SOMALIA: ITALY REQUESTS CLOSER CONSULTATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002413

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR SO ET IT YE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ITALY REQUESTS CLOSER CONSULTATIONS

REF: STATE 131526

Classified By: Labor Counselor Candace Putnam, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Although we may differ on what should be
addressed first--nation-building or local assistance that
supports peaceful development of a national government--Italy
supports U.S. goals for Somalia. In Italy's view the
greatest threat Somalia faces is not renewed fighting by
warlords but the growing and pernicious influence of Islamic
fundamentalists. MFA DG for Sub-Saharan Africa Dejak
insisted that Italian Senator Raffaelli consults fully with
SRSG Fall, and that the district-level reconciliation process
Italy is funding was blessed by both Fall and UNDP. Dejak
suggested closer Washington-Rome-Nairobi contacts to
eliminate "confusion" over Italian objectives. Please see an
action request in para 10.


2. (C) Labor counselor and poloff delivered reftel points
to Stefano Dejak, Director General for Sub-Saharan Africa,
and Giancarlo Izzo, former Italian Ambassador to Accra who
will replace Dejak next week. Dejak is moving on to Nairobi
to join the Special Italian Delegation for Somalia.


3. (C) Dejak opened the meeting by expressing appreciation
at what he described as the new (since March) level of U.S.
engagement in Somalian affairs. Throughout the meeting, he
stressed that Rome and Washington were in agreement on the
broad goals of reconciliation, the peaceful establishment of
a functioning central government in Somalia, and the
importance of coordinating activities through the UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). He regretted
that rumor and innuendo had perhaps confused Washington about
Rome's commitment to those goals and suggested that the best
way to eliminate this confusion was more communication. He
regretted that the proposed DVC with Brussels and other
interested states had to be canceled for technical reasons.


4. (C) In Dejak's view, the greatest danger Somalia faced
today was not the prospect of renewed fighting by warlords.
Rather the danger stems from (a) the inability of the
international community to deliver tangible and timely
progress on reconciliation that would forestall intervention
by front-line states, and (b) the pernicious and growing
influence of Islamic fundamentalists on Somali society.


5. (C) According to Dejak, if the peace process fails and
the international community does not deliver on its promises,
Somalia will again descend into war. Ethiopia agreed to
restrain itself, but only as long as Addis is convinced the
international community is making progress. After their
defeat in 1997, Dejak maintained, the Islamic fundamentalists
changed tactics and adopted a new Turabi-inspired plan to
permeate Somali society through the education, health and
water services networks. Since 40 percent of the population
is under age 14, this presents a real and future danger, one
that should be addressed through extensive civil society
programs.


6. (C) Dejak insisted that the MFA, and Italian Special
Representative Senator Mario Raffaelli, every day urge
Somalia President Yusef to cease unhelpful warlike rhetoric
and noted that Raffaelli had gone to Addis earlier in the
year to tell the Foreign Minister that Ethiopian troops must
stay out of Somalia. However, Dejak disputed our suggestion
that Yusef's rhetoric would lead to renewed attacks by the
warlords. He said that the warlords had already established
a pattern of dialogue;
on March 17, the parties agreed that frontline states could
help train Somali forces but that no foreign troops would be
sent to Somalia, either under their own or an AU/IGAD flag.
Dejak maintained that the warlords are united in saying that
there be no/no AU/IGAD operation in Somalia and that
Mogadishu remain the capital and the seat of the federal
institutions.


7. (C) On the issue of Senator Raffaelli, Dejak insisted
that Raffaelli fully supported SRSG Fall and closely
consulted with him on a regular basis, including on
Raffaelli's trip to Mogadishu. Dejak regretted the
"confusion" about this trip but pledged full and continuing
cooperation with Ambassador Fall.


8. (C) On the issue of Italian funding for district-level
reconciliation, Dejak was mildly annoyed at the suggestion
that it was an "Italian" project. Italy, he said, is trying
to enhance dialogue among Somalis and does not want this
funding to be perceived as "divisive." He maintained that

Italy was trying to foster local administration in the
districts that are ready to do so, where there is no conflict
or controversy. Dejak said he understood there was concern
in Washington about extending this project to the two regions
of Somaliland but repeated Italy did not want to create
division. He noted that Italy's effort is aimed to show with
this action that the international community goes beyond mere
words. Dejak claims that the Coordination and Monitoring
Committee (CMC) approved the project and that it is part of a
UNDP effort. In addition, according to Dejak, SRSG Fall was
aware of it from its inception.


9. (C) With out prompting, Dejak took on the issue of the
CMC and its effectiveness. In Dejak's view the CMC is broken
and has not met since April with Somalis. Italy has asked
SRSG Fall to convene a "real" CMC as soon as possible. Dejak
noted that Italy was part of the EU-Somalia Core Group that
met regularly well before SRSG Fall's arrival. Italy has
suggested the idea of reconstituting this group and,
according to Dejak, SRSG Fall is amenable.


10. (C) Ambassador Izzo suggested that what we faced was a
difference in focus. The U.S. was more interested in first
tackling nation-building, while Italy saw an urgent need to
first provide funds on the ground to foster local
institutions that would support a national government.
Perhaps, he suggested, there was a way to meld our two
approaches. Dejak encouraged more specific communication on
Somalia. Italy maintains regular contact with the UK,
Sweden, and the EU Commission on the Somali peace process,
and the Italians would like to establish a similar link with
the U.S. He proposed first a DVC among Washington, Rome, and
Nairobi (he suggested that Raffaelli might be invited to a
DVC through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi). Action Request:
Please advise if Washington would like to organize such a DVC.

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2005ROME02413 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL