UN REFORM, IRAN: VISIT OF IO A/S SILVERBERG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 003597

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015
TAGS: PREL KUNR XF IT UNSC
SUBJECT: UN REFORM, IRAN: VISIT OF IO A/S SILVERBERG

REF: ROME 03538

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor David D. Pearce, reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Summary. Italian officials told visiting A/S
Silverberg they would look at any UNSC reform proposal except
national permanent seats, such as the G4 proposal. They
agree on the importance of moving forward before the end of
the year on UN Secretariat reform, the Peace Building
Commission, and the Human Rights Council. MFA officials
pledged to work to close the gap between the U.S. and EU on
UNESCO's cultural diversity convention, which they saw as a
difference in interpretation, not substance. A/S Silverberg
delivered a clear message to both MFA and prime ministerial
officials on the importance of unity and clarity on the
U.S.-EU message to Iran. Italian officials stressed the
political importance to them of such high-level
consultations, especially on issues like Iraq, Iran, and UN
reform, where Italy's interests are heavily engaged. Iraq
portion of conversation reported reftel (notal). End summary.



2. (C) Assistant Secretary for International Organizations
Kristen Silverberg met with senior officials from the Italian
MFA and PM Berlusconi's office October 21 to discuss
multilateral issues including UN reform, Iraq, Iran, Syria,
the UN logistical base in Brindisi, and the UNESCO cultural
convention. She was accompanied by Rome Political M/C,
poloff, and IO senior adviser.

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UN Reform
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3. (C) "Not that we're obsessed" said a senior MFA official,
but UN Security Council expansion continues to be a key issue
for Italy. Director General for Political and Multilateral
Affairs Giulio Terzi and PM Berlusconi's Deputy Diplomatic
Advisor Francesco Talo both emphasized that they are happy
with the current U.S. position on UNSC changes. They
reiterated Italy's opposition to the G4 proposal, since it
would give Germany a permanent UNSC seat and relegate Italy
to a second-tier among European powers. A/S Silverberg said
the United States only expressed specific support for an
additional Japan seat, although our general thinking was in
terms of a possible two or so permanent and three or so
non-permanent seats. Terzi indicated that it might be
possible to re-examine the definition of "permanent", but
Italy was not interested in making P5 veto rights part of the
debate. Talo said that Italy would be willing to look at any
formula except national permanent seats.


4. (C) Terzi and Talo agreed with A/S Silverberg on the
importance of moving forward before the end of the year on
Secretariat reform, the Peace Building Commission, and the

SIPDIS
Human Rights Council. A/S Silverberg highlighted the need for
progress on management reform before the December budget
deadline and Terzi agreed to build consensus to move up the
timetable to November. Italy supports a peer review process
for the Human Rights Council, but Terzi commented that
membership criteria might be hard to work out with important
players like China that have human rights problems. The EU
is discussing membership criteria that would allow a large
majority of UN members to qualify while avoiding the "bad
composition" of the current membership. Members could
possibly be approved based on a 2/3 vote of UNGA members and
a commitment, before UNGA, to abide by the highest standards
of human rights protection. A/S Silverberg indicated the GA
should also adopt minimal criteria--like excluding countries
currently under UN sanctions for human rights abuses--to
exclude truly bad actors.


5. (C) Italy's main concern in establishing a Peace Building
Commission (PBC) is its position in the UN hierarchy, with
Italy preferring a commission that recognizes ECOSOC's role,
although Terzi recognized the UNSC role during the crisis
phase of an operation. He felt the PBC should answer to
ECOSOC in the latter, developmental stages of a crisis. thus
avoiding some of the current misunderstandings and friction
between peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. A/S
Silverberg pointed out the potential difficulties in having a
Peace Building Commission with two masters.

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Iran
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6. (C) A/S Silverberg emphasized to Terzi, Sessa, and Talo
the importance of maintaining a united front on Iran and not
allowing Tehran to engage in its usual effort to play on
perceived differences among the positions of the U.S. and
various EU member states. Sessa, noting that he had served
as ambassador in Iran, said the government situation in
Tehran was very complex. The supreme leader had given new
powers to Rafsanjani; this worked to undermine the power of
the new president. Internal tensions could follow. It was
important to use both sticks and carrots with Iran, but in
the right way. A/S Silverberg replied that this was just the
time when it was most important that Iran see unity and firm
resolution by the U.S. and EU. It was essential that no
individual countries offer Iran any "carrots" under the table.


7. (C) Sessa said Italian contacts with both Iran and Syria
was at ambassador level. There is cohesion and this is
essential, but to achieve what? The first concern in Iran is
the stability of the regime. And Iran, unfortunately, can
play a negative role in the stability of the region. Pol M/C
put in that the Iranians do not respect weakness, they seek
to exploit it. They do understand clarity. Sessa responded
that only our country--the United States--can contribute to
an Iranian policy change. The EU has only limited influence.
Dialogue with the U.S. would be "very disruptive" for them,
he said. "You are the only ones who can legitimate the
regime, and this is their real target."


8. (C) Terzi and Sessa noted that Italy had concerns with the
EU3 negotiating format (which it would never voice publicly),
which they say is problematic within the EU context. Terzi
explained that, holding the EU presidency at the time, Italy
did not feel it was appropriate to join the EU3 when it
initially formed. Now that the EU3 is more than a temporary
format, Italy would like to be in close consultations with
the group, as the United States and Russia are. Italy has
been left out of the picture repeatedly, according to Terzi,
which places them in a difficult position as Iran's main
European trade partner. Terzi commented that Italy often had
to ask the Russians for information on Iran talks because it
heard nothing from the EU3.

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Syria
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9. (C) In response to that morning's release of the Mehlis
report on Syrian involvement in the Hariri assassination,
Sessa said it was important to renew the commission's UN
mandate. Italy shares the U.S. view of Syria, according to
Berlusconi's diplomatic advisor Marco Carnelos, but wants to
avoid what it views as an even worse situation: regime
collapse and Sunni extremists or the Muslim Brotherhood in
charge in Damascus. Change is fine, but it should be
well-calibrated.

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UN Logistical Base in Brindisi
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10. (C) Terzi reiterated Italy's concern with DPKO's plans to
build a back-up communications center in Valencia, Spain, for
functions now located in the UN Logistical and Communications
Base in Brindisi. Italy feels any back-up capabilities that
might be built in Valencia could be more efficiently
incorporated into the existing Brindisi operation. Terzi also
expressed concerns that Italy was not consulted in the
decision-making process and only found out about the
initiative from the press. A/S Silverberg assured Terzi that
we value the Brindisi operation. We were not sure what DPKO
had in mind, but would look into it.

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UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention
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11. (C) A/S Silverberg raised U.S. concerns regarding
potential misuse of the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention,
especially in light of recent announcements by the French.
Adolfo Barattolo, head of the Cultural Affairs Office,
responded that Italy viewed the convention positively. The
Italians share our view that the convention should not be
misused in trade negotiations, but do not think this misuse
is likely. Terzi recognized the importance of keeping the
United States in UNESCO and promised to work within the EU on
interpretation of the document. (On October 24, Terzi called
DCM to report that Italy had been working hard on this issue,
both in Rome and with Brussels, and he felt the result would
be clarification of the interpretation of Article 20, "in a
way you like.")

Comment
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12. (C) In each of A/S Silverberg's meetings, Italian
officials stressed the value to them of consultations on
issues where they are heavily involved, whether bilateral or
multilateral. The MFA clearly took A/S Silverberg's message
on UNESCO's cultural diversity convention to heart, and
understood well the substance of U.S. concerns. The visit
was also a timely opportunity to deliver USG views on the
need for a clear and unified message on Iran to senior
policymakers of one of Tehran's major trading partners. End
comment.


13. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Silverberg.
SPOGLI