IRAQ/ITALY: CALIPARI INVESTIGATION AND THE VIEW

S E C R E T ROME 001392

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS KJUS IT IZ IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: CALIPARI INVESTIGATION AND THE VIEW
FROM ROME - LITTLE PROSPECT FOR A JOINT REPORT, GOI ASKS NO
PRESS BEFORE APRIL 26

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary: Based on what senior GOI officials have told
us in the past 48 hours, we believe there is little chance
that we can achieve a joint report in Baghdad on the March 4
Calipari shooting. We should prepare a public affairs
strategy for that outcome now. The GOI's national security
advisor has asked that we not speak to the press about this
possibility until after the April 25 national holiday, even
if it materializes, so as not to give the Italian opposition
additional fodder on what is traditionally a left-wing
oriented public occasion. We recommend that we keep our
powder dry until April 26, even if stories appear in the
Italian press, and work for a well-prepared and coherent
public line to accompany the release of the AR 15-6 report.
End Summary.


2. (S) Given the juncture at which we have arrived in the
Calipari investigation, we believe it would be useful to
review the situation from the Rome perspective. We believe
there are four key points to keep in mind in order to
understand the Italian approach.


3. (S) First, for the Italians, there is no independent
investigation in Baghdad. Both Italian Government
representatives in Baghdad are well known to this Embassy as
smart and responsible public servants. Unfortunately, in
this case they are only mouthpieces restricted to saying
nothing but what Rome tells them to say. All the shots on
the Italian side are being called by two people: SISMI
(External Intelligence Service) Head Pollari and
Undersecretary to the Prime Minister Gianni Letta, Pollari,s
unofficial boss and an extremely powerful individual who
undertakes all of Berlusconi,s toughest assignments.


4. (S) Second, the Italians have fundamentally different
motivations than the USG. Our goals are to have an objective
investigation of the facts, preempt call for some type of
more elaborate joint commission to look into the killing,
reach common conclusions in order to defuse political outrage
about Calipari,s death, and reduce pressure on the
Berlusconi government to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq.
Letta,s and Pollari,s primary goals are to save their
political skins. It is widely known that they designed and
directed the intel op in which Calipari was engaged when he
was killed. If it appears that American forces acted
correctly and thus it was poor execution of the Italian
operation that was at fault, criticism will eventually be
focused on Letta and Pollari.


5. (S) Third, the two Italians refuse to accept that the U.S.
approach to the investigation does not mirror theirs. Just
as their center of gravity is in Rome, they assume that ours
is in Washington, or perhaps in Rome, despite our repeated
assertions that the details of the joint report must be
negotiated in Baghdad by the investigators. As a result,
they continue to try and press upon us examples of the report
language yet to be agreed, along with excruciatingly detailed
explanations of why it is or is not acceptable to them.
Their assumption appears to be that we are feeding this info
to Washington, which then instructs U.S. investigators in
Baghdad the same way and in the same detail that Italian
investigators are being instructed from Rome. When they
later hear reports from Baghdad that our investigators have
not caved into their demands, they mistakenly assume it is
because there is a lack of political will or understanding by
the U.S., leading them to dig in their heels deeper. If the
issues around the report are sufficiently sensitive to them,
their logic goes, it is inconceivable that Principals in
Washington are unengaged and cannot influence it.


6. (S) Fourth, we need to recognize that U.S. military
investigators have done their job and done it well. They
have finished the substantive investigation, and, like it or
not, we are now in what the Italians view as a political
discussion. The facts have been established and almost
completely accepted by the Italians. What remains is
disagreement about how to present those facts, particularly
the characterization of adherence to ROE by U.S. forces at
the checkpoint.


7. (S) We understand that the US investigating officer has
virtually finished a draft of the AR 15-6 report which, if
there is no agreement on a US-Italian joint report, will go
forward as a US-only document in fulfillment of his mandate.

Given this, and the above four points, from our perspective
it appears there are only two likely outcomes:


A. The negotiators somehow find mutually acceptable language
that allows them to reach agreement on a joint statement of
facts and (if possible) recommendations that constitutes a
joint report; in addition the US side the complete AR 15-6
report up the usual chain as a U.S.-only report. This would
require finding a political compromise with the Italians on
how ROE is described in the joint report, but would NOT
require changing the language on ROE in the separate 15-6
report. (Of course, we would need to preare guidance
explaining the difference in treatment of ROE between the two
reports).


B. No bilateral agreement on any joint report. The
investigators announce the joint investigation in completed
and the US side sends up the AR 15-6 as a normal USA
investigation. Far from ideal, but still manageable in terms
of preserving our military/intelligence/political
relationship. It would allow Berlusconi to say he stood up
to the US and refused to sign a report he couldn't agree
with. As long as his people (and ours) don't go overboard in
spinning to the press that it's all the other side's fault,
we could ride out a stormy period and preserve the Italian
government's political capacity to remain in the coalition in
Iraq.

--------------
WHAT EMBASSY ROME HAS DONE
--------------


8. (S) Amb. Sembler took advantage of Gen. Pollari's presence
at the Ambassador's farewell reception April 20 to work him
over for an hour on the need to come to closure. Through a
smoke screen of inaccurate statements, Pollari did make one
or two cogent arguments and finally produced a couple of ways
in which the one outstanding issue (rules of engagement)
could be addressed (or, more accurately, avoided) in a joint
statement. They were (as far as we knew) new formulations
from the Italian side and, since they were new, the Amb.
encouraged Pollari to present them in Baghdad, but cautioned
that they did not sound new enough to be very promising.
(NOTE: From what we can reconstruct here, Pollari's bottom
line is that the phrase "rules of engagement" NOT appear in
any joint report, whereas the US investigator requires
inclusion of that phrase, even if it's only to say "we did
not reach common conclusions on ROE". END NOTE)
Potentially the most beneficial outcome of this discussion
was that Pollari is fully aware that we are very close (a day
or two) to the point where both sides need to say "a joint
report is not possible; let's now figure out together how to
manage publicly our divergence." He did not seem intimidated
by that prospect, just as we should not be.


9. (S) On April 22, following a meeting on another topic, DCM
updated Berlusconi,s NSA-equivalent (and
Ambassador-Designate to Washington) Giovanni Castellaneta on
the joint investigation. DCM emphasized that our offer to
coordinate our respective press strategies is still on the
table, but needs to be picked up by the Italian side soon if
it is to be effective. Castalenetta noted that Letta/Pollari
were controlling this issue, but said he would discuss it
with Letta. He urged, even if the discussions in Baghdad
terminate today, that the US side avoid telling the press in
any way that the work is over and issuing the AR 15-6 report
until after the Italian holiday April 25. He noted that this
holiday, the Anniversary of Italy,s Liberation in World War
II, has been increasingly politicized by the opposition in
recent years as a celebration of the Communist-led partisan
movement during the war. Many speeches and public
appearances by leaders of Italy,s left were already
scheduled for that day, and we should avoid giving them the
opportunity to use these appearances to lash out at the U.S.
about its conduct of the Calipari investigation.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) We see little prospect that Letta/Pollari will give
their investigators enough flexibility to enable a joint
report to be concluded. Outcome &B8 above - no joint
report at all - thus appears to us to be the likely result.
We should prepare for that eventuality with our own public

release strategy along lines already discussed in Washington,
with particular attention to the following:

The timeline for the USG internal review of the AR 15-6
report.

Avoiding (as Castellaneta requested) any indication to the
press that the joint investigation process is over, until
Tuesday, April 26.

Being prepared to emphasize that the joint investigation
reached common conclusions on nearly every issue covered, and
to address the one area where they did not: ROE.

Keeping our powder dry. Even if Pollari jumps the gun and
starts spinning the Italian press before our AR 15-6 is
released, we should focus our preparation on a coherent and
well-prepared public release of our report, and not respond
to various outrageous Italian stories until after the public
rollout of the AR 15-6, when we will have the definitive USA
investigation results.

Understanding the reasons for the likely weakness of the
GOI,s public communication on this topic until a new
government is formed. The past two days, which followed
Berlusconi,s resignation, have been marked by ringing
silence on the Calipari case, after weeks of daily leaking
and spinning. SISMI may have rested its preemptive public
defense. But it is more likely that the attentions of this
media-addicted government are being exhausted elsewhere.
End Comment.

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2005ROME01392 - Classification: SECRET