Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA1126
2005-05-01 14:23:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FOR AMERICAN

Tags:  AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 001126 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FOR AMERICAN
EMBASSY SANAA

REF: A. SANAA 955

B. SANAA 881

C. SANAA 896

Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and
(d).

S E C R E T SANAA 001126

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE FOR AMERICAN
EMBASSY SANAA

REF: A. SANAA 955

B. SANAA 881

C. SANAA 896

Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and
(d).


1. (U) This is an action request; see para 6.


2. (SBU) Based on the recommendations of the Emergency
Action Committee (EAC),Ambassador requests that the
Department not extend Authorized Departure beyond the current
expiration date.


3. (SBU) The EAC unanimously agreed that Post's security
situation is reflective of Reverse Trip Wires, as reported in
REFTEL A. Therefore, EAC members unanimously agree that the
security situation, particularly in reference to the specific
threat that instigated our request for AD, has improved to
the extent necessary to support an EAC recommendation that
Authorized Departure end.


4. (S/NF) A delineation of the EAC findings includes:


A. No new credible, specific non-counterable threats:
Kanaan, the terrorist who was the source of the specific
threat that led to Post's request for Authorized Departure
(Ref B),has now been captured along with several of his
colleagues. There is no new information that post knows
of that poses a credible specific threat at this time.


B. EAC, applauding responsiveness of ROYG security apparatus
to Embassy needs, feels that ROYG has and is deploying
sufficient resources to adequately protect American personnel
and assets in Yemen.


C. EAC concurs with RSO and MOI that travel in Yemen, with
sufficient coordination through the RSO, can meet reasonable
security standards for USG essential and non-essential travel.


D. EAC members agree that acts of violence resulting from
the spillover related to Saada fighting do not pose a
significant risk to Americans at this time or for the
foreseeable future that would be mitigated by continuation of
Authorized Departure.


5. (SBU) The EAC recognizes the need for continued
vigilance regarding security policies and practices that
protect lives in Yemen's critical security threat. To that
end, the EAC will recommend to USG personnel and to the
broader American community, via a new Wardens message, that
they remain vigilant, exercise caution in traveling
throughout Yemen and continue to vary routes and routines in
their home-to-office movements.


6. (U) Embassy requests approval/guidance from the
Department on this matter.
Krajeski