Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ROME178
2005-01-19 15:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: ITALY ON PRT/FSB RECCE TRIP -

Tags:  MOPS MARR PREL AF IT AFGHANISTAN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000178 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL AF IT AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY ON PRT/FSB RECCE TRIP -
DEPLOYMENT PLANS

REF: A) STATE 2743 B) '04 ROME 3849 C) '04 ROME 2913
D) '04 ROME 2122

Classified By: CHARGES D'AFFAIREtions Chief Col.
Castellano, along with the MFA Coordinator for Afghanistan,
Anna della Croce, and the NATO Office Director Giovanni
Brauzzi, on Italian PRT/FSB plans for Herat. The Joint
Operation Headquarters representatives provided a classified
power-point presentation (faxed to the Italy Desk) of their
December reconnaissance (recce) mission to Afghanistan, in
which della Croce also participated.


3. (C) For initial logistics the Italians want to bring
material to Herat via the Mashhad airfield in Iran, a
one-time event that would save them considerable amounts of
money and time, since Mashhad is only 250 km from Herat.
They said they had discussed the proposal recently at SHAPE
(General Jones reportedly said he saw no problem from a
military point of view) and with Amb. Burns and are waiting
for a "political" green light to go forward. (Note: they
cautioned that if they cannot use Mashhad they may be forced
to seek US help with C-17 lift).


4. (C) The presentation also noted poor infrastructure for
the FSB, including a control tower with limited capabilities,
scarce water and power supply, an acceptable runway with many
repairs required at the strip's edge, pads, and taxiways,
radio assistance and fire fighting service, scarce streets,
sewerage, etc., and the presence of UXOs (landmines) within
the airfield area. They foresee a transitional phase from
now until Stage 2 starts with Italy folding its PRT
contributions and first FSB contributions under RC
West/CFC-A/CENTCOM but transitioning once Stage 2 comes under
COM ISAF/JFC-B/SACEUR control.

Don't Hold us Hostage to Other Events
-------------------------------------


5. (C) The Italians were concerned about possible delays to
their deployment due to USG insistence that Stage 2 could not
begin before all requirements are met. They were also
unclear on whether SACEUR would declare Stage 2 when there
was initial operating capability or when all the requirements
were in place and expressed a strong preference for the
former. They emphasized that Italy is an actor in the NATO
(ISAF) show in Afghanistan and that their timetables were not
an Italian national goal, but were based on NATO's request
for movement on Stage 2 PRT and FSB prior to the upcoming
parliamentary elections (which could be held between April
and June). They argued that their timetable is realistic if
commitments are made at the January 20 Force Generation
Conference at SHAPE.


6. (C) Brauzzi argued that it would be unfair to hold Italy,
which was providing the bulk of Stage 2 offers, "hostage" to
other allies' failure to step forward with contributions, a
precedent that could dissuade others from taking on lead
nation roles in Stages 3 and 4. Italy is delivering what it
had promised, the Italians emphasized, and did not want to be
trapped into a situation with the PRT and FSB beyond their
control. They argued that getting Stage 2 elements deployed
and operational could have a snowball effect in generating
more countries' participation.


7. (C) The Italians said that in trying to stick to the
timetable, they don't want the US to feel like they are
trying to push us out of our PRT, or for the Afghans to feel
like the FSB is pushing them out of the airfield in Herat.
Citing Amb. Burns' recent letter to the Italian NATO PermRep,
the Italians noted that they had always heard the US talk
about PRT and FSB as two faces of the same coin, but now that
seemed to be changing. They also worried about political
fallout if the Italian timetable gets pushed back and Italy
is blamed for dragging its feet. In addition, they worried
that delay could cause the perception of a gap between OEF
and ISAF that would harm us all.

Italians Ready to Roll
----------------------


8. (C) Italy's tentative deployment schedule has a seven
person planning team departing Italy January 19 for another
reconnaissance mission (these personnel will not/not stay on
as part of PRT or FSB). For the PRT, they envision 40 people
plus vehicles to arrive on February 3, another 23 people plus
vehicles February 15, another 25 people on February 22,
another 25 people plus vehicle on March 2, and a final 10
people on March 10, with a target of having the full Italian
PRT complement in place by March 31. For FSB, they envision
moving 10 people plus vehicles on April 1, 35 people plus
vehicles on May 1, 44 people plus vehicles on May 6, 66
people plus vehicles on May 11, 66 people plus vehicles on
May 16, 10 people plus vehicles on May 22, with the FSB
complement complete by May 31. Italy plans on bringing
120-140 people to the PRT and 190-210 to the FSB and hopes
both will be approximately 70 percent Italian and 30 percent
multinational.


9. (C) The Italians said they had discussed deployment plans
and logistics concepts with SHAPE/ISAF and would decide on
communications infrastructure and its integration with ISAF
based on the January 19 planning team findings (the team
should leave Italy January 19 and arrive in theater January
21). The planning team will also assess the composition for
each deployment and identify which forces will support FSB
and which the PRT. The planning team will seek to maximize
use of local resources/contractors and will look to the US
for suggestions in this regard.

Key Enablers: Italy Will Provide Helicopters from June
--------------------------------------------- ---------


10. (C) The Italians will provide four to six AB212
helicopters, including maintenance and support assets, but
they will not be available until June - and may be delayed
depending on time needed for upgrades. Until these
helicopters arrive in theater, they would need the US to
provide helo support for medevac and Quick Reaction Forces
(QRF). On QRF, they said that if no one else offers, Italy
could provide forces for QRF. The Italians said they hope
Spain can provide Role 2 Medical support, though they had
heard from SHAPE the day before that the US would provide
some medical assets (NFI). Finally, Italy plans to send a
small civilian component to the PRT and wanted to know if
there was/when there would be room for them.

Points of Contact
-----------------


11. (SBU) The Italians gave the following POCs for CFC-A, at
the admiral and colonel levels: Italian Joint Operations
Command Chief of Staff Admiral Maurizio Gemignani, tel.
39-06-4691-9080, cell 39-335-104-1950, fax 39-06-4691-9175
and Chief of Plans COL SM Rosario Castellano, tel.
39-06-4691-9062, fax 39-06-4691-9245. They were eager to get
a CFC-A POC.


12. (C) Comment. Brauzzi followed up the meeting with two
phone calls stressing that Italy is very concerned about what
it sees as uncertainties and ambiguities in the US position.
The Italians have painful memories of completing detailed
planning for two different PRTs in 2004 and in both cases
having to stand down in response to last-minute US changes of
directions. Now, faced with perceived changing signals from
the US, the Italians fear a repeat of last year's
difficulties, just as they are getting ready to begin their


deployments. Brauzzi stressed that Italy hopes that, prior
to the January 25 visit of Special Coordinator for
Afghanistan Ambassador Maureen Quinn, the USG will provide
Italy assurance that
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000178

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL AF IT AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY ON PRT/FSB RECCE TRIP -
DEPLOYMENT PLANS

REF: A) STATE 2743 B) '04 ROME 3849 C) '04 ROME 2913
D) '04 ROME 2122

Classified By: CHARGES D'AFFAIREtions Chief Col.
Castellano, along with the MFA Coordinator for Afghanistan,
Anna della Croce, and the NATO Office Director Giovanni
Brauzzi, on Italian PRT/FSB plans for Herat. The Joint
Operation Headquarters representatives provided a classified
power-point presentation (faxed to the Italy Desk) of their
December reconnaissance (recce) mission to Afghanistan, in
which della Croce also participated.


3. (C) For initial logistics the Italians want to bring
material to Herat via the Mashhad airfield in Iran, a
one-time event that would save them considerable amounts of
money and time, since Mashhad is only 250 km from Herat.
They said they had discussed the proposal recently at SHAPE
(General Jones reportedly said he saw no problem from a
military point of view) and with Amb. Burns and are waiting
for a "political" green light to go forward. (Note: they
cautioned that if they cannot use Mashhad they may be forced
to seek US help with C-17 lift).


4. (C) The presentation also noted poor infrastructure for
the FSB, including a control tower with limited capabilities,
scarce water and power supply, an acceptable runway with many
repairs required at the strip's edge, pads, and taxiways,
radio assistance and fire fighting service, scarce streets,
sewerage, etc., and the presence of UXOs (landmines) within
the airfield area. They foresee a transitional phase from
now until Stage 2 starts with Italy folding its PRT
contributions and first FSB contributions under RC
West/CFC-A/CENTCOM but transitioning once Stage 2 comes under
COM ISAF/JFC-B/SACEUR control.

Don't Hold us Hostage to Other Events
--------------


5. (C) The Italians were concerned about possible delays to
their deployment due to USG insistence that Stage 2 could not
begin before all requirements are met. They were also
unclear on whether SACEUR would declare Stage 2 when there
was initial operating capability or when all the requirements
were in place and expressed a strong preference for the
former. They emphasized that Italy is an actor in the NATO

(ISAF) show in Afghanistan and that their timetables were not
an Italian national goal, but were based on NATO's request
for movement on Stage 2 PRT and FSB prior to the upcoming
parliamentary elections (which could be held between April
and June). They argued that their timetable is realistic if
commitments are made at the January 20 Force Generation
Conference at SHAPE.


6. (C) Brauzzi argued that it would be unfair to hold Italy,
which was providing the bulk of Stage 2 offers, "hostage" to
other allies' failure to step forward with contributions, a
precedent that could dissuade others from taking on lead
nation roles in Stages 3 and 4. Italy is delivering what it
had promised, the Italians emphasized, and did not want to be
trapped into a situation with the PRT and FSB beyond their
control. They argued that getting Stage 2 elements deployed
and operational could have a snowball effect in generating
more countries' participation.


7. (C) The Italians said that in trying to stick to the
timetable, they don't want the US to feel like they are
trying to push us out of our PRT, or for the Afghans to feel
like the FSB is pushing them out of the airfield in Herat.
Citing Amb. Burns' recent letter to the Italian NATO PermRep,
the Italians noted that they had always heard the US talk
about PRT and FSB as two faces of the same coin, but now that
seemed to be changing. They also worried about political
fallout if the Italian timetable gets pushed back and Italy
is blamed for dragging its feet. In addition, they worried
that delay could cause the perception of a gap between OEF
and ISAF that would harm us all.

Italians Ready to Roll
--------------


8. (C) Italy's tentative deployment schedule has a seven
person planning team departing Italy January 19 for another
reconnaissance mission (these personnel will not/not stay on
as part of PRT or FSB). For the PRT, they envision 40 people
plus vehicles to arrive on February 3, another 23 people plus
vehicles February 15, another 25 people on February 22,
another 25 people plus vehicle on March 2, and a final 10
people on March 10, with a target of having the full Italian
PRT complement in place by March 31. For FSB, they envision
moving 10 people plus vehicles on April 1, 35 people plus
vehicles on May 1, 44 people plus vehicles on May 6, 66
people plus vehicles on May 11, 66 people plus vehicles on
May 16, 10 people plus vehicles on May 22, with the FSB
complement complete by May 31. Italy plans on bringing
120-140 people to the PRT and 190-210 to the FSB and hopes
both will be approximately 70 percent Italian and 30 percent
multinational.


9. (C) The Italians said they had discussed deployment plans
and logistics concepts with SHAPE/ISAF and would decide on
communications infrastructure and its integration with ISAF
based on the January 19 planning team findings (the team
should leave Italy January 19 and arrive in theater January
21). The planning team will also assess the composition for
each deployment and identify which forces will support FSB
and which the PRT. The planning team will seek to maximize
use of local resources/contractors and will look to the US
for suggestions in this regard.

Key Enablers: Italy Will Provide Helicopters from June
-------------- --------------


10. (C) The Italians will provide four to six AB212
helicopters, including maintenance and support assets, but
they will not be available until June - and may be delayed
depending on time needed for upgrades. Until these
helicopters arrive in theater, they would need the US to
provide helo support for medevac and Quick Reaction Forces
(QRF). On QRF, they said that if no one else offers, Italy
could provide forces for QRF. The Italians said they hope
Spain can provide Role 2 Medical support, though they had
heard from SHAPE the day before that the US would provide
some medical assets (NFI). Finally, Italy plans to send a
small civilian component to the PRT and wanted to know if
there was/when there would be room for them.

Points of Contact
--------------


11. (SBU) The Italians gave the following POCs for CFC-A, at
the admiral and colonel levels: Italian Joint Operations
Command Chief of Staff Admiral Maurizio Gemignani, tel.
39-06-4691-9080, cell 39-335-104-1950, fax 39-06-4691-9175
and Chief of Plans COL SM Rosario Castellano, tel.
39-06-4691-9062, fax 39-06-4691-9245. They were eager to get
a CFC-A POC.


12. (C) Comment. Brauzzi followed up the meeting with two
phone calls stressing that Italy is very concerned about what
it sees as uncertainties and ambiguities in the US position.
The Italians have painful memories of completing detailed
planning for two different PRTs in 2004 and in both cases
having to stand down in response to last-minute US changes of
directions. Now, faced with perceived changing signals from
the US, the Italians fear a repeat of last year's
difficulties, just as they are getting ready to begin their


deployments. Brauzzi stressed that Italy hopes that, prior
to the January 25 visit of Special Coordinator for
Afghanistan Ambassador Maureen Quinn, the USG will provide
Italy assurance that 1) the US intends to move forward with
the OEF-ISAF transition; 2) we still welcome Italy's plan to
deploy a PRT and FSB before the parliamentary elections; and
3) the US will help provide some of the necessary resources.
End comment.


(U) Minimize Considered.


SKODON


SVC FOR PARA NUMBERING.....
NNNN


2005ROME00178 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL