Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA117
2005-01-18 09:45:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING 01/16/2004

Tags:  AMGT ASEC PREL PTER YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000117 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 01/16/2004

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and
(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000117

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 01/16/2004

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and
(d).


1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened an
EAC meeting on January 17, 2005, to review post policy for
private or official events at Embassy Officer housing
following a recent attempted attack against Embassy personnel
at an Employee residence during the Christmas holidays. The
COM noted the possibility that the possible assailant might
have committed an overt act had his bodyguard team not been
at the residence - a team which was beefed up in the past two
years with a RSO directed Embassy hired advance and follow
team of LES security officers. The Ambassador concluded the
discussion with EAC members by directing the RSO to write
down a post policy for RSO/COM review and approval involving
any event American Embassy related that would result in the
clustering of westerners at difficult to defend/soft-target
sites i.e. private residences or public restaurants. EAC
members noted no additional threats against Embassy Sanaa or
Americans in Yemen and discussed make up and execution of the
EAC core and expanded meetings. Key offices and personnel
represented included: CDA, FPD, OMC, RMAS, POL/ECON ,MO,
CCE, DAO, AID, PD, and RSO. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) The Ambassador with the assistance of RMAS, began
the discussion with an update regarding details concerning
the recent attempt by a man with two fragmentary grenades and
a handgun who attempted to scale the wall of an Embassy
residence in what may have resulted in an attack against
Embassy personnel attending a private Christmas Eve dinner.
The RSO briefed EAC members on recent requests to hold
representational events at private residences since the
incident. RSO further noted with the EAC the difficulty in
protecting such residences despite Yemen government officials
assurances from a vehicle born improvised explosive device or
intrusion by armed assailants.


3. (S/NF) Under the direction of the COM, EAC members
reviewed current policies and practices regarding the
coordination of such events with the RSO. Finally, based on
EAC input, the COM directed the RSO to write down a policy,
making the sponsoring of large soft target events the
exception rather than the rule for the foreseeable future.
EAC provided three categories for the RSO to consider in
refining post soft-target events to include: 1. Private
Dinner Parties with 15 or fewer invitees; 2. Large Open
Parties/Celebrations at residences or public places and 3.
Medium to Large Official Functions at private residences or
public places. The COM noted that in a critical threat
security environment medium to large gatherings that cluster
westerners in an undefended or inadequately defended location
should not occur. EAC members also noted that all events
both private and official must be carefully coordinated with
the RSO to ensure perimeter security commensurate with the
nature and size of the event and proper access control.
Events that leave a footprint and significantly raise a
location's threat profile should not occur according to EAC
members if the RSO is unable to ensure standoff on the
perimeter and proper access control into the event.


4. (S/NF) RMAS provided no new insights into recent threat
reporting regarding Yemen.
The EAC noted the fact that the British Embassy re-opened
Saturday 15 January 2004, but little information regarding
why British officials concluded it was safe to re-open was
known by EAC members, other than the lack of threat specifics
or imminent threat information.


5. (SBU) EAC members also discussed the warden messages to
date and considered who should receive distribution of warden
messages as well as how to notify unofficial Americans
staying in twelve hotels throughout Yemen.


6. (SBU) The DCM prodded EAC members and their staff to take
their personal security very seriously and keep the RSO
informed about security concerns in light of what appears to
be an increase in threat reporting regarding Yemen and the
region. The EAC meeting ended with a review by the DCM of
the make-up of the Core EAC and recognition that core EAC
meetings must be called and reported immediately after threat
related incidents or threat related reporting involving
Yemen.


KRAJESKI