US-ITALIAN GOALS FOR BALKANS: "PLAYING THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000989

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2014
TAGS: PREL AL SR BS EUN HZ
SUBJECT: US-ITALIAN GOALS FOR BALKANS: "PLAYING THE SAME
TUNE ON DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS"

REF: STATE 44531

Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON:1.4 (B)(D
)


1. (C) Summary. In meetings with MFA Political Director
Terzi and European Affairs Director-General Caracciolo, DAS
Stephens heard a strong Italian pledge of continued
participation and cooperation with the US in the Balkans.
Terzi said that Italy was focusing on a number of important
issues, from the new political structure in Pristina to
SFOR-ESDP handover and post-Ashdown OHR in Bosnia to Croatian
and Serbian compliance with ICTY commitments. Italy was
relieved by both Kosovo PM Haradinaj's decision to resign and
go peacefully to The Hague, and by the relative calmness with
which news of the indictment was received by the general
population. Next steps include the selection of a new Prime
Minister and legislation to safeguard K-Serbs and allow
access to religious shrines. Stephens urged that the EU use
the leverage of the Feasibility Study to keep Belgrade
focused on the proximate goal of the "3 generals" and on the
ultimate goal of Mladic and Karadzic,s arrest and transfer
to The Hague. Belgrade is "watching Zagreb," underscoring
the importance of maintaining the EU,s line on Gotovina.
Italy is working now with its Contact Group partners on
building blocks for the "Key Messages" on Kosovo's future
status, to include: no partition; minority protections;
access to religious sites; and continued international
presence. The Italians are also thinking about an
"Ashdown-like" figure to administer the international
presence.


2. (C) Summary Continued: During his February 23 visit to
the region, FM Fini voiced the general European view that the
will of the people must be respected regarding continued
Montenegrin membership in the SAM Union. He could not agree
when Montenegrin President Vujanovic asserted that a separate
and independent Montenegro would be a stabilizing
development. Caracciolo said Italy would stand firm on
Croatia in Brussels. Italy was thinking about a narrower
mandate for the post-Ashdown OHR, and would nominate a
replacement candidate. End Summary.

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POSITIVE/PRAGMATIC TONE
--------------


3. (C) On March 15, EUR DAS Kathy Stephens and EUR/SCE
Deputy Director Eric Gaudiosi had separate meetings with MFA
Political Director Terzi and European Affairs
Director-General Caracciolo. POL Minister-Counselor and
Poloff accompanied. Balkans Affairs Office Director Raimondo
De Cardona also participated on the Italian side, and hosted
a lunch following the MFA meetings. The overall tone from
Terzi and Caracciolo (Italian Ambassador in Belgrade
2000-2003),was upbeat but pragmatic. Both sides recognized
the progress made in stabilizing the region over the past
year, and agreed that Europe and the US must remain engaged
through the Contact Group and other multilateral institutions
if the final push to resolve remaining issues region-wide is
to be successful. Caracciolo underlined the similarity of US
and Italian positions and approaches, asserting that we are
"playing the same tune on different instruments." That
morning's bombing of Rugova's motorcade in Kosovo was
indicative of the still fragile situation on the ground.
Terzi emphasized Italy's special interest in the Balkans,
given its geographical proximity and historical ties. He had
hosted a lunch for contact group Ambassadors the previous
week (POLMIN attended for US) during which all agreed that
the highest priority now is Kosovo, given the upcoming
standards report and Haradinaj's departure for The Hague.
That said, no one issue can be looked at in isolation in the
Balkans, and Italy was focusing on a number of priorities,
from the new political structure in Pristina to SFOR-ESDP
handover and post-Ashdown OHR in Bosnia to Croatian and
Serbian compliance with ICTY commitments.

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HARADINAJ RESIGNATION
--------------


4. (C) Terzi said he was relieved by both Haradinaj's
decision resign and go peacefully to The Hague, and by the
relative calmness with which news of the indictment was
received by the general population in Kosovo. Terzi credited
Haradinaj with keeping a lid on the situation by involving
his political deputies early in the process, and urging calm
in his public statements following the decision. Terzi said
that SRSG Jessen-Petersen's remarks praising Haradinaj may
have been a bit over the top, but noted that the two had
developed a personal relationship over the past few months
and predicted that the long-term consequences of the
statement would be "marginal." What is important is that a


crisis had been defused and a strong message on the
impartiality of the ICTY had been sent to Zagreb, Belgrade
and Sarajevo. Terzi noted that the next step is the selection
of a new Prime Minister to replace Haradinaj. It is
essential the incumbent has credibility, be an efficient
administrator and cooperative interlocutor for Belgrade. The
IC has a bit of a dilemma, continued Terzi, between using its
influence to ensure such a person is selected, and creating a
perception that it is interfering in an internal political
decision.

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IC ROLE
--------------


5. (C) DAS Stephens reiterated US appreciation for Italian
efforts in the region, and for its continued close
coordination with the US on its multilateral and bilateral
Balkans initiatives. She concurred with Caracciolo's
observation that we must guard against EU "enlargement
fatigue," and pressed Italy to think creatively, as an EU
member, about means to accelerate the region's Euro-Atlantic
integration. She also agreed with Terzi's view that the IC
has a strong interest in seeing that the right person is
selected to replace Haradinaj, but there was a "tension"
between influence and interference. The US has made clear
to Peterson it wants to see a broadly representative PISG
committed to active implementation of Standards. Time is
running short, and the IC cannot afford any backsliding on
progress made during Haradinaj's administration. Caracciolo
noted that after Haradinaj, the list of responsible political
interlocutors is quite small. For instance, his impression
of Rugova from his visit (accompanying Fini) was very
negative. Rugova seems committed to the hard-liners among
Haradinaj's supporters, and continues to insist on full
independence for Kosovo with immediate EU recognition.
Caracciolo also suspects Rugova has a drinking problem - "It
was his worst performance in years."

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REGIONAL APPROACH
--------------


6. (C) Terzi cited legislation to safeguard K-Serbs and allow
access to religious shrines as critical next steps. Stephens
emphasized the need to carefully craft the script for the
Contact Group Political Director's April 12 visit to Pristina
and Belgrade. It should follow closely the message in the
letter from Secretary Rice which Stephens had carried to Rome
for FM Fini: the way ahead in Kosovo cannot be looked at in
isolation, but rather in the broader context of a regional
move toward European institutions, and reaffirm continued
trans-Atlantic involvement, including US participation in
KFOR. Stephens noted a recent article in the Financial Times
by former Italian PM Amato as the type of creative thinking
necessary to move the process along. (Embassy Note: We are
often struck by the fact that Italy's voice is often
inversely proportional to its interests in the Balkans.
Fini's identification of the region as one of the key US-EU
priorities may change that and is worth noting as the IC
prepares for more high-level travel to the region. End
Note.) Both Caracciolo and Terzi noted that Belgrade is
aware that it cannot stop and is falling behind the trend
towards regional integration of its Former-Yugolsav
neighbors, and must be encouraged to engage actively in this
process. De Cardona noted the challenge the IC faces in this
regard given the current leadership vacuum in Belgrade.


7. (C) Terzi agreed that the Amato piece was well written
and "influential." He said that during his visit to the
region, Fini tried to convey to all interlocutors, Serb and
Kosovar alike, that there was "light at the end of the
tunnel" and that the standards review was a step in the
evolution towards a government in Pristina with broad
authorities but connection to a "European dimension" to
include some type of security presence as a stabilizing
component. Fini stressed, with DPM Labus particularly, the
need for active and cooperative Belgrade participation, for
example, encouraging K-Serbs to participate in elections.
Italy was working now with its Contact Group partners on
building blocks for the "Key Messages" on Kosovo's future
status, to include: no partition; minority protections;
access to religious sites; and a continued international
presence. Caracciolo added that the Italians were also
thinking of a "Bosnia model" for Kosovo - not partition, but
an "Ashdown-like" figure to administer the international
presence. We should also use pieces from the OHRID agreement
and Serbian ideas on status, mixing the best of these and
other initiatives and apply to Kosovo as appropriate. the
threat of violence cannot be used to drive the process in
Kosovo. Caracciolo would be traveling to Athens and Vienna
the following week to brief governments there and enlist
support and ideas. He lamented Greece's still inflexible


position on the "Macedonia" name issue and expected the
Italian Parliament to vote to take a similar position to the
US' in the near future.

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ICTY COOPERATION
--------------


8. (C) Stephens said that the US was encouraged by the
recent improved level of cooperation with the ICTY, noting
that the transfer rate of PIFWCs to the Hague has increased
dramatically in recent weeks. The results represented the
effect of the US and EU speaking with one voice on the
necessity of accused war criminals being brought to justice.
Stephens hoped that the EU would use the leverage of the
Feasibility Study to keep Belgrade focused on the proximate
goal of the "3 generals" and on the ultimate goal of Mladic
and Karadzic,s arrest and transfer to The Hague. Belgrade
is "watching Zagreb," underscoring the importance of
maintaining the EU,s line on Gotovina." Caracciolo noted
that Fini had reminded Kostunica that he too was a "man of
the right," but underscored that there was a difference
between patriotism and the extremism of the Yugoslav wars,
and that PIFWCs were "not heroes but criminals."


9. (C) Terzi agreed that pressure must be kept on
governments region-wide for full ICTY compliance. However,
he argued that the Feasibility Study was simply a
preparatory phase" in the accession process. He guaranteed
that the EU would, in parallel, continue to urge Belgrade to
pursue more actively war criminals living in areas or among
populations it controls or influences. Caracciolo said Italy
would stand firm on Croatia in Brussels, urging member states
to complete the "negotiating framework" for Croatia but
placing the process on hold until Gotovina arrives in The
Hague.

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SAM UNION
--------------


10. (C) Terzi reported that Fini also discussed SAM union
issues with Montenegrin President Vujanovic in Belgrade.
Fini concurred with the general European view that the will
of the people must be respected regarding continued
Montenegrin membership in the Union. However, Fini could not
agree when Vujanovic asserted that a separate and independent
Montenegro would be a stabilizing development. For instance,
Montenegro could not advance within the EU's Stabilization
and Association process without Serbia as an economic driver.
Caracciolo worried about the presence of a "rogue state" in
its neighborhood created by a referendum that excluded votes
of Montenegrins living in Serbia.

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BOSNIA POST-ASHDOWN
--------------


11. (C) Stephens said that with approaching 10th anniversary
of Dayton and imminent departure of HiRep Ashdown, the US had
been thinking about the structure and personnel that make up
the international presence in Bosnia, and asked whether
Italians had been doing the same. Terzi said that Italy had
not reached final decisions, but was thinking about a
narrower mandate for the post-Ashdown OHR, as a signal to
Bosnians that they have made some progress over the past 10
years, and as a way to increase the "European Dimension" role
within the IC presence. Italy would be putting forward a
candidate to replace Ashdown, and was thinking along the
lines of an "ambassadorial" candidate, rather than someone
from the "political circuit." Caracciolo had visited Bosnia
with Fini, where their meetings had included talks with US
military officials. He had come away "concerned" at the slow
rate of progress and foresaw a continued strong international
presence for some time.

12 (U) DAS Stephens has cleared this message.

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2005ROME00989 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL