IRAQ: US/ITALY JOINT INVESTIGATION - LOOKING AHEAD

S E C R E T ROME 001024

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 03/24/2020
TAGS: IT IZ KJUS MOPS PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ: US/ITALY JOINT INVESTIGATION - LOOKING AHEAD
TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY

REF: BAGHDAD 1186

Classified By: DCM EMIL M. SKODON, REASONS 1.4 B, C, D


1. (S) SUMMARY: We have gotten past Italian nervousness (Ref
A) about participating jointly in the full range of Gen.
Vangjel's investigation into the March 4 death of Nicola
Calipari. PM Berlusconi's office, which is tightly managing
the Italian public stance on this issue, remains concerned
about future political fallout. They are ready to begin
coordination on common press strategy for the eventual
conclusions of the investigation. This cable reports on key
recent developments in Rome, and begins to lay out procedures
and themes for a joint public affairs strategy. END SUMMARY

(TEMPORARY) ITALIAN NERVOUSNESS ON FULL PARTICIPATION


2. (S) As reported Ref A, the Italian investigators in
Baghdad told Charge Jeffrey on March 18 that they could only
participate in part of the joint investigation. Upon
learning of this, Amb. Sembler requested a meeting with
Berlusconi,s right hand, Undersecretary Gianni Letta. DCM
and POLMC joined the Ambassador for the Friday night meeting.
Letta was accompanied by SISMI chief Gen. Nicolo Pollari,
National Security Adviser Gianni Castellaneta and (late in
the meeting) PM Berlusconi. Letta confirmed that he had told
Ragaglini not to participate in any aspect of the
investigation that went beyond the immediate events of the
March 4 shooting, as this went beyond the Italian
understanding of the terms of reference (ref B) for the joint
investigation.


3. (S) Pollari made a less legal, but more convoluted
argument for restricting Italian participation, saying in
essence that he wanted to avoid embarrassment for the USG.
If a public report makes known that a US military officer was
pre-notified and waiting at the airport for the car, but that
he clearly did not know about that particular checkpoint, it
would be politically sensitive for the USG.


4. (S) Ambassador emphasized:
- The USG wants a full investigation of ALL relevant facts,
so that we can be certain such an event does not recur.
- Italian participation is essential to establishing the best
possible record.
- If Italy declined to participate in any part of the
investigation, for whatever reason, this would eventually
become known and would not be defensible to the press and the
public. In the worst case, it could even lead to a public
dispute between the USG and Italy, which we had all pledged
to avoid.
- Therefore, he urged Letta, Ragaglini should be instructed
not to limit his participation to such a narrow
interpretation of the relevant events.


5. (S) After much discussion, Letta phoned Ragaglini in
Baghdad to tell him that he would be getting new instructions
allowing him to participate also in the part of the
investigation studying the degree of advance US
knowledge/Italian notification of the operation. (Note:
Castellaneta confirmed to DCM on March 21 that Ragaglini now
had full authority to participate in all aspects of the
investigation). Further, Letta agreed with the Ambassador on
the essential points guiding the way ahead:
-- We share the common goal of producing a report that is
accurate, defensible and does not lead to any finger-pointing
between our two governments.
-- Letta added that, for Italy, it is essential that the
final report does not put the blame for the incident on
Calipari himself. Ambassador agreed we should seek to avoid
this.
-- As the investigation draws to its conclusion, we will
coordinate on a common strategy for presenting its results to
the public. Until that time, both governments will continue
to avoid making press statements on the details on the
events.

POLITICAL FALLOUT MANAGABLE -- WITH A FEW WILD CARDS


6. (S) All but the furthest left opposition figures and press
are impressed by how well the Berlusconi government has
handled its response to this tragedy, largely because they
perceive the PM as standing up for Italy in contesting the
initial statements made by the US government and successfully


pressing the USG to agree to a joint investigation. If both
governments continue to show restraint and unity, we will
take some bruises, but we can get through this without
lasting damage to the two governments and with our bilateral
relationship stronger than ever.


7. (S) The first wild cards, about which the Italians have
already expressed their concern, are the concurrent
investigations by the Rome prosecutor (who does not answer in
any way to the Italian executive or legislative branches) and
by Iraqi authorities, who are apparently investigating
whether the Italians paid ransom to get Sgrena,s release.
Neither of these are likely to be concluded before Gen.
Vangjel,s 15-6 report, but rampant leaks from both sources
could steer the public perception in a way detrimental to our
effort to present a full and documented result. (On March
21, Castellanetta told DCM that, while Italy appreciates that
the Iraqi investigators are part of the sovereign Iraqi
government, he would hope that the US could persuade them to
avoid incautious press statements about the Italian actions).


8. (S) The next wild card is the issue of responsibility. In
his first statements, Berlusconi emphasized that an
investigation was necessary in order to determine who was
responsible for the death. Although he has not used this
line in the last two weeks, there will still be a desire on
the part of many Italians to identify (and punish) a guilty
party. However, if the investigation concludes (and we are
not trying to prejudge the results) that no individual --
Italian or American -- can be blamed, and can back up that
conclusion with jointly agreed facts, the issue of fixing
responsibility will -- for all but the most anti-Berlusconi
parties and newspapers -- die noisily but rapidly.


9. (S) SISMI chief Pollari is watching more closely than
anyone else the investigation and the political mood within
Italy. He knows that if the demand for "responsibility"
(i.e., a scapegoat) turns out to be irresistible, he is more
at risk than anyone else. He has already been questioned by
the Senate intelligence oversight committee, and challenged
in the press, on the question of why he did not coordinate
this operation with USG intelligence services. He has put up
a vigorous defense, arguing that Italy and the US conduct
separate operations in Iraq according to their interests, and
that SISMI cannot be considered to be subordinate to the CIA.
We strongly suspect (based in part on his comments to us
March 18) that he has been the one spinning the press toward
the line that the failure of communication rests with the US
military, not SISMI. If he feels pressured by the results of
the joint investigation, he would not publicly point fingers
at the US military, but would actively work the press to that
end.

QUESTIONS FOR EMBASSY BAGHDAD


10. (C) Embassy Rome is deeply grateful to our military and
diplomatic colleagues in Baghdad for their skillful efforts
in support of the joint investigation and for keeping us well
informed, despite the press of a hundred other issues. In
preparing for discussion of the rollout strategy, it would be
helpful to have Embassy Baghdad,s assessment of the
following issues. (We realize these issues are within Gen.
Vangjel,s purview, and are not trying to steer his decisions
in any particular direction).
-- Your best guess on when the investigation will be
concluded?
-- Have the Italian investigators (Ragaglini/Campregher)
indicated whether they wish to be signatories of the final
15-6 report? (NOTE: Castellaneta told DCM March 21 that the
Italians had no fixed position on who should sign the final
report and are prepared to discuss the best options with US
mil investigators in Baghdad).
-- Will the final 15-6 report include both findings of fact
and recommendations? Will these be separable documents?
-- Is the final report likely to be classified? (Note: If
part of the report is classified, not only will it not stay
secret for long, but it will be the focus of unbounded press

SIPDIS
speculation and "cover-up" theory, and the unclassified
version will be ignored).

LOOKING AHEAD TO A JOINT PUBLIC STRATEGY


11. (C) In the March 18 meeting, PM Berlusconi and U/S Letta
repeatedly affirmed to Ambassador their determination to


forge a common US/Italian public affairs line for the
conclusion of the joint investigation. With Washington,s
concurrence, Embassy Rome is prepared to move forward on that
discussion with the Prime Minister,s inner circle of
advisors, and suggests USG diplomatic and military officials
also discuss the same issue with Ragaglini and Campregher. A
common public line can only be finalized once we have a
better idea of the investigation,s results. However, we can
seek consensus now on the following key points of procedure
and substance.


12. (C) Procedure: The USG and Italy should agree that:
-- Once the investigation is complete (or nearly so),we will
coordinate urgently on the common press line before either
side releases (or leaks) any portion of it to the press.
-- Each government will designate one agency/office as the
lead for official reaction to the report. For Italy, this
will almost certainly be the Prime Minister,s office
(Palazzo Chigi). For the US, we need to decide whether the
designated spokesperson should be in Baghdad, Rome or
Washington.
-- All other Italian and US officials will have clear
instructions to refer questioners to the lead spokesperson
and to the report itself. Substantive comments should be
limited to the core points below.


13. (C) Substance (to be supplemented as report is finalized):
-- Both governments are fully satisfied with the completeness
of the investigation.
-- Both governments representatives, cooperated fully in
every aspect of the investigation.
-- The US, Italy and the sovereign government share the
conviction that Italy continues to make an essential
contribution to Iraq,s stability.
-- (IF JUSTIFIED BY REPORT): Agreement that this was a tragic
accident that should have been avoided, but not an accident
for which blame can be assigned.
-- (AS APPROPRIATE): Common statement on steps both
governments will take to ensure there is no recurrence.


14. (C) Finally, perhaps most importantly: Despite best
efforts by all parties, we must recognize that it may never
be possible to establish objectively all the precise facts of
what happened the night Calipari was killed. If so, our two
governments may end up with differeing subjective evaluations
of who (if anyone) is to blame. Some political actors,
seeing how Berlusconi benefited from the perception that he
"stood up" to the Americans, will be tempted to play up any
such differences. We must prepare for a scenario in which
full agreement is not reached, and be ready to identify with
Italy the points on which our commentary will differ, and
manage these differences in a way that defends our point of
view adequately and brings most Italians to closure on this
issue. In short, joint management of our differences will be
even more important than managing our points of agreement.


15. (C) Minimize considered.

SEMBLER


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2005ROME01024 - Classification: SECRET