SYRIA/LEBANON: ITALY STILL PLANS TO HOST FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000976

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL SY LE IT EUN
SUBJECT: SYRIA/LEBANON: ITALY STILL PLANS TO HOST FM
SHARA'A IN ROME

REF: A. STATE 44087


B. ROME 878

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The Italian MFA has given serious
consideration to our request that Italy postpone the April 6
visit of Syrian FM Shara'a but, barring major changes on the
ground in Lebanon, still plans to go through with the visit.
Rome continues to view engagement as the best way to deal
with Damascus, and views Italy as the US' most forceful ally
in delivering a tough message. End summary.

"It's in our DNA"
--------------


2. (C) DCM, Pol MC and Poloff met with Riccardo Sessa, the DG
for the Mediterranean and Middle East, and Luca Ferrari,
Office Director for the Eastern Mediterranean, on March 21 in
follow-up to our March 14 demarche (Ref B) asking Italy to
postpone Syrian FM Shara'a's planned April 6 visit to Rome,
at least until Syria announces a firm timetable for full
withdrawal from Lebanon. Sessa said that Italy, as always,
is taking our request very seriously because of its close
relationship with the United States and Italy's special
interest in the region. He said that the MFA agrees in
general terms with our assessment of the situation in
Lebanon, but disagrees about postponing FM Shara'a's April 6
visit, explaining that "it's in (Italy's) DNA" to maintain an
open dialogue with "rogue states" even if Rome is skeptical
about the immediate results of engagement. Sessa underscored
that he had discussed our demarche directly with FM Fini and
Secretary General Vattani and both had "blessed" the view

SIPDIS
that the Shara'a visit should not be postponed.


3. (C) Sessa likened Syrian President Asad to Qaddafi,
arguing that Bashar "gets it" and is reacting to the strong
pressure of the international community. By closing the door
to dialogue, he argued, the US deprives itself of the
opportunity to have a reliable partner like Italy deliver a
tough message to Damascus. Furthermore, Ferrari noted,
closing the door in Italy would only open another one
somewhere else, such as Greece or Spain, where the US has a
much less reliable ally and one whose voice would not
resonate as widely. (Note: Ferrari said Athens, though not
confirmed, probably will be on Shara'a's European itinerary,
as well as the Holy See. End note.)


4. (C) Both Sessa and Ferrari argued that Italy has been the
most aggressive EU member state when it comes to dealing with
rogue states. They cited several examples of Italy's
toughness on Syria and its commitment to the US position,
including Fini's tough message to Shara'a during his January
visit to Damascus, Italy's statement -- the strongest in the
EU -- after the Harari bombing, Italy's modification of its
position on Hezbollah at last week's EU Clearing House
meeting (Ref B). Fini's March 8 statement on Lebanon
differed from other EU states' in its explicit reference to
the other requirement of UNSC 1559, the disarmament of
militias. The focus, our contacts argued, should not be on
whether or not to meet with the Syrians, but on what to say.

It's the Syrians, not the Italians
--------------


5. (C) DCM pushed back, saying that the US is fully confident
of Italy's commitment and ability to deliver a tough message.
The issue under discussion was not Italy's intentions, bur
rather Syria's. Unfortunately, going forward with the
meeting runs the very likely risk that Syria will use it to
further its own goals and stall for time, citing European
support. Syria, he said, is only moving because of
international pressure, not because Damascus suddenly has
seen the light. Transatlantic cohesion is what has caused
Syria to begin to move. At a minimum, he argued, Italy
should postpone the visit until Syria agrees to a fixed
timetable for withdrawal.


6. (C) Ferrari countered that the April 6 meeting could be
viewed from an opposite angle, as the last chance to send the
Syrians a tough message before the Lebanese and Syrian
military committees meet on April 7 to set a timeframe for


Syrian withdrawal. Ferrari argued that the Syrians are
already moving toward withdrawal, and that international
pressure is at the bottom of the list of explanations,
following fears of an internal Sunni-Maronite uprising, Arab
pressure, and the "Saddamization" of Syria that would give
the US an excuse to intervene militarily.

Agreeing to Disagree
--------------


7. (C) Sessa mused that the best outcome might be if Shara'a
himself asked to postpone the visit so that he could
participate in the April 7 military committee meetings. DCM
said that if this happened, Italy needed to think ahead about
how it would react to different outcomes. If the Lebanese
and Syrians decided on April 7 that a full withdrawal would
be completed in two weeks, before Lebanon's elections, that
would be one thing; but what if they agreed on a 12-month
timetable? Would Italy then still go forward with a Shara'a
visit? Sessa concluded the meeting stating that, for the
moment, Italy does not intend to postpone the visit.
However, he suggested that we revisit the issue again next
week to see if there are any changes in the Syrian position
that would merit a postponement.

Prime Minister's Office Takes a Different Approach
-------------- --------------


8. (C) DCM raised the Shara'a visit in the course of a
separate meeting later on March 21 with PM Berlusconi's top
diplomatic advisor, Giovanni Castellaneta. Castellaneta said
that he had raised the issue in a March 18 telcon with NSA
Hadley and that he shared our view on the need to pressure
the Syrians. He opined that Bashar might even appreciate a
postponement as he tries to distance himself from the "old
guard" that Shara'a represents. Castellaneta promised to
discuss the issue directly with FM Fini on March 22.


9. (C) Comment. Sessa was eager to demonstrate to us that
the MFA is taking our concerns about Syria seriously.
However, the Italians' desire to accommodate us on this issue
is at odds with their own (self-inflated?) image as the most
effective EU player in the Middle East and, more
significantly, their conviction that they can play a useful
role when it comes to Syria and that dialogue is the way to
go. Given that their message has been "blessed" from the top
of the MFA, it probably will take an equally strong hand from
our side or from PM Berlusconi's office -- or a misstep by
the Syrians -- to persuade them to change their mind. End
comment.

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2005ROME00976 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL