IRAQ: ITALIANS LEND SUPPORT TO AMB JONES'

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001484

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS IZ IT UNSC IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALIANS LEND SUPPORT TO AMB JONES'
INTEGRATED APPROACH

REF: STATE 72185

Classified By: Pol M/C Tom Countryman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Senior diplomatic officials told Senior
Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy Ambassador Richard
Jones during his April 22 visit to Rome that Italy intends to
continue its engagement in stabilization efforts in Iraq.
They were optimistic that the current political stalemate,
though worrisome because of the tight schedule, would be
solved, but stressed the need to include the Sunnis. The
officials pressed for an enhanced UN role in the political
process and stressed the need to help the Iraqis better
disburse economic aid. Finally, they reiterated the Italian
position that troop withdrawal should be based on security
conditions on the ground. End summary.

Favoring an Integrated Approach
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Jones (accompanied by Assistant Matt
Fuller, EUR/ERA Deputy Director Karen Volker, and Embassy
Rome staff) met with MFA Iraq Task Force Director Luigi
Maccotta, Deputy Task Force Director Damiano Francovigh, NATO
Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi, and Middle East Development
Assistance Office Director Federica Ferrari-Bravo on April 21
to explain his mandate and US policy priorities and concerns
in Iraq. Maccotta said that Italy agrees with the need for
an integrated approach that includes security, political, and
economic aspects, which are mutually reinforcing. However,
the current stalemate in forming a new government shows that
inclusion of all ethnic groups is not occurring, and this
could lead to more violence. We need to give the Sunnis a
reason to renounce violence, he said.


3. (C) At a dinner hosted by the Ambassador the same evening
for Ambassador Jones and visiting Italian Ambassador to
Baghdad Gian Ludivico De Martino, Middle East Bureau Director
General Riccardo Sessa said that Italy was in "full
immersion" with its partners (the US, UK, UN) in Iraq and
that we are finally beginning to face a success story. We
need now to look forward to identify issues where we can help
to support the Iraqis to prepare for their future. We need
engagement, Sessa said, not statements.


4. (C) Maccotta said that Italy strongly supports the
planned international conference on Iraq, which would
demonstrate international solidarity. At dinner, Sessa
reminded Ambassador Jones that FM Fini, in discussions with
Secretary Rice, had offered to host the conference. He

SIPDIS
stressed the need for a clear sense of the conference's
purpose and the need to involve regional actors. He warned
that some may raise "exit strategies" at the conference and
that careful preparations are needed. Maccotta agreed,
noting that there were expectations that the conference would
yield an announcement of MNF withdrawal. Italy's position, he
said, remains the same: conditions-based disengagement. We
do not know how long we still stay, Sessa added, and we can
not fix a date, because it depends on the situation on the
ground.


5. (C) Sessa also stressed the role of regional actors,
including Syria and Iran, that can not be excluded because of
issues like border controls. He repeated his by now familiar
theme that the US should use partners like Italy to dialogue
with these countries. He also supported Cairo's initiative
to hold a PrepCom; the key, he said, is to demonstrate to the
Arab world that the political process in Iraq is not another
US effort to "impose its model."
Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi Francesco Talo, also
present at the dinner, agreed, adding that the international
conference should be put in the framework of UNSCR 1546. A
wider mandate, he explained, helps with perception problems.
Central European countries also could play a greater role, he
suggested, especially in terms of debt forgiveness.

Supporting the Political Process
--------------


6. (C) On the political process, Maccotta noted that, unlike
with the January 30 elections, the possibility for a 6-month
delay in signing a constitution is written into the TAL.
That said, he agreed that it was better not to publicly
accept such a delay up front, but instead to keep up the
pressure to stick to the current schedule. He opined that


the current political stalemate was due to political
maneuvering aimed at getting rid of al-Jafari. He stressed
the need for the political process to be seen as a domestic
effort, with international assistance provided only upon
request, in order to be legitimized in the eyes of the Iraqi
people, noting that the Iraqis had not yet asked the UN for
help. He agreed with Ambassador Jones that the Iraqis needed
to begin the constitutional process as soon as possible,
starting with a request for UN assistance.


7. (C) Sessa echoed Maccotta's statements on the need for the
national reconciliation of all ethnic groups and for the
inclusive nature of the constitutional process. To help the
institution-building process, he said, Italy is sending 6-7
more civilians to help with new ministries. Talo noted that
Italy is currently offering a third training course in Italy
for Iraqi journalists -- a double-edged sword, he noted
wryly, but one that helps with perception problems.


8. (C) On the EU rule of law initiative, Maccotta said that
Italy will play a leading role, sending an expert on
penitentiary systems to Baghdad and offering two courses in
Italy. Italy likes the idea of keeping things close to the
people and empowering local government, and, since Italian
forces are in the Dhi Qar province, he said, that is where
Italy will focus.

Providing Economic Assistance
--------------


9. (C) Sticking with the integrated approach theme, Maccotta
stressed that job creation and improving governance capacity
are necessary to improve the security situation. He
commented that a lack of governance capacity in Iraq is one
reason for the slow disbursement of reconstruction aid.
Regarding debt relief, Italy, he said, had already presented
the Iraqi government the text of an agreement to forgive 80
percent of Iraq's official debt to Italy ($3.4 billion
including accumulated interest) in accordance with the Paris
Club agreement. Maccotta noted that Iraq had requested a
higher level of forgiveness, but Italy simply does not have
the budget to forgive more. Italy has, however, lowered the
interest rate on the remaining balance. Once the official
debt agreement is done, Maccotta said, Italy would try to
resolve the issue of outstanding commercial debt, which
totals approximately $3 billion, making Italy one of Iraq's
largest commercial creditors.

...and Doing Its Part on the Security Front
--------------


10. (C) On security issues, Brauzzi emphasized the need to
give back to the Iraqis the security aspects of stabilization
efforts. He noted that, out of a 26-member NATO Alliance,
Italy alone will provide trainers for three of four training
modules in the NATO training mission, in addition to
providing money for the NTM-I trust fund (Note: 500,000 Euro,
300,000 of which is earmarked for training inside Iraq).
NATO, however, is not providing force protection for the
trainers, he added, asking whether MNF planned to help.
Paradoxically, he said, Italy's troops are based in a less
troublesome area of Iraq, but Italy can not withdraw its
troops because of the slow pace of training Iraqi security
forces. If we are unable to demonstrate that we can train
the Iraqis in a relatively secure area, he asked, how can we
convince anyone that we can do it in more dangerous areas?
Finally, he argued that the review of MNF-I under UNSCR 1546
by June 8 offered an opportunity to get a renewed blessing of
the coalition's troop presence in Iraq.


11. (C) Brauzzi lamented the fact that the portion of MNF
protection devoted to the UN was so far dormant, and said
that an increased UN presence would make it necessary to
implement this role. Finally, he noted the "domino process"
of countries like Ukraine and Poland withdrawing their
forces, saying that many in Europe were now looking to see
what Italy would do and stressing the need for close
consultations with coalition partners.


12. (C) Responding to the issues Brauzzi raised, Ambassador
Jones said that if MNF-I forces were used for force
protection, that would take away from other missions. We can
hire force protection services, he said, but we can not hire
someone to fight insurgents. On the Polish and Ukrainian
troop withdrawals, he said that Iraqi forces will have to


take up the slack. He reiterated Secretary Rice's insistence
that such decisions be done in consultation with partners,
and said that preferably any decrease in support in combat
roles would be balanced by an increase in support for
security training. Finally, he said that progress on
drafting the constitution would lead to progress on the
security front.


13. (U) Ambassador Jones has cleared this cable.

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2005ROME01484 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL