Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ROME4005
2005-12-06 17:06:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON "CLUSTER LEADS" STRATEGY

Tags:  EAID PREF EAGR AORC UN WFP FAO 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 004005 

SIPDIS

FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME

STATE FOR PRM/MCE; IO/EDA SKOTOK
USAID FOR DCHA FOR JEFF DRUMTRA; OFDA MLUTZ AND MBBRENNAN
USUN NEW YORK FOR TMALY
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH/USAID
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER AND PMANSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF EAGR AORC UN WFP FAO
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON "CLUSTER LEADS" STRATEGY
FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

REF: STATE 215257

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 004005

SIPDIS

FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME

STATE FOR PRM/MCE; IO/EDA SKOTOK
USAID FOR DCHA FOR JEFF DRUMTRA; OFDA MLUTZ AND MBBRENNAN
USUN NEW YORK FOR TMALY
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH/USAID
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER AND PMANSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF EAGR AORC UN WFP FAO
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON "CLUSTER LEADS" STRATEGY
FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

REF: STATE 215257


1. Summary. This message responds to reftel query of UN
agencies regarding a strategy for more effective division
of labor among these agencies in the field in meeting the
needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs). USUN-Rome
transmitted to the World Food Program (WFP) as the
sectoral lead on logistics the seven pertinent demarche
questions (A-G); see Section I for WFP's detailed
responses. Also, based on a request by USUN-Rome and on
communications with USAID/DCHA's Jeff Drumtra, Mission
transmitted same to the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO); see Section II for FAO's response. USUN Rome
echoes many of the concerns raised by the FAO regarding
coordination, and in addition has concerns regarding the
possible financial impact of WFP's role in the logistics
clusters and the need for closer oversight by the WFP
Executive Board. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Section I: WFP Response to the Questionnaire
-------------- --------------


2. A) APPROVAL PROCESS: It is important at the outset to
underscore that the cluster lead approach as approved by
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is projected
to be used in all large complex emergencies and is not
restricted only to response to IDP situation. WFP
considers its responsibility as cluster lead for
logistics as an elaboration of an existing role. WFP has
previously been given responsibility by the IASC for
management of the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) and
IASC has endorsed WFP leadership of the UN Humanitarian
Air Service (UNHAS). WFP has in the past performed
interagency logistics services on a case-by-case basis
and views the "cluster lead" designation as providing a
more formal, systematic basis for providing such
services. The WFP Executive Board has already approved
WFP performing interagency logistics and
telecommunications services: 1) when requested by other

parts of the UN system; and 2) when sufficient resources
are available to perform such services. WFP therefore
does not believe it needs additional governing board
authority to accept the cluster lead agency role, which
has already been approved internally by its Executive
Director. The Program will, however, keep its Executive
Board regularly informed of WFP activities undertaken in
its cluster lead role.

B) TIMEFRAME: The logistics cluster is preparing a
written plan on future cluster work for consideration by
the IASC Principals. Any decision on when and how to
share this plan with donors will be taken collectively by
the IASC.

C) FUNDING: WFP expects there will be some additional
costs in carrying out its cluster coordination and
preparedness responsibilities, as well as costs in
providing interagency logistics and emergency
telecommunications services in specific emergencies.
Exact costs will depend on the frequency and size of
emergencies for which interagency cluster logistics
services are requested. WFP does not view the cluster
lead as having a major role in raising resources for
other actors involved in the sector. WFP does have the
capacity to mobilize cash resources for operational
implementation of interagency logistics and
telecommunication services through the Special Operations
(SO) program category established by its Executive Board.

D) STAFFING & ORGANIZATION: WFP expects that there may
be need for some modest staffing increases in the
logistics service within WFP, but the full implications
on internal organizational structure are still under
consideration. Any staffing changes are likely to be at
the level that can be approved by the Executive Director
under his delegated authority, but the WFP Executive
Board would be informed of the organizational
implications of cluster leadership. To the extent
cluster responsibilities require additional resources,
board approval may also be required.

E) COORDINATION VS. OPERATIONAL: As food aid provided by
WFP usually presents the largest logistical requirements
in any humanitarian emergency, WFP will be "operational"
in logistics for its own programs in virtually every
emergency. The extent to which it assumes broader
interagency coordination or operational tasks will depend
on the specifics of the situation and what is requested
of WFP by the humanitarian coordinator and the UN Country
Team (UNCT) and what coordination tasks can be managed
solely by the UNJLC. At the global level, both cluster
leads and OCHA are at the service of the IASC. At the
country level, cluster leads and OCHA support the
humanitarian coordinator (HC). WFP's links with OCHA are
through the IASC and the HC.

F) LAST RESORT: The logistics cluster has developed its
workplan on the basis that other sectors (shelter, water
and sanitation, food, health) will manage their own
logistics as part of an integrated supply chain approach
in most circumstances. WFP as cluster lead would provide
interagency logistics services as a "last resort" when
the size and magnitude of the logistics challenges
require more robust interagency coordination and action.
Requests from other agencies/cluster leads, vetted
through the HC, would be the basis of considering
providing such "last resort" services. WFP believes that
cluster leads should be prepared to initiate activities
in a crisis even before donor contributions flow if
donors provide sufficient resources through early
response mechanisms (such as WFP's Immediate Response
Account or OCHA's CERF) to permit funding advances to
cover costs of early response.

G) PILOT COUNTRY TEST: The UN Country Teams in Liberia,
DRC and Uganda have proposed cluster arrangements that do
not exactly parallel the nine clusters established by the
IASC at the global level. WFP believes such flexibility
at the country level is essential. In the case of Liberia
and the DRC, the UNCT has expressed interest in having a
food security cluster (with WFP and/or FAO leadership),
representing an enhancement of existing sectoral
coordination mechanisms already existing in country. It
is not clear at this time if the logistics requirements
in any of these three countries will require any
additional responsibilities for WFP as cluster lead. WFP
believes it is too early to tell if the cluster approach
will lead to changes in the division of labor in Sudan, a
situation that is further complicated by the existence of
a significant humanitarian coordination structure under
the authority of the UN integrated mission in Sudan.
WFP believes that, on balance, use of the cluster
approach in Pakistan was positive, but that there were
lessons for improving the cluster approach in the future.
These include: 1) the importance of allowing the country
team to modify global cluster divisions of labor and
leadership roles if required to respond to local
circumstances; 2) the need to manage cluster meetings and
coordination mechanisms more efficiently so they enhance
rather than delay quick operational action; and 3)
clarity that cluster leads at country level report to the
HC, and not to the global cluster lead headquarters unit,
so as to ensure coherent management of the overall
humanitarian response at country level.

-------------- --------------
Section II: FAO Response to the Questionnaire
-------------- --------------


3. Global clusters with lead agencies have been
identified to address key gaps in humanitarian action,
following the findings of the Humanitarian Response
Review (HRR) that was commissioned by OCHA in the wake of
the perceived slow humanitarian response to the outbreak
of conflict and massive displacement in Darfur. The OCHA
led cluster initiative was meant to be about identifying
ways of plugging the gaps, particularly in the first
three months, to sudden onset crises. However, the
process has gained a lot of momentum and is likely to
influence the architecture of planning in protracted
crises and post conflict transition, as we have seen in
DRC where the DSRSG has taken up the HRR clusters with
enthusiasm.


4. Organization and leadership is: not yet cast in
concrete; far from comprehensive (i.e., it does not cover
those sectors not identified as a problem); and meant to
be applied flexibly. For instance there is no food
cluster because it was not identified as a gap and
leadership of WFP is not in question. But there is a
Nutrition cluster led by UNICEF, which focuses only on
supplementary and therapeutic feeding. While the
clusters were not intended to become the basis for a new
architecture for appeals, it does seem to be going that
way.


5. Most agencies are unhappy with the plethora of HQ-
based meetings (particularly in the Geneva bubble) and
emails when the focus would rather be on supporting the
field. Many agencies are also complaining about the
excessive haste in the process resulting in many problems
and confusion so far, particularly in rolling out the
cluster approach in Pakistan and the DRC. On the other
hand, the big agencies that have been assigned or lobbied
heavily for cluster leadership roles do see it as an
opportunity to better their own resource mobilization.


6. In the field, the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator
and the UN Country Team (UNCT) define the clusters,
sectors, leaders and architecture of appeals based on
crisis-specific humanitarian issues to be addressed and
the comparative advantage of each agency for a leadership
role. For instance in DRC, FAO leads a food security
cluster with WFP and there is no early recovery cluster
(which was meant to be a forum for addressing a cross
cutting issue and not to be a component of an appeal).


7. In Pakistan, it made no sense to have a nutrition
cluster focusing on therapeutic and supplementary
feeding, as this was not an issue. Thus, WFP and UNICEF
joined forces and formed a food and nutrition cluster and
did a food security assessment with Oxfam including the
impact of the earthquake on livelihoods. FAO was
sidelined to an early recovery/reconstruction cluster led
by UNDP (which donors had no interest in because
funds were short and priority was given to life saving.
In FAO's view, this really backfired as it reinforced the
divide between saving lives and saving livelihoods while
FAO, the Tufts Famine Centre and others have been arguing
that saving livelihoods saves lives). In many ways, FAO
was marginalized by the UNDP Coordinator and UNCT even
though FAO did try hard to include a better livelihoods
assessment than by Oxfam. Ninety-five percent of the
affected population have agricultural-based livelihoods
and have lost most of their productive assets. Unless
steps are taken to protect surviving livestock and ensure
the spring planting, malnutrition will become a problem
and food aid will be required at a much higher cost
through 2007. FAO has discussed this experience with
WFP. At the HQ level, WFP is interested in joining
forces on a food security cluster and in food security/
livelihood assessments. In the field, however, some WFP
directors may not want to play that way.


8. A real issue is that cluster leaders may abuse their
leadership role particularly when resources are short to
bias decision-making on resource allocation towards their
agency and sector and that other sector leaders lose
their voice in meetings with the UN Coordinator and
donors. Already some strong sector leaders are arguing
for their sector to become a cluster. For instance,
health was not identified as a gap, but WHO argued and
won the case for a Health cluster; similarly UNICEF is
arguing for an Education cluster. FAO should join forces
with other agencies around food and nutrition security,
and fight very hard when it believes protection of
agricultural-based livelihoods is not being given the
attention and funding it deserves.


9. FAO will raise these issues at the December meeting of
the heads of agencies to discuss the cluster approach in
humanitarian action. FAO believes that clusterization is
not yet principled, but over driven by the strong
agencies' funding interests. Meanwhile, work on
standardizing a Needs Analysis Framework (NAF) that would
be less biased by agency interests has gone on the back
burner. Donors could ensure that the NAF is brought back
to the top of the agenda. Moreover, if rampant
clusterization continues the guidelines for needs
analysis, Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAPs),
Consolidated Appeals Process (CAPs) and Flash Appeals
will have to be modified. FAO will continue to advocate
for an holistic approach to food security, including
protection and early rehabilitation of agricultural-based
livelihoods as a key component of humanitarian action in
order to reduce needs first and enable a rapid exit.

-------------- --------------
USUN Rome Comments:
-------------- --------------


10. USUN Rome finds the frank discussion of concerns of
clusterization in the FAO response useful. We have
concerns over WFP's responses to B) Approval Process and
C) Funding. In the interest of more transparent and
controlled costs as well as an efficient and effective
WFP, USUN Rome and USAID/Food For Peace are currently
engaging WFP in a dialogue on issues of increased costs
relative to food aid delivered and an Indirect Support
Cost charge that exceeds actual overhead costs. Although
the WFP Executive Board has approved Special Operations
to include enhanced coordination within the UN system and
with other partners through the provision of designated
common services, of which interagency logistics
coordination and telecommunications projects are part, as
its largest donor, the U.S. must be mindful that this
extended role may generate financial implications to WFP
and donors. Understanding the clusters framework was
created to fill notable gaps in humanitarian assistance,
the WFP Executive Board at a future date may need to
discuss this issue to further clarify the parameters for
the use of funds related to the clusters strategy. We
are concerned that decisions made by the IASC and OCHA
may circumvent or work at cross-purposes to the WFP
Executive Board. USUN Rome is available to query further
on this or any related UN cluster leads strategy.

CLEVERLEY