AFGHANISTAN: PRT/FSB -- ITALY URGENTLY SEEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000211

SIPDIS


BERLIN: PLEASE PASS TO AMB. MAUREEN QUINN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2014
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL AF IT AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: PRT/FSB -- ITALY URGENTLY SEEKING
ANSWERS

REF: A) ROME 178 B) STATE 2743 C) 04 ROME 3849 D) 04
ROME 2913 E) 04 ROME 2122

Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.4(b & d)


1. (U) This is an action cable. See Paragraphs 2 and 5.


2. (C) Summary. Italy is firm in its commitment and poised to
deploy a PRT and FSB to Herat before Afghan parliamentary
elections (Reftel A). However, after receiving recent U.S.
demarches on Stage II requirements, the Italians are having
doubts about whether the U.S. will support their deployment
plan. During Ambassador Quinn's January 25 visit to Rome,
the Italians will press for specific answers to three
questions on which -- in spite of explanations given by the
Embassy and US NATO -- Italian and U.S.views seem to differ.
We need either to reassure the Italians that we support their
plan or else immediately begin working with them to modify
their plan so that we can support it. ACTION REQUEST: Post
requests guidance to answer questions posed in Paragraph 5 no
later than Amb. Quinn's January 25 meetings in Rome. End
Summary.


3. (C) Over the past two weeks, the uncertainty expressed by
Italian military and MFA officials has grown. On January 19,
Italian CHOD Adm. Giampaolo di Paola telephoned CJCS to seek
clarification on U.S. positions regarding readiness for the
Italian deployment, transfer of the Herat PRT to ISAF, and
support for the Italian FSB. On January 20, working-level
officers from the Italian Defense General Staff (IDGS)
stressed to Polmil Counselor and DATT that Italy's prestige
and credibility will be damaged if the U.S. delays transfer
of the Herat PRT to Italian command beyond June 2005 (or
before Afghan parliamentary elections). According to the
officers, it is vital that Italy visibly take on the
responsibilities to which it has committed itself. In
responding to U.S. requests to take on a PRT, Italy has
assumed that, once it showed up in sufficient force, it would
take command. The Italians feel that the key condition for
transferring command should be Italian readiness and not the
readiness of others in other provinces.


4. (C) Italy is looking forward to the January 25 visit of
Coordinator for Afghanistan Maureen Quinn as an opportunity
to reconfirm bilateral understanding about the terms and
schedule of Italy's deployment. Amb. Quinn can expect
pointed questions on the three areas of particular concern
mentioned in Reftel A, Paragraph 12, and further defined in
the following paragraph.


5. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that the Department
provide the Embassy and Amb. Quinn with answers to the
following questions prior to Amb. Quinn's January 25 visit to
Rome.

Deployment Schedule
--------------
Italy has made its plans on the assumption that Italy should
deploy its PRT/FSB personnel prior to Afghan parliamentary
elections (now expected in early or mid-summer) and that ISAF
would consequently expand to at least Herat due to the
Italian ISAF presence. To meet this requirement, the
deployment schedule outlined in Reftel A is now practically
underway. QUESTIONS: Does the U.S. still support the Italian
deployment schedule? If the U.S. has problems with it, we
need to tell Italy exactly how many personnel the U.S. can
accommodate in Herat and on what timeline for the PRT and, if
possible, for the FSB.

Transfer of Herat PRT to Italian Command under ISAF
-------------- --------------
We have repeatedly told the Italians that conditions on the
ground, not a pre-set timetable, will determine the transfer
of Herat PRT to Italian command. We have also told them
repeatedly that, if Stage II requirements are not filled, the
U.S. may withdraw its offer to transfer the Herat and Farah
PRTs to ISAF command (Reftels A and B). But the Italians
have reacted unhappily to these points, and have cited recent
reports from SACEUR (NFI) indicating that conditions at Herat
are fair and improving. Italy continues to underline its
strong preference that the PRT should transition from OEF to


Italian command under ISAF once the Italian troops have
arrived (and prior to parliamentary elections). Italy does
not understand what additional changes on the ground need to
occur before its military can take command. QUESTION: The
Italians will seek U.S. confirmation that the Herat PRT's
transfer to Italian command under ISAF will occur by June

2005. Is transfer to Italian command indeed conditional on
other factors, as suggested in Reftel B? If so, Ambassador
Quinn should be prepared to define such factors clearly, in
order to give the Italians a chance to evaluate whether a
summer transfer of command is achievable.

Helicopters for Italian FSB
--------------
Italy has agreed to provide helicopteections.
However, U.S. Joint Staff has made it clear that Phase II FSB
resources must be generated through SHAPE. QUESTIONS: Is
there a realistic prospect that SHAPE can get the helicopters
needed to support the Italian FSB from April through June?
If SHAPE cannot, what should Italy do before its helicopters
are available? Can OEF helicopters be available if needed
for these months for the 100-plus Italians in the FSB? If
not, should Italy postpone the FSB deployment due to start in
April until its helicopters arrive in theater?


6. (C) Comment. Differences between the Italian and U.S.
positions on these questions have caused the Italians to
doubt whether their deployment plan will work. If we want
Italy to modify its deployment schedule, Italy must know this
quickly. We should bear in mind that, in 2004, switches in
U.S. signals caused Italy to cancel plans for PRT deployments
(first to Ghazni and later to Herat). If Italy is forced to
re-write well-advanced plans drawn up at NATO request, it may
weaken the strong Italian commitment to the success of OEF
and ISAF. End Comment.


SKODON


NNNN


2005ROME00211 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL