Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ROME1979
2005-06-10 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

EUR A/S FRIED'S ROME CONSULTATIONS, JUNE 6-7, 2005

Tags:  PREL MOPS IT NATO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001979 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS IT NATO
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED'S ROME CONSULTATIONS, JUNE 6-7, 2005


Classified By: PolMinCouns Tom Countryman, for reasons 1.5 (B)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001979

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS IT NATO
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED'S ROME CONSULTATIONS, JUNE 6-7, 2005


Classified By: PolMinCouns Tom Countryman, for reasons 1.5 (B)(D).


1. (C) Summary: EUR A/S Dan Fried met with Italian
officials and
press June 6-7 to stress our commitment to a strong
U.S.-European
partnership working through NATO and with the EU ready to
tackle
worldwide challenges. Italians viewed the "no" votes in
France and
the Netherlands on the EU Constitution not as a crisis but as
an
opportunity to improve EU institutions and better explain EU
actions
to European publics. This was also a chance for Italy to
take
the lead in strengthening trans-Atlantic relations (at French
expense, as an ancillary effect). Rome also wants to prevent
the "no" votes from derailing progress on enlargement and
engagement. Italy is inclined to provide C-130 support for
Darfur but has yet to decide if/how (to EU or NATO) to deploy
these assets. In response to Rome's renewed pitch against
G-4 proposals on UNSC reform, Fried said the U.S. was
stepping
back to await a broader consensus. Fried suggested now would
be a good time for Italy to reaffirm support for a vulnerable
Lebanese interim government and urged Italy to fully fund
commitments for Iraq at the June 21-22 Conference. See septel
for discussions on Kosovo/Balkans/Ukraine septel. End
Summary.


2. (U) EUR A/S Dan Fried, accompanied by Acting EUR DAS
Kathy Allegrone met in Rome June 6-7 with MFA Secretary
General Umberto Vattani (plus Americas DG Bisogniero, D/DG
for Europe Mancini, D/DG for Middle East del Balzo and Dept
for European Integration Office Dir Grassi),Gianni
Castellaneta, Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi/Ambassador
-designate to Washington (with PM Diplomatic Advisor
Scarante,
Americas DG Bisogniero, and PM Advisor Francesco Talo),and
U/S for Political Affairs Giulio Terzi (with NATO DG Brauzzi
and G-8 DG Cantini). Fried also held a lunch with senior
newspaper editors and a roundtable discussion with
journalists
and met with tri-mission and (via DVC) consulate employees in
a town hall. A/S Fried's meeting with Vatican Deputy FM
Parolin
will be reported by Embassy Vatican.

Italy: "No" Votes Are an Opportunity
--------------


3. (C) At every meeting, Fried explained that this visit,

his first bilateral trip as A/S, was to assess the way
ahead in the U.S.-European relationship in the wake of the
"no"
votes by France and the Netherlands on the EU Constitution.
The U.S. had no specific position on the Constitution itself--
that was Europe's business--and we recognized that EU
countries
now had some serious thinking to do about how to better
explain
the EU to its citizens. But we did not want the EU to react
to
the "no" votes by withdrawing into introspection that would
endanger a vital and active partnership with Europe on a
common worldwide agenda. President Bush in his visit to
Brussels made it a point to visit the EU as well as NATO--
this was no accident. It was a deliberate message,
reinforced
by Secretary Rice and U/S Burns, that we want an active
partnership with Europe.


4. (C) Fried noted that we also wanted to deter some EU
members from using the "no" votes to revive anti-Americanism
and the bankrupt argument that the EU was a counterweight to
the U.S. We needed and wanted a strong trans-Atlantic
partnership to move forward on an outward-looking action

agenda to promote democracy, stability and prosperity
throughout the Broader Middle East (especially Iraq and
Lebanon),the Balkans, the South Caucuses, and Sudan.
Fried said this partnership was already a reality with
Italy, which we considered a major player in Europe, and he
expressed U.S. appreciation for Rome's support in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Forum for the Future and the BMENA
initiative.


5. (C) At the MFA, Secretary General Vattani stressed that
Italy continues to support EU enlargement in a way that
supports the trans-Atlantic partnership. He cited the
December 2003 joint statement by Secretary Powell and EU
Foreign ministers (drafted by Vattani) that defined common
values and threats and supported strengthening the EU-NATO
relationship. He recommended the UK during its upcoming
EU Presidency use this paper as a basis to build U.S.-EU
cooperation. Italy was already engaged, working not only
in Iraq and Afghanistan but also with the G-8 on Yemen,
the Balkans, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Ajerbaijan.
Italy considered the Black Sea states similar to the
Mediterranean in importance. Fried agreed that NATO was
the core institution of the trans-Atlantic alliance, not
just an extension of the U.S., and said we wanted a strong
NATO capable of projecting effective multi-nationalism
(not just coalitions of the willing) beyond Europe's
traditional borders. He welcomed Italy's interest in the
Black Sea, the edge of classical Europe, where the EU
should be trying to enhance stability. The prospect of
EU membership for not just Turkey, but also Georgia and
Ukraine, was a magnet to promote democracy and prosperity.
Vattani reaffirmed Italy's support for Turkish membership
and noted the danger that some states would use the "no"
to slow enlargement. This would affect not just Turkey
but also Bulgaria and Romania.


6. (C) Castellaneta said the "no" votes did not create a
a crisis but could not be ignored either. There were ways
forward without the Constitution, perhaps to create a
Foreign Minister, extend the tenure of the Presidency, and
consider more input from individual states. This could
also be an opportunity for Italy (read PM Berlusconi) to
lead European states to support a more liberal economic
agenda, as well as a political program that strengthened
the trans-Atlantic relationship (at France's expense, he
implied). The point was to show the public that the EU
was not just an abstract entity that made life more
difficult for Europeans. He did not rule out development
of an anti-American agenda by some members, if only as a
means to change the subject. In his view, the French vote
was a rejection of expansion, a popular French reaction
against "Polish plumbers" (i.e., cheap "foreign"workers).
Castellaneta, who had just visited Tunis, also commented
that the "no" votes were worrying states in North Africa
that depended on a strong Europe to promote trade and
stability.


7. (C) Terzi, fresh from a G-8 meeting in London,
described the UK decision to postpone its referendum as
understandable, if not particularly helpful for efforts to
stabilize the mood in Europe. There was no need to
dramatize events, but Europe must face the lack of public
support and understanding for EU institutions--the recent
debate among some in Italy for returning to the lira was
one example of this reaction.


8. (C) Tactically, Terzi reported the European Council
would in the next few days try to assess next steps. They
had to absorb the shock and proceed carefully but had to
keep in mind the two-year timetable for approval of the
Constitution. He echoed Castellaneta's suggestions--to
strengthen foreign policy capability, even without the
Constitution, and to support stability in the Balkans and
Quartet action in the Middle East. It was important to
consider the effect of the "no" votes on enlargement;
Sofia, he said, is already concerned. Then there is the
question of Turkey; Italy supports membership but France
could use the votes to slow or block negotiations with

Ankara. Terzi noted that the original concept of the EU had
not been to allow a few big states to call the shots on
major issues like Iraq or ESDI. The whole point of
creating supra-national institutions was to rise above
nationalism. Italy could now position itself as a
proponent of a Europe comprised of equal partners and
strong trans-Atlanticism. There were opportunities to
review cooperation with the U.S. every day on Kosovo,
Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, MEPP.

UNSC Reform: Final Blow for Integration
--------------


9. (C) Vattani commented that the "no" votes exposed deep
rifts ("subterranean rivers") within Europe. The G-4
proposal
to reform the UNSC would only deepen these rifts, and we
could
face not only the lack of a common agenda but the
possibility the U.S. and EU will not be talking at all. He
warned it could create bitter exchanges and mechanical
reactions based on nationalist interests that would
reverberate beyond New York. Vattani noted that it was not
in Italy's interest to prevent others from joining the
Security Council, but Rome remained concerned that reform
would create further divisions in Europe. He was not sure
that Washington fully understood this.


10. (C) Fried responded that we do appreciate the depth of
Italian feeling on this issue. This is a tough issue for
us. We support UN reform that improves the efficiency and
effectiveness of the institution but UNSC reform must be
based on a broad consensus that does not yet exist. This
is true even in Asia, where we have already committed to
giving Japan a seat. But we are not interested in
exacerbating tensions or increasing divisions. This is not
just an Italian problem. The U.S. has not yet taken a
position on the details of UNSC reform; we want first to see
broad
consensus. Vattani suggested the U.S. needs to publicize
that position and joked, "do we want five more years of
Schroeder?"


11. (C) Terzi characterized the G-4 offer on reform as
the final blow to European integration, at least for
foreign policy. With Castellaneta and Terzi, Fried
reiterated that the U.S. wanted to step back to look
carefully at the question of UNSC reform. We did not want
to exacerbate tensions in the name of improving
international relations.

Darfur: Decision on C-130 Deployment June 7
--------------


12. (C) Fried told Vattani, Castellaneta and Terzi that
there was plenty of work for all in Sudan, but it was
important for each country and institution to focus on its
competitive advantages. The U.S. and France offered to
airlift battalions of the African Union. SHAPE is best
positioned to organize an airlift; EU countries have
airlift assets to lend. We were asking Italy to provide
one-two of its C-130's to this important humanitarian
effort. In principle, all the Italians agreed on their
desire to help. Vattani noted that an MFA officer had been
in Darfur for months and they were planning on providing
200 soldiers. Vattani and Terzi noted that there was an
MFA-Ministry of Defense meeting scheduled for June 7 at
which it would be decided if and to whom (EU or NATO) the
Italians would support deployment of C-130s for Darfur.
(Note: As of June 10, the Italians had not yet made a final
determination on how to support the airlift.) Francesco
Talo indicated that Italy also would be able to
extend training in Vincenza for African peacekeepers if the
G-8 could come up with additional funding. Current plans,
funded by the U.S. and Italy, called for training 1,000
trainers from seven countries per year beginning in
September/October.

Lebanon/Syria
--------------


13. (C) In the MFA meeting with Vattani, Fried described
Lebanon as being vulnerable and in need of continued
U.S.-EU support. Without suggesting we have proof, Fried
said one would wonder if the assassination of journalist
Samir Kassir was Syria's way of continuing to pressure
Lebanon. This would perhaps be a good time to show support
for the interim Lebanese government, perhaps with a
high-level visit.


14. (C) Vattani responded that the assassination of PM
Hariri, and now Kassir, were real blows. Italy has a long
relationship, including active cultural ties, with Lebanon
and is Lebanon,s leading trade partner. The question is
Syria. The Syrians, he said, have always responded in
devious and obscure ways to all the pressure exerted
against them. They withdrew troops but what or who did
they leave behind? Vattani wondered if there was a way
we can persuade Syria to a "more positive and less
obnoxious" stance. Threats do not seem effective, and
there could be a time--perhaps not yet--when the EU could
offer economic incentives in exchange for better behavior,
especially on border and security issues.


15. (C) Fried responded that there was a real risk if the
timing of such an initiative was wrong. Asad could easily
misinterpret such an offer as a reward for bad behavior.
The U.S. understands the possibility of positive outreach,
and Fried cited recent policy on Libya and Iran. However,
Fried noted that combined U.S.-French pressure had yielded
results on withdrawal, and it was important that Asad
continue to feel that pressure. A positive outreach to Syria
now would be misinterpreted. The U.S. and the EU were
working together on Gaza disengagement, a two-state
solution and a credible Palestinian state, and democracy
in Lebanon. Syria was working against all of these
initiatives and was providing real support for fighters
killing U.S. and Italian forces in Iraq. It was time Syria
understood it had few friends and needed to change its
behavior. We do not rule out in principle positive
engagement with Syria, Fried noted, but now is not the time.
Vattani held out the possibility that the EU could take
some soundings of Damascus to see how they might react
to an initiative, but conceded the time is not yet right.

Iraq: Leave the Fish but Reduce the Water
--------------


16. (C) Fried told Castellaneta and Terzi that things
were steadily improving in Iraq. We deeply appreciated the
continued Italian commitment and were pleased Rome would
attend the June 22 Conference on Iraq. He told
Castellaneta it was important for Italy to fully fund its
existing commitments and hopefully unfreeze remaining Iraqi
assets here. Castellaneta agreed things were slowing
improving vis a vis the insurgency, noting that sometimes
it was better to leave the fish but reduce the water in
which it swims.

Agrement/Berlusconi Address to Congress
--------------


17. (C) Over dinner at the Ambassador's residence, Fried
delivered the good news to Castellaneta that Washington had
granted his agrement to become Italy's next Ambassador.
Castellaneta reported that PM Berlusconi was hoping to
schedule his address to a joint session of Congress next
spring, perhaps in February-March, depending on the
Congressional agenda. (Note: The invitation for the
address came from House Speaker Hastert).


18. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Fried.


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2005ROME01979 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL