Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ROME2115
2005-06-20 16:46:00
SECRET
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

IRAQ/ITALY - MOD/IDGS STUDYING ISF EMBEDDING

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL IT IZ NATO EUN IRAQI FREEDOM 
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201646Z Jun 05
S E C R E T ROME 002115 

SIPDIS


DEPT. FOR PM/ISO; PM/RSAT; PM/PMAT; NEA/I; EUR/WE; AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IT IZ NATO EUN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY - MOD/IDGS STUDYING ISF EMBEDDING
CONCEPT; SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE DELIVERED; ITALY SUPPORTS
NATO LANGUAGE IN IRAQ CONFERENCE STATEMENT

REF: A. STATE 111092


B. STATE 112917

C. STATE 114212

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott Kilner, Reasons 1.4 B and D.

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T ROME 002115

SIPDIS


DEPT. FOR PM/ISO; PM/RSAT; PM/PMAT; NEA/I; EUR/WE; AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IT IZ NATO EUN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY - MOD/IDGS STUDYING ISF EMBEDDING
CONCEPT; SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE DELIVERED; ITALY SUPPORTS
NATO LANGUAGE IN IRAQ CONFERENCE STATEMENT

REF: A. STATE 111092


B. STATE 112917

C. STATE 114212

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott Kilner, Reasons 1.4 B and D.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) Ambassador discussed Engaging the Coalition message
(Ref A) with DefMin Martino June 17; Army Attache and
PolMilCouns, accompanied by UK counterparts, followed up with
D/CHOD Castagnetti and MoD Diplomatic Advisor Amerio June 20.
The Italians noted that while they would begin an internal
GOI discussion of Ref A concept, the issue in Italy was
highly political and linked to how Italian politicians
decided to handle Iraq in connection with Italy's 2006
general elections. Martino said he would like to discuss the
US ideas with SecDef when Martino is in the US, July 12-13.
Given the highly political nature of Iraq issues, Castagnetti
urged a "top-down" approach to garner political leaders'
support before tasking military planners to work on it. He
pointed out that in Italy's case, embedding in border patrol
units or Iraqi special units would not be the purview of the
MoD or IDGS, but that of the MoI, which oversees the
Carabinieri, and SISMI, Italy's external intelligence
service. We are also seeking appointments with the MFA and
the PM's office to convey Ref A points.


2. (S) Separately, Charge presented the Secretary's oral
message on the Iraq Conference (Ref C) to FM Fini's Chief of
Cabinet Massolo, and LaborCouns raised with MFA Iraq Office
Director Maccotta June 20. Both said the Italian delegation
to the Brussels Conference had no plans to meet with the
Syrians. Massolo promised to convey the Secretary's oral
message to FM Fini. Maccotta reported that Italy had
strongly supported the UK on including NATO language in the
Conference statement (Ref B). End Summary.

MNF-I Embedment Planning
--------------


3. (S) On June 17, Amb. raised Ref A points on engaging the

Iraq coalition with DefMin Martino. Martino said he would
begin a conversation on Ref A concepts with the CHOD. He
noted that the problem for Italy, with respect to Iraq
policy, was not a military but a political one, and would be
more intensely so in the run-up to Italian general elections
in spring 2006. He said he thought PM Berlusconi would
decide to continue the Italian deployment in Iraq into 2006
and would be anxious to discuss with the US a common approach
to the future there. Martino said Italy would be happy to
receive the US high-level delegation when it comes. He added
that he would be in Washington, DC July 12-13 and would like
to meet with SecDef to discuss Ref A at that time.


4. (S) On June 20, Army Attache and PolMilCouns, accompanied
by UK DATT, called on D/CHOD Gen. Castagnetti to go over Ref
A points in detail. Gen. Castagnetti said IDGS would study
the points, but at first glance, he was rather pessimistic
about Italy's ability to embed in Iraqi units as envisioned
in Ref A. That, he said, would require full synergy among
the involved Italian authorities, and such synergy did not
exist. Embedding Italians in border patrol or special
operations units would not be a matter for the IDGS, he said,
but rather for the Ministry of Interior, which has oversight
of the Carabinieri, and for SISMI, Italy's external
intelligence service. He stressed that SISMI was jealous of
its turf, that relations between IDGS and SISMI were "not
good," and that neither SISMI nor MoI would take instruction
from IDGS.


5. (S) Gen. Castagnetti pointed out that IDGS was providing
the Iraqis with the help they were asking for in the form of
advisors to the security ministries, but not in active units
and not beyond Italy's area of responsibility, where Italians
were not in the command and control chain. IDGS, he
continued, was helping the ISF build an Iraqi brigade, with
one battalion almost formed. He asked rhetorically if we

knew the Iraqis well enough to embed with them and influence
them from inside their own units. Finally, Gen. Castagnetti
urged us to adopt a "top-down" approach in this matter,
getting senior civilian leaders to agree first and then
instruct the military and other agencies to cooperate in the
planning. It would be hard, if not impossible, to plan
something like this from the "bottom-up," he argued, implying
that was what we were trying to do. We stressed that this
was being handled at a very high level, that the Amb. had
already spoken to the Defense Minister, and that we would be
making this demarche with senior MFA officials and the PM's
office, as well as following up with a high-level delegation
from Washington.


6. (S) Also on June 20, PolMilCouns, accompanied by UK First
Secretary, went through Ref A points with MoD Diplomatic

SIPDIS
Advisor Achille Amerio. Amerio said he had seen the report
of the Washington briefing given to the Italian Embassy. One
question that emerged was whether our proposal would require
a new UN resolution. a new resolution, effectively providing
the UN's blessing of the transition in coalition involvement,
would significantly impact how Italian politicians handle the
issue as Italian elections approach. Amerio said we should
have no doubt about current Italian commitment, and thought
Ref A approach made sense as an evolutionary one that built
on the training now being done.

Iraq Conference: Italy Not Planning to Meet Syrians
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Charge presented the Secretary's oral message on the
International Conference on Iraq (Ref C) to FM Fini's Chief
of Cabinet Giampiero Massolo June 20. Massolo said the
Italian delegation to the Brussels conference had no plans to
meet with the Syrian delegation. Luigi Maccotta, MFA Iraq
Office Director, told LaborCouns the same thing, adding that
he had inserted language in Fini's draft speech saying that
border crossings should be used to further commerce and
tourism, not violence and terrorism.

Italy Supports NATO Language in Conference Statement
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Maccotta also said that Italy had strongly supported
the UK within the EU on including a reference to NATO's role
in supporting the ITG in the statement for the Iraq
Conference. He noted Italian satisfaction that a compromise
had been reached on Sunni participation in the Constitutional
Convention, but cautioned that political success might
increase insurgent attacks in the near term.


KILNER


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2005ROME02115 - Classification: SECRET