SERBIA/MONTENEGRO AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 003729

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IT MW SR NATO
SUBJECT: SERBIA/MONTENEGRO AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON RELATIONS
WITH ITALY, POSSIBLE MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM


Classified By: Classified by Gabriel Escobar, Political Officer, for re
asons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. On November 8, Poloff met with Amb. Darko
Uskokovic, Serbia/Montenegro Ambassador to Italy to discuss
his views on the bilateral relationship between SaM and Italy
and a possible Montenegrin referendum for independence.
Uskokovic, a politically-appointed Ambassador who is close to
Montenegrin PM Djukanovic, stated that one of his priorities
as ambassador in Italy would be to ensure "proper"
Montenegrin representation in the bilateral relationship and
to work to allay Italian fears of an independent Montenegro.
End summary.


2. (C) On November 8, Poloff met with Uskokovic at his
request to discuss the current political situation in the
Balkans. Uskokovic is an influential member of the ruling
Montenegrin DPS party and staunch supporter of Montenegrin
independence. Uskokovic stated that he agreed to leave his
position as Montenegrin Minister of Economy to become SaM
ambassador to Italy after a Montenegrin leadership decision
to populate the central government institutions in Belgrade
with competent, pro-independence figures from Montenegro.
This policy marks a departure from a long-standing
Montenegrin policy of ignoring the central government or
using it as a place to exile those who had passed their
political prime. Central to this policy was a goal of
sending pro-independence ambassadors and deputy chiefs of
missions to key Western nations. Uskokovic noted that his
first priority will be to ensure that his staff gives an
accurate and balanced view of the political situation in SaM,
including the view that "Montenegro has the democratic right
to vote on its future status."


3. (C) Uskokovic claimed that despite his personal interest
in seeing Montenegro become independent, he will continue to
defend the interests of the central government. He added,
however, that he hoped that he could help overcome opposition
to potential Montenegrin independence. His efforts will
focus on three themes:

- To dispel the notion that Montenegro is a
crime-exporting entity and a haven for smugglers. "We live
in a bad neighborhood," he added, pointing out that Bosnia,
Kosovo, Albania and Serbia have similar or worse crime
problems than Montenegro. The Montenegro leadership was
puzzled as to why the US and EU believed that the current
union created better conditions to fight organized crime than
an independent Serbia and independent Montenegro.

- To allay fears that an independent Montenegro would
become an economically failed state. Montenegro gains no
economic benefit from Serbia, he stated, and Montenegro gets
no transfer payments, subsidies or food and fuel discounts
from Serbia. The current plan of the Montenegrin leadership
would be to propose a union of independent states that would
provide for freedom of movement, goods, labor, and capital.
The only difference, he said, would be voting rights. The US
and EU should not fear a population displacement or economic
disruption caused by a declaration of Montenegrin
independence.

- To urge Italian leaders to avoid linking a Montenegrin
referendum to Kosovar independence. International pressure
to keep Montenegro from holding a referendum will not
decrease Kosovar Albanian demands for independence.
Similarly, keeping Montenegro would be a poor "consolation
prize" for Serbian leadership in the wake of Kosovar
independence.


4. (C) Uskokovic plans to urge GOI interlocutors to look more
closely at the unstable Serbian political situation. The
current Serbian leadership is so fragile that it cannot
afford to take any decisions at all regarding the status of
the union, combating organized crime, or making painful
economic reforms. "In the end, this is not leadership," he
stated, questioning whether the US and EU wanted to preserve
the current government at the cost of future stability. He
agreed that the a shift to a Radical Party government or a
coalition that included the SRS would be a serious setback,
but the US and EU needed to be more imaginative in finding
ways to advance the transatlantic agenda than by stifling the
democratic processes in Kosovo and Montenegro.


5. (C) When asked about a possible postponement of a
Montenegrin referendum from the spring of 2006 to the fall of
2006, Uskokovic noted that he believed the DPS would not want
to risk losing momentum during local election campaigns,
which he insisted were more important to the current
coalition than the 2006 parliamentary elections. Djukanovic,
in his view, would be more responsive to the pressures of his
own party to hold a referendum sooner rather than later than
he would be to pressure from the Contact Group.

6. (C) Comment: Uskokovic's comments are a reiteration of the
same line that the Djukanovic government has pressed for the
last 7 years. Although there may be some validity to
Uskokovic's arguments, they are unlikely to convince the
Italians to drop their opposition to an early referendum in
Montenegro.
SPOGLI