Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA1534
2005-06-07 10:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU

Tags:  MASS PARM PREL YM YE COUNTER TERRORISM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SANAA 001534 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMY COLETTA, MAINSTATE POL/MIL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: MASS PARM PREL YM YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU

REF: SECSTATE 104157

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 a, b, and
d

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SANAA 001534

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMY COLETTA, MAINSTATE POL/MIL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: MASS PARM PREL YM YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU

REF: SECSTATE 104157

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 a, b, and
d


1. (S) Summary. Post welcomes the opportunity to address
the issue of including Yemen,s Central Security
Force-Counter-Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU) in Yemen,s FY 05, 06,
and 07 Foreign Military Financing allocations. Post assesses
that the inclusion of the CSF-CTU in FMF is an essential
element in supporting Yemen as a partner in the GWOT.
Reallocating scarce FMF dollars away from the Ministry of
Defense and its components, to the Ministry of Interior,s
CSF-CTU, will cause some disgruntlement within the MOD.
However, we believe that the disgruntlement is transitory and
manageable. End Summary.


2. (S) Post assesses that the use of FMF to equip the
CSF-CTU is absolutely essential. RMAS has already ceased
providing equipment to the CSF-CTU. Without a
replacement-funding source, replenishment of worn-out
equipment and acquisition of additional gear will cease. The
operational capability of Yemen,s premier counter-terrorism
unit will steadily degrade, without intercession of FMF. Use
of RMAS funds for equipment was the right answer for a quick
start, but FMF is the only available tool for the long term.
The Department of Defense currently provides training to the
CSF-CTU in the form of a continuing Mobile Training Team and
occasional Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) teams.
Using FMF funds to equip the CSF-CTU allows the equipping and
training of the CSF-CTU to remain in the Embassy and under
the purview of the Embassy,s Office of Military Cooperation.



3. (S) The recommended change in funding strategy will
have a minimal effect on Yemen,s MOD. There are several
reasons for this:

*Yemen,s MOD has traditionally relied on national funds,
usually spent on Russian or other Eastern European sourced
equipment, for the majority of its Defense procurement.
*Yemen MOD,s procurement effort is very unsophisticated, and
has until recently, not fully utilized its annual FMF
allocation, but rather built up a sizeable &unallocated8
balance.
*Yemen MOD does not have a Defense acquisition strategy, but

is given to &impulse buying8 when it realizes it has
options other than national funds.

There may be some minor resentment from the Yemen MOD that
&their8 FMF money is to be shared with the MOI,s CSF-CTU,
and not just with the Yemen Coast Guard (also part of the
MOI). We believe that this sentiment will be manageable.
Our usual reply to the allegation that we favor MOI over MOD
is that we will always reinforce success, and especially with
our most cooperative partners.


4. (S) Post deems MOI (CSF-CTU and YCG) as a willing
partner with the United States. YCG and CSF-CTU are
transparent organizations that actively seek cooperation and
allow monitoring of their activities by the OMC and other
organizations. Unlike the MOD, MOI allows U.S. officials
access to training plans, arms rooms, and supports long range
planning. MOI supports and cooperates with efforts by Post
to conduct end use monitoring.

MOD is at best opaque and a reluctant partner with the
United States. Several elements of the military are viewed
as corrupt and part of the small arms/light weapons problem
in Yemen. Unlike MOI (with exceptions) the MOD is not open
to long range planning, or allowing access for inspections.
Typically MOD only cooperates with the U.S. when it suits
their needs or they want something (like 5000 M-16's). The
one exception in MOD at this point is the YSOF which has
demonstrated more openess than the remainder of MOD. This
may be due to the fact that it is commanded by President
Saleh's son.


5. (SBU) Proposed FMF funding breakout for Fiscal Years
05, 06, and 07:

a. FY 05 ($ 9.9 M)

Ministry of Interior 4.9 M

Yemen Coast Guard 2.9 M
-New Equipment .8 M
-Shotguns
-Tactical gear for boarding teams
-Body armor
-Maritime Radios
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts .5 M
-Spare parts/tools for 25,defender boats and 42, Arch
Angel boats
-Infrastructure/Trng 1.6 M
-Communications infrastructure for new Coast Guard
stations
-Blanket order training case
-Computers/ADP for classrooms
-Advice/Support to establish Yemeni Boarding Operator
Course

Yemen Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 2.0 M
-New Equipment 1.2 M
-Sniper Rifles w/optics
-Shipment of EDA M-113s with parts and training
-NVD scopes for sniper rifles
-EDA M-79 grenade launchers
-4 recoilless rifles
-20 7.62 NATO machine guns
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts .2 M
-Spare Parts for Armored HMMWV,s
-Infrastructure/Trng .6 M
-Blanket order case for medical supplies
-.5 M Blanket order case for CT training MTT,s

Ministry of Defense 5.0M

Yemen Air Force 2.5 M
-New Equipment 0.0 M
-Spare Parts 2.2 M
-F-5 CAD/PAD buy
-F-5/C-130/Huey spare parts blanket order
-Infrastructure/Trng .3 M
-Upgrades to Air Force operations center

Yemen Army/Special Operations Forces (YSOF) 2.0 M
-New Equipment 1.7 M
-Weapons for one SOF battalion
-NVD,s for one SOF battalion
-Assorted tactical equipment for one SOF battalion
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts .2 M
-Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s
-Infrastructure/Trng .1 M
-Upgrades to YSOF operations center

Yemen Navy .2 M
-New Equipment 0.0 M
-Spare Parts .1 M
-Tools and parts for boats
-Infrastructure/Trng .1 M
-Upgrades to Navy operations center

Yemen Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (MOD/MOI/PSO/NSB
Fusion Center) .3 M
-New Equipment .3 M
-Computers/ADP and communications equipment
-Spare Parts 0.0M
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.0 M

b. FY 06 ($ 10 M request)

Ministry of Interior 5.3 M

Yemen Coast Guard 2.6 M
-New Equipment 0.8 M
-Body Armor
-Maritime Radios
-Long Range Optics
-Spare Parts 1.0 M
-Blanket order parts case for boats
-Spare parts for weapons/commo
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.8
-Blanket order training case

Yemen Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 2.7 M
-New Equipment 2.0 M
-Ammunition
-Weapons (M-4,s, M-2,s)
-Body armor
-Assorted tactical equipment
-Spare Parts 0.2 M
-Spare parts for armored HMMWV,s
-Spare parts for NVD,s and weapons
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.5 M
-Blanker order training case for CT training MTT,s

Ministry of Defense 4.7 M

Yemen Air Force 2.0 M
-New Equipment 0.0 M
-Spare Parts 1.8 M
-F-5 CAD/PAD buy
-F-5/C-130/Huey spare parts blanket order
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.2 M
-Blanket order for US maintenance training courses

Yemen Army/Special Operations Forces (YSOF) 2.4 M
-New Equipment 1.7 M
-Weapons for one SOF battalion
-NVD,s for one SOF battalion
-Assorted tactical equipment for one SOF battalion
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts 0.4 M
-Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.3 M
-Blanket order for US courses
Yemen Navy 0.1 M
-New Equipment 0.0 M
-Spare Parts 0.0 M
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.1 M
-Blanket order for US training courses

Yemen Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (MOD/MOI/PSO/NSB
Fusion Center) 0.2 M
-New Equipment 0.1 M
-Computers/ADP and communications equipment
-Spare Parts 0.1 M
-Spare parts and tools for communications equipment
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.0 M

c. FY 07 ($ 25 M est.)

Ministry of Interior 15.2 M

Yemen Coast Guard 7.5 M
-New Equipment 2.7 M
-Additional 25, Defender boats
-Long range communications
-Shotguns and M-16A4,s
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts 2.0 M
-Spare parts and tools for boats
-Spare parts and tools for communication systems
-Infrastructure/Trng 2.8 M
-Building upgrades for Coast Guard stations
-Communication infrastructure upgrades
-Upgrades to maintenance facilities
-Blanket order training for US courses
-Blanket order training for Coast Guard MTT,s

Yemen Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 7.7 M
-New Equipment 2.9 M
-Assorted tactical equipment
-Air ground radio systems
-Transport trucks
-Mobile command post
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts 1.2 M
-Spare parts and tools for M-113,s and HMMWVs
-Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s
-Infrastructure/Trng 3.6 M
-Range improvements
-Establishment of Yemeni Counter Terrorism
school/course and CQB course
-Blanket order training case for CT training MTT,s

Ministry of Defense 9.8 M

Yemen Air Force 4.0 M
-New Equipment 1.0 M
-Upgrades for F-5,s
-Upgraded communications systems capable of air ground
communications
-Spare Parts 1.7 M
-Spare parts/engines for F-5,s/C-130,s, and Hueys
-F-5 CAD/PAD buy
-Infrastructure/Trng 1.3 M
-Upgrades to maintenance/logistics facility
-Blanket order for US training courses

Yemen Army/Special Operations Forces (YSOF) 4.4 M
-New Equipment 2.7 M
-Weapons for two SOF battalions
-NVD,s for two SOF battalions
-Assorted tactical equipment for two SOF battalions
-Ammunition
-Spare Parts .5 M
-Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s
-Infrastructure/Trng 1.2 M
-Establishment of a Yemeni mountain warfare
school/course

Yemen Navy 1.2 M
-New Equipment 0.5 M
-Maritime radios
-Life jackets
-Spare Parts 0.1 M
-Spare parts and tools for boats
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.6 M
-Blanket order training for US courses

Yemen Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (MOD/MOI/PSO/NSB
Fusion Center) 0.2 M
-New Equipment 0.1 M
-Computers/ADP and communications equipment
-Spare Parts 0.1 M
-spare parts and tools for communications equipment
-Infrastructure/Trng 0.0 M



Krajeski