BOSSI-FINI IMMIGRATION REFORM: THE RESULTS ARE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002922

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB IT ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION
SUBJECT: BOSSI-FINI IMMIGRATION REFORM: THE RESULTS ARE IN


Classified By: LABOR COUNSELOR CANDACE PUTNAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)(D).


1. (C) Summary. Italian efforts to manage legal immigration
and limit illegal immigration have met with mixed success.
The Bossi-Fini law of 2002 produced a limited
regularization of illegal workers but failed to establish
viable long-term procedures to either encourage the legal
immigration Italy needs to sustain its economy or restrict
the illegal immigration that many fear breeds crime and
Islamic extremism. Economists criticized the law as
ineffective; human rights groups attacked it for violating
constitutional rights. In the wake of the London bombings
and terrorist threats, Italy approved new anti-terrorism
legislation and recent police crackdowns focused on illegal
immigrants. But the debate over how to fix Bossi-Fini in a
way that meets economic needs, addresses security concerns
and preserves Italian civil rights has just begun. End
Summary.

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History
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2. (U) With the second-lowest birthrate and the largest
percentage of elderly in its population in Europe, Italy
needs immigrants to support rising pension and health care
costs and sustain its future economy. Yet, Italy has
traditionally been a country of emigrants; immigration is
a relatively new phenomenon that began in the 1970's. The
immigrant population doubled between 1975-80 to surpass
500,000; today there are 2.9 million legal immigrants and
approximately 600,000 illegal immigrants in Italy. Current
estimates suggest that 33% of all illegal immigrants
crossed the border without visas, and 67% are legal border
entries who have overstayed their permits. While many
immigrants transit Italy in the search for better jobs in
northern Europe, an increasing number, are staying and
working in the underground economy, which accounts for
as much as 20% of Italy,s economic output. As the number of
illegal immigrants rose, new legislation was introduced in
1998 and 2002 to help combat the phenomena

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Immigration Legislation
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3. (U) The Bossi-Fini Law of 2002 was designed to
regularize immigrants already in Italy and to prevent
further illegal immigration from occurring. It was
introduced by Umberto Bossi, leader of the Northern League
(a right-wing party based in northern Italy that uses often
xenophobic rhetoric to raise concerns about how immigration
threatens security, cultural homogeneity and social
cohesion) and Gianfranco Fini, leader of the National
Alliance (AN) party (a center-right party with fascist
roots that also supports strong immigration controls).
Both the Northern League and AN are members of the
Berlusconi ruling coalition; Fini is now Deputy PM and FM.


4. (U) The Bossi-Fini law sought to control the number of
legal immigrants and where they could work using a strict
national and regional quota system. Under the law,
immigrants seeking entry must have employment prior to
applying for a visa and/or residency permit. The law
requires employers to provide the immigrants with
transportation and housing and to pay a fee of 300-800 Euro
per worker. The government sets national and regional
quotas on immigration as it sees fit, and the limits do not
always correspond to employer demand or the availability of
jobs. Fines for those who assist illegal immigrant
entrances into the country and those who employ them rose
steeply under this law.


5. (C) Opponents of the Bossi-Fini law focus on economic
and social concerns. Italy,s long coastline and geographic
proximity to North Africa and Eastern Europe make
regulating immigration a very difficult, if not impossible
task. Additionally, because immigrants come to Italy for
economic reasons, they settle in areas where jobs are
abundant regardless of the quota system. The majority of
businesses (85%) are small to medium size and do not have
the capacity to deal with the paperwork or cannot afford
the regularization fee. Until 2004-2005, there were no
private jobs banks or employment services and only limited
legal part-time work, which made it difficult for
immigrants to find jobs prior to arrival. The law has
further complicated bureaucratic processes associated with
immigrant legalization, family reunification, arrests,
expulsion, and residency. Monitoring individuals and
organizations who break the law is costly, complicated and
often ineffective.


6. (C) Many critics predicted that the quota system,
coupled with expensive new bureaucratic regulations, would
encourage rather than discourage illegal immigration and
underground work. Employers have an incentive to risk
fines and bypass the system to employ cheap low-skilled
laborers, who are arriving in increasing numbers.
Bossi-Fini also did not address Italy,s long-term need to
match employment needs (whether for seasonal
agricultural/construction workers or high-tech specialists)
to the pool of potential immigrants.

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Impact of Regularization
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7. (U) In the first week after implementation, over 30,000
immigrants were legalized. Although the government
expected around 100,000, this was considered a good start.
Between 2002 and 2003, over 700,000 migrants became
legalized under Bossi-Fini, creating a dramatic increase in
the number of tax-paying laborers in the legal work force.
In 2004, almost 130,000 laborers became regularized. During
the
first-quarter of 2005, there was a smaller declared
employment growth of 1.4%, which government officials are
attributing partially to the regularization of immigrant
workers and partially to a 2003 law that increased labor
market flexibility by allowing employers to hire part-time
workers without providing full benefits. The largest
levels of growth took place in the sectors of construction
(8.9%)and services (1.3%),traditionally areas of migrant
employment. In the north, the region most foreigners
migrate to upon entrance to Italy, over 180,000 jobs were
created during the first quarter of 2005.


8. (U) In 2004, anticipating an even larger migration
flux, the government fixed the 2005 immigration quota at
79,500; above the original long-term plan of
60,000-70,000. The 2005 quota allows for 25,000 seasonal,
30,000 non-seasonal, and 15,000 domestic worker entrances
in 2005, with specific limits on how many workers can come
from each high-level migration country. Most of the limits
are on Albanian (3000 per year),Tunisian (3000 per year),
and Moroccan immigrants (2500 per year),who make up the
largest percentages of the immigrant population and are the
biggest source of illegal immigration.


9. (U) The data indicates that the Bossi-Fini reforms are
not working as the Government had hoped. The most recent
Caritas (a Catholic NGO) data estimates that illegal--those
who came to Italy without visas--and irregular--those who
came
to Italy with visas that have expired--immigrants present in
Italy rose 12.5% between 2002 and 2003. There is a high
intensity of underground employment in bars and restaurants
(22.3%),in small commercial enterprises (17.4%),and in
agriculture (17.3%).


10. (U) The number of expulsions of illegal immigrants and
the number of immigrants turned away at the borders
declined significantly between 2002 and 2003, but rose
again in 2004-2005 with the influx of illegals arriving in
boatloads from Libya. Italy has been criticized by the
human rights community for its new policy to quickly return
these immigrants to Libya without adequate asylum
processing. Italy was successful in reducing illegal
immigration for Albania by providing border control
assistance and training and is pursuing a similar bilateral
program with Libya.

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Security and Social Concerns
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11. (C) In the wake of the London bombings, Italy enacted a
new Anti-Terrorism law, and the police have cracked down on
illegal immigrants with 141 arrests and over 700 planned
expulsions since the beginning of August. With a
heightened terror alert, it is likely this trend will
continue in Italy through the 2006 national elections.


12. (C) The majority of Italians associate immigrants with
clandestine immigration, and clandestine immigration with
the black market and crime. The numbers of illegal
immigrants
arrested in for crimes rose in 2004, justifying
the stereotype. It is important to point out that the
number of criminal offenses associated with legal
immigrants, however, is extremely low. Statistics like
these, coupled with media coverage of clandestine

immigrants trying to reach southern Italy via
sea-transport, have heightened growing discrimination
against immigrants, particularly in the North. Parties
like Northern League and National Alliance have used
these images and statistics to gain support for their
anti-immigrant platforms, which have become popular
in the 2006 national election campaign.


13. (C) Although perhaps overtaken by the new Antiterrorism
legislation, left and center-left critics of Bossi-Fini
continue to criticize the law as insufficiently humane.
In 2004, the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that the
Bossi-Fini provisions allowing for rapid arrests and
deportation of illegal immigrants infringed on the personal
liberties guaranteed in Article 13 of the Italian
Constitution.
The law,s restrictions on family reunification, they argue,
are also counterproductive to efforts to integrate immigrants
into Italian society. These critics have a fundamentally
different approach to immigration than the drafters of
Bossi-Fini.

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Comment
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14. (C) Bossi-Fini was successful in bringing a limited
number
of illegals onto taxpaying business payrolls. If the
bureaucratic
obstacles to legal immigration were eliminated, there would
likely
be a further increase in declared work force numbers.
However,
the Bossi-Fini quota system and fines have failed to deter
increased illegal immigration. Lacking other solutions, the
Government raised its quota level well beyond the average
they
originally intended to pursue, but it will not be enough to
deter illegal entrances. Bossi-Fini also does not include
long-term solutions for recruiting the type of workers the
economy needs or addressing growing integration concerns.
The Government's recent crackdown in response to the London
bombings was aimed primarily at immigrants; with extremist
threats directed at Italy and a 2006 election campaign in
full
swing, this trend is likely to continue despite some concerns
about civil liberties. But the debate over how to fix
Bossi-Fini
in a way that meets economic needs, addresses security
concerns
and preserves Italian civil rights has just begun.
SPOGLI


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2005ROME02922 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL