Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ROME1270
2005-04-14 15:17:00
SECRET
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

CALIPARI: ITALY PROPOSES SPLITTING JOINT REPORT FROM

Tags:  PREL MOPS IT IZ IRAQI FREEDOM 
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S E C R E T ROME 001270 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P AND EUR/BRADTKE

REQUEST STATE OPS PASS TO EMBASSY BAGHDAD, DOD/OSD/ISP
BRZEZINSKI, MNF-I GENERAL CASEY, CENTCOM GENERAL ABIZAID AND
POLAD, AND NSC SCHAKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/15
TAGS: PREL MOPS IT IZ IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: CALIPARI: ITALY PROPOSES SPLITTING JOINT REPORT FROM
NJF-I AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION

Classified By: Ambassador Sembler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T ROME 001270

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P AND EUR/BRADTKE

REQUEST STATE OPS PASS TO EMBASSY BAGHDAD, DOD/OSD/ISP
BRZEZINSKI, MNF-I GENERAL CASEY, CENTCOM GENERAL ABIZAID AND
POLAD, AND NSC SCHAKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/15
TAGS: PREL MOPS IT IZ IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: CALIPARI: ITALY PROPOSES SPLITTING JOINT REPORT FROM
NJF-I AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION

Classified By: Ambassador Sembler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Italian government officials tell us they will refuse
signature or endorsement as a "joint report" of any MNF-I AR 15-6 inves
contains the unqualified conclusion that personal responsibility for th
cannot be assigned and U.S. forces did not violate their ROE. They say
a political backlash that could lead to withdrawal of Italian forces fr
however, agree to a binational "joint report" restricted to findings of
AR 15-6 investigation, with conclusions and follow-up actions to be rep
to U.S. and Italian national authorities by their respective investigat
via submission of the AR 15-6 report to the appointing authority). END


2. (S) Late on April 13 Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's Office G
SISMI (External Intelligence Service) Chief General Pollari discussed w
and DCM the reluctance of Italian investigators in Baghdad to agree wit
counterparts on concluding language of a joint investigative report int
SISMI officer Calipari in Iraq. Repeating arguments he and Berlusconi
President Bush during the President's recent visit to Rome, Letta said
politically impossible for the Government of Italy to sign on to a repo
conclusion that personal responsibility for the Calipari killing could
that ROE had not been violated by U.S. forces, as desired by U.S. inves
would be interpreted as a whitewash by the opposition and the political
eventually force the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq (a point Le
repeating later in the conversation).


3. (S) Ambassador and DCM repeated to Letta and Pollari a point the Ita
many times previously: MNF-I was carrying out an investigation under p
spelled out in Army Regulation 15-6, and no U.S. official outside the i
interfere in this independent inquiry. The Italians took the point but
what they described as management of the political implications of the
investigation. That investigation had been endorsed by President Bush
by an exchange of letters between Letta and the Embassy. Letta and Pol
Italian and U.S. investigators had reached broad agreement on the fact-

the AR 15-6 report, and expressed understanding for the requirement of
investigators to reach a clear-cut conclusion based on those facts. Th
that if the language to which they objected appeared in the conclusion
would be more politically palatable for the Italian side to decline to
the report as a whole.


4. (S) After extensive discussion, Letta and Pollari proposed that a wa
impasse might be to break out the binational report from the USA AR 15-
confine this separate "joint report" solely to the fact-finding portion
The explanation would be that both countries had agreed on the facts su
Calipari's death to the extent they were ascertainable, the investigato
their agreed findings to their respective national authorities in a joi
both sides, and it was now up to those national authorities to draw the
conclusions, including about any follow-up actions. The vehicle for th
investigators to report to higher authorities would be the AR 15-6 repo
document separate from the "joint report" could contain conclusions or
that had not necessarily been agreed to by the Italian government. The
be made publicly that this was consistent with the original terms of re
investigations, which called for both countries to "ascertain the dynam
through "investigative fact-finding" but which made no mention of drawi
or making recommendations.


5. (S) While this was not an ideal outcome, Letta and Pollari believed
approach under the circumstances. Pollari said it might be advisable f
to keep their conclusions confidential, but Ambassador and DCM cautione
investigating officers conducting an AR 15-6 investigation had a respon
recommendations to the appointing authority, that appointing authority
if further action was required, and it would be impractical to do all t
Letta and Pollari did not challenge this approach, as long as it was cl
being done as part of the "national" AR 15-6 process, as distinct from
"binational" fact-finding investigation. Ambassador and DCM advised th
Government of Italy wished to pursue its idea of separating the "joint"
investigation reports, that idea should be presented by the Italian par
investigation to their USA counterparts in Baghdad.


6. (S) Regarding the rollout strategy for whatever joint investigative
issued, in response to Ambassador's request Letta confirmed that Italia
Ragaglini and Campregher would be asked to stay in Baghdad until report
He would not commit, however, to having them appear together with U.S.
public announcement of the report Q that would depend on what was to be
announcement. If there was full agreement ahead of time on a joint rep
to be said at the rollout, then it would be good for officials from bot
present. If not, however, it would be better to keep the U.S. and Ital
separate. Otherwise the media would press the American and Italian off
together to disagree publicly on some detail, and that would become the
of subsequent domestic political pressure on the Italian government. P
personal opinion that the best date for a rollout would be Tuesday or W
week.


7. (S) Letta rebuffed the Ambassador's request that he designate Italia
other officials to begin working now with Embassy Rome press and politi
contingency press guidance and Q's and A's. He insisted that we first
agreement on a joint report, so that we knew what it was we would be co
Only after this was achieved would it make sense to start working on sh
and guidance.


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2005ROME01270 - Classification: SECRET