Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ROME4052
2005-12-13 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALIANS FOCUS ON LONG-TERM IN IRAQ, SEEK

Tags:  PARM PREL PGOV IZ IT UNSC IRAQI FREEDOM NATO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 004052 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA, EUR/WE AND S/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV IZ IT UNSC IRAQI FREEDOM NATO
SUBJECT: ITALIANS FOCUS ON LONG-TERM IN IRAQ, SEEK
US-UK-ITALY CONSULTS

REF: A. STATE 220728

B. ROME 3936

Classified By: Pol M/C David Pearce for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 004052

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA, EUR/WE AND S/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV IZ IT UNSC IRAQI FREEDOM NATO
SUBJECT: ITALIANS FOCUS ON LONG-TERM IN IRAQ, SEEK
US-UK-ITALY CONSULTS

REF: A. STATE 220728

B. ROME 3936

Classified By: Pol M/C David Pearce for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. In meetings with the Deputy Senior
Coordinator for Iraq Robert Deutsch, Italian government
officials stressed the need for the continued involvement and
commitment of the international community in Iraq. The Prime
Minister's office suggested a UN Presidential statement would
help underline that the December 15 election is part of a
process laid out in UNSCR 1546. Though the Italian
elections next spring were also on the minds of Italian
officials, discussion of troop withdrawals was minimal;
Center-Left politicians said they would never withdraw forces
abruptly, as Spain had done. Instead, the Italians were
focused on longer-term initiatives aimed at consolidating the
political, economic, and security improvements in the
country. On PRTs, the GOI was cautious but willing to explore
avenues of cooperation. The destabilizing influences of both
Iran and Syria were significant concerns. Both the Foreign
Ministry and the Prime Minister's office pressed for
trilateral consultations among the US, UK, and Italy. End
summary.


2. (SBU) During his December 5-7 visit to Rome, Deputy Senior
Advisor/Deputy Senior Coordinator for Iraq Robert Deutsch
briefed key Italian government officials responsible for
Iraq, Center-Left leaders, and think tank analysts on
political, security, and economic developments in the
country, including the PRT initiative. On December 6,
Deutsch met MFA Iraq Task Force Director Gherardo Lafrancesa
and Desk Officer Stefano Stucci, as well as NATO Office
Director Gianni Bardini, Middle East Development Cooperation
Office Director Federica Ferrari Bravo, Desk Officer
Guillermo Giordanio, and MFA Iraq Consultant Lino Cardarelli.
Lafrancesca, Stucci, and Ferrari Bravo also attended a
dinner the same evening hosted by the DCM that included the
MFA's Deputy Directors for the Middle East and Multilateral
Political Affairs bureaus, Luca Del Balzo and Giacomo

Sanfelice; Diplomatic Advisor to Defense Minister Martino,
Achille Amerio; and Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi,
Marco Carnelos. On December 7, Deutsch held a separate
meeting with Carnelos and another senior Diplomatic Advisor
to the PM, Francesco Talo. Deutsch also held discussions
with Center-Left leaders and leading think tank analysts.

Optimism on the Political Front
--------------


3. (C) Lafrancesca noted "some positive signals" on the
political front, which he summarized as increased
participation in the political process and inclusiveness. He
said we should encourage more Sunni participation, citing the
Arab League's involvement as a positive development.
Lafrancesca said the EU election monitoring is developing
well, and, although it will stay within the Green Zone, it
will serve as a reference point for others. Talo
highlighted the rule of law and better representation of all
communities in the armed forces as two areas where the new
government needed to make progress quickly. At the DCM's
dinner, Del Balzo argued that the new government, as the
first fully legitimate Iraqi government, should have the best
possible leverage. Therefore, the international community
should not get over-involved in the constitutional process
and should let the new assembly take ownership of the
process.


4. (C) On the security front, Talo stressed the need for
clear benchmarks in the transition process so that people can
easily understand what "condition-based" withdrawal means.
Until now, he said, the political process has been used to
identify benchmarks, but after the elections, we will have to
rely on a different type of calendar, one not based on dates.
Bardini, stressing that training of Iraqi security forces
must be a long-term commitment by the international
community, said Italy would "not dislike" expansion of the
NATO Training Mission (NTM-I),though it might be too soon to
discuss this in the NAC. He suggested that eventually NATO
could incorporate all training, including bilateral efforts
and police training, into its mission.


5. (C) Talo, noting that the upcoming months will be crucial
in internal Italian politics, said that Berlusconi continues
to stress Italy's commitment to Iraq, not just because Italy
is a US ally, but because Italy is a responsible partner in
the international community and wants to see a democratic
Iraq in the Middle East. Talo noted that the Berlusconi
government's public diplomacy efforts distinguish between the
military campaign against Saddam Hussein and post-conflict
efforts. Its efforts also stress that all of the
post-conflict UNSC resolutions have been adopted unanimously,
i.e., with the support of countries that opposed the initial
military intervention. Iraq has the support of the entire
international community, Talo added. This was important for
Italian public opinion, especially during an election year.


6. (C) Talo continued that, just as Italy refrained from
participating in military operations against Iraq, it prefers
to avoid bellicose language of any sort and therefore prefers
to refer to a "success" strategy in Iraq rather than
"victory," though in substance they are the same. Italy
would make a statement congratulating the Iraqis on the
upcoming elections, Talo said, though the timing and
substance of the statement would be crafted so as not to
affect the outcome of the elections. He suggested that the
UN consider both a press release and a presidential statement
to underline that the elections are the conclusion of a
process laid out in UNSCR 1546. Talo further suggested that
once the new Iraqi government is well-established, the UNSC
should pass a resolution recognizing the new sovereign
government. He urged early and intensive bilateral
consultations on any new Iraq resolution.

Concerns about Iran and Syria
--------------


7. (C) All of Deutsch's interlocutors were interested in US
views on the roles of Iran and Syria, with Iran clearly
standing out as the GOI's main concern. At the MFA, Bardini
commented that the Iranian presence is more and more
pervasive, especially at the local level, in southern areas
like Dhi Qar, where the Italian troops are located. At the
PM's office, Talo noted that a succession of Iraqi
PM-hopefuls had recently visited Tehran in apparent attempts
to gain favor with their eastern neighbor. Noting Syria's
failure to police its borders, Talo asked from which
countries most insurgents originated and whether the US was
pressuring those countries to control their borders. Deutsch
acknowledged that Ambassador Khalilzad had been authorized to
engage with his Iranian counterpart in Baghdad on limited
issues relating to Iraq's stability, but stressed that Syria
was being especially unhelpful in Iraq by allowing insurgents
to enter through its borders. Most of the foreign
insurgents, including most of the suicide bombers, had
transited through Syria.

Mixed Feelings on PRTs
--------------


8. (C) The GOI officials were interested in the details of
the PRT concept but expressed concerns that the PRTs not
create the perception of backsliding on Iraqi sovereignty or
continuation of foreign troop presence. Furthermore, they
warned that PRTs could be a very visible target. At the MFA,
Lafrancesca expressed mixed feelings, saying the GOI has
concerns about creating new structures that create new
security needs. Lafrancesca said it made sense to have a
more coordinated civil-military presence. He asked whether
an Italian-led PRT in Nasiriyah would fit into the US.
picture and whether it could be tailored to the specific
needs of Dhi Qar province.


9. (C) Bardini stressed that Italy wanted to remain engaged
in the whole range of assistance, and that PRTs might be the
correct approach, though he was skeptical that the
Afghanistan model -- Italy's frame of reference -- could be
applied to Iraq. He said he understood that the PRTs' main
focus would be on civilian issues, but warned that, unless
the security situation improves, military aspects could end
up prevailing. Furthermore, PRTs risked being viewed as
permanent foreign structures, a negative signal that the
coalition forces intended to stay on in changed guise.
Bardini warned that the PRTs would be very visible targets
and require substantial security protection.


10. (C) Deutsch responded to these concerns explaining that
the PRTs would be US-led, that for security reasons they
would be based on existing military installations rather than
consulate-like settings, and that their purpose -- helping
the regions get the economic assistance that the central
government is not yet able to provide -- would be discussed
with the local populations to get their buy-in. He confirmed
that the US welcomed flexible approaches and foreign
participation, noting that the three existing PRTs are tests
cases, in part to see how the local population reacts. The
purpose of the PRTs, he stressed, is to fill the gap left by
the central government's inability to get aid to the
provinces and to support the local governments through
capacity building. The PRTs would have no security functions
other than ensuring their own security.


11. (C) PM Berlusconi's Diplomatic Advisors, noting the PRTs'
relatively quick development in Iraq, said Italy is cautious
but open to the concept. It would like to see a broader
multilateral presence, in addition to Iraqi involvement.
Talo added that contractor security is a controversial issue
for Italy. (Comment. Italy, which leads three out of four
modules of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I),has
long favored the use of Allied over contract security forces
for the NTM-I. End comment.)

Economic Assistance Hindered by Security Conditions
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Lafrancesca said that Italy has spent 195 million of
200 million euros pledged at the Madrid Donors' Conference.
He noted that MFA's Task Force Iraq has a small portfolio
that it administers in Iraq, but that the bulk of MFA funds
is administered by the Office of Development and Cooperation.
Lafrancesca mentioned that the ministries of Environment and
Culture also provide funds for water irrigation and museum
restoration projects respectively. Unfortunately,
Lafrancesca said, the bulk of Italy's assistance has been
used for "emergencies" (read "security"); in the near future
Italy hopes to turn more to long-term development
cooperation, especially supporting institution-building, and
the water, agriculture and health sectors. Lafrancesca also
stressed the need to stimulate the Italian private sector's
involvement in Iraq, noting that Cardarelli had recently
visited Dhi Qar province to organize an upcoming mission for
Italian companies. Lafrancesca concluded by saying the
danger of working in Iraq remains prohibitively high for
private Italian business.


13. (C) Ferrari Bravo spoke briefly about Italy's intention
to provide soft loans to Iraq, especially for agriculture and
infrastructure projects. To date Italy has set aside five
million euros to reestablish the Iraqi meteorological system,
essential to running airports. Italy cannot move forward
with the loan, however, until the Iraqi Ministry of Finance
signs a bilateral assistance agreement.

Next Steps: Trilateral Consultations with the UK
-------------- --------------


14. (C) The GOI officials were extremely appreciative of US
efforts to continue consultations on the way forward in Iraq.
In all of the meetings, they pushed for trilateral (US, UK,
Italy) consultations, noting that they recently had also held
bilateral discussions with the British.

Center-Left Denies Plans for "Zapatero" Troop Withdrawal
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Also on December 6, Deutsch briefed former Minister
of Defense and Daisy party parliamentarian Sergio Mattarella
and Democrats of the Left (DS) International Affairs Director
Luciano Vecchi on US political and reconstruction policy in
Iraq. Vecchi and Mattarella expressed appreciation for the
briefing and Mattarella asked questions about the
distribution of oil revenue in Iraq as a means of garnering
support for the central government among various ethnic
groups. Vecchi focused his questions on the ability of Shia
leaders in southern Iraq to effectively govern the provinces
in the absence of a coalition military presence. Deutsch
responded that Shia leaders are learning democratic
principles and that challenges remain both on the military
and political fronts.


16. (C) On Center-Left plans for Italian troop deployments in
Iraq in the event of a victory in the spring 2006 elections,
Vecchi said that the Center-Left will call for the withdrawal
of troops and establish a calendar for that withdrawal over
an extended period of time. Deutsch cautioned as to the
dangers of establishing dates for withdrawal given the fluid
nature of developments in Iraq. Vecchi repeated comments
previously made to Poloff (Ref B) that the calendar did not
necessarily imply dates. Vecchi specifically said that the
Center-Left, despite calls from radical elements in the
coalition, would never withdraw in the way the Spanish did.
He also said that a small military contingent could possibly
remain to assist in police and other security training where
he believes Italians have considerable expertise. He said
that Italian civilian cooperation would certainly remain and
might even increase.


17. (C) Deutsch participated in a December 6 roundtable
discussion with leading think tank analysts hosted by the
Aspen Institute. The group included former Italian
Ambassador to Washington Ferdinando Salleo; Laura Mirachian
(Italy's candidate to replace Paddy Ashdown as the UN High
Representative for Bosnia); Stefano Silvestri, Director of
the Institute for International Affairs and former Under
Secretary of Defense; Karim Mezran, Director for the Center

SIPDIS
for American Studies; Carlo Jean, former military advisor to
former President Cossiga; Lucio Caracciolo, Chief Editor of
Limes (an Italian geopolitical review) and editorialist for
La Repubblica; Monica Maggioni, TV journalist with state-run
TG1; and Marta Dassu, Director of the Aspen Institute. The
wide-ranging discussion focused mainly on internal political
developments in Iraq (sectarianism and the role of the Kurds
in keeping a united Iraq, the opposing influences of Iran and
Al-Sistani on Shia fundamentalists, prospects for the Sunnis
under a federal system, etc.) as well as external factors
such as the evolving role of coalition forces, and the
destabilizing influence of Syria and Iran.


18. (C) Comment: Deutsch's visit was timely and very much
welcomed by GOI Iraq specialists who have routinely asked for
more frequent intensive Iraq consultations. It follows up
directly on the Secretary's undertaking to FM Fini for more
Iraq consultations. The next step, in the GOI view, is
trilateral US-UK-Italy discussions (Italy's troops serve in
the UK sector). End comment.


19. (U) Deputy Senior Advisor Deutsch has cleared this cable.
SPOGLI