship. Due to complications on the USG
side, however, the trip has been postpone three times and is
not expected to take place in October.

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Muddy Waters
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4. (C) ROYG Confusion remains as to what exactly the U.S. is
requesting with regard to Yemenis at GTMO. Throughout the
notification process, officials have expressed their
confusion. Lack of English language capabilities among the
security services has been cited more than once by Deputy
Foreign Minister Noman as a complicating factor in eliciting
satisfactory ROYG responses to GTMO-related USG requests.
This is especially true of the process to determine enemy
combatant status, with the ROYG insisting that it could not
provide supporting materials for Yemenis coming before ARB
because it could not determine who were their families and
associates base on the information we provided.


5. (C) Post is now delivering three types of ARB
notifications to Yemen: the ARB met and will continue to hold
the detainee as an enemy combatant; the ARB met, determined
the detainee is no longer an enemy combatant, and therefore
the USG wants to return him to Yemen; and, the ARB met and
determined the individual remains a threat, however, the USG
wants to return him to Yemen on the condition of certain ROYG
security and legal assurances. Ref A demarche, the first
notification of the latter later type, will be delivered on
June 12. (Comment: While confusion along does not explain
ROYG reluctance to provide requested assurances, it should
not be wholly discounted. End Comment).

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ROYG Security, Political and PR Concerns
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6. (S) The ROYG is reluctant to accepted returning detainees
and provide human rights guarantees. Why? One the one hand,
returnees are likely to be detained, at least temporarily,
until their nationality is confirmed and the threat they may
pose to ROYG security assessed. On the other hand, holding
them upon arrival would create a public relations problem for
the regime, particularly in the run-up to the 2006 local
councils and Presidential elections.


7. (C) During last December's Ramadan amnesty, President
Saleh and other high-level officials were quick to point to a
U.S. "double standards" regarding pressure to hold off
indefinitely on releasing some security detainees slated for
amnesty. In addition to opposition criticism of the regime
for being "too close to you (the USG)," said Saleh at that
time, you turn around and "blast Yemen in your Human Rights
Report" for violating the rights of prisoners.


8. (C) Comment: USG provision of better documentation to
the ROYG, particularly the full names of Yemenis GTMO
detainees in Arabic, might help attain a smoother process.
The ROYG's non-transparent investigation process, competing
security and investigatory agencies, and weak judicial
institutions, however, are unlikely to yield prompt and
sufficient answers to our questions on possible ROYG
detention, investigation, prosecution, and surveillance of
returnees from GTMO (ref A). End Comment.
Krajeski