Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05RIYADH9142
2005-12-13 06:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

SHI'ITE COUNCIL MEMBER PREDICTS SACKING OF SAUDI

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER KIRF SA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 009142 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KIRF SA
SUBJECT: SHI'ITE COUNCIL MEMBER PREDICTS SACKING OF SAUDI
ARABIA'S LEADING SHI'A JUDGE

REF: A. RIYADH 8582

B. RIYADH 3154 (NOTAL)

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 009142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KIRF SA
SUBJECT: SHI'ITE COUNCIL MEMBER PREDICTS SACKING OF SAUDI
ARABIA'S LEADING SHI'A JUDGE

REF: A. RIYADH 8582

B. RIYADH 3154 (NOTAL)

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Shi'a activist Jafar Al-Shayeb described efforts to
oust Abdullah Al-Khunaizi, Qatif's Shi'a judge, saying that
he was not effective as a representative of the community
given "new social forces" gaining strength in Qatif. He said
that the Shi'a were pleased with the signals from King
Abdullah but waiting for concrete initiatives to help realize
their goals of religious freedom and an end to
discrimination. He and his colleague Mohammed Mahfoodh
argued that pluralism in Iraq, if it were achieved in a
stable way, would set a good example for the region's
governments. They also downplayed the idea that Iran was
actively trying to influence the Saudi Shi'a. The movement
to oust Judge Khunaizi is the most striking example we have
seen to date of the struggle for leadership in the Qatifi
Shi'a community, and we will follow it closely. End summary.


2. (SBU) The CG and PolOff called on Jafar Al-Shayeb, a
Shi'a activist, businessman, and elected member of the Qatif
municipal council, at his offices in Qatif on December 11.
Mohammed Mahfoodh, a writer on Islamic issues and a political
associate of Al-Shayeb's, also joined the meeting.

--------------
A Judgeship in the Balance
--------------


3. (C) Noting that the CG had recently called on Abdullah
Al-Khunaizi (ref A),the Shi'a judge in Qatif, Al-Shayeb
began the conversation by saying that the Ministry of Justice
was likely to replace Judge Khunaizi with Ghalib Al-Hammad, a
Shi'ite from Tarut Island who had studied Shi'a jurisprudence
in Qum and was currently in Iran. Al-Shayeb said that he
hoped Al-Hammad would be more successful than Judge Khunaizi
in working with the Minsitry of Justice to define and
formalize the authority of the Shi'a court vis-a-vis the
Sunni courts and to increase the staffing and capabilities of

the Shi'a court.


4. (C) Asked by the CG why the Ministry of Justice would
want to replace Judge Khunaizi, Al-Shayeb explained that
"new, more powerful social forces" were at work in Qatif and
that Al-Khunaizi did not represent these forces. Traditional
leaders like the large families, wealthy merchants, and
traditional religious figures no longer represented the
diversity of the community, Al-Shayeb said. "The municipal
elections were a real turning point. We now are seeing the
rise of younger religious leaders, who are able to think more
openly." He argued that Judge Khunaizi was not effective and
expressed confidence that Al-Hammad would be "more open, more
communicative, and more able to resolve problems." The
Ministry of Justice, Al-Shayeb said, had come to realize the
consensus of the community and was therefore poised to
replace Judge Khunaizi, a member of a large Qatifi family who
represented the traditional establishment, with Al-Hammad, a
younger figure from a less well-known family and from an area
outside of central Qatif.

-------------- -
Shi'a and Liberal Reformers Waiting for Change
-------------- -


5. (C) Speaking more broadly about recent changes in
conditions for the Shi'a, Al-Shayeb said that there are
"signals" from King Abdullah that he will act to improve
conditions for the Shi'a, but as yet no "initiatives." He
gave examples of how Shi'a are not represented in the
government bureaucracy, even as it relates to Qatif: "We
have not had a Shi'a mayor for thirty years, and even the
local heads of the government ministries are from outside."
Asked by the CG what requests the Shi'a were making of King
Abdullah, Al-Shayeb said, "We are asking for an end to
discrimination against the Shi'a and for religious freedom -
the freedom to have Shi'a books, to study religion from a
Shi'a perspective, and to have Shi'a religious educators."
Al-Shayeb and Mahfoodh also discussed the Shi'a imprisoned in
connection with the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, saying that
the individuals had either not been tried, had not been tried
fairly, or had not received any sentence. Mahfoodh asked
rhetorically, "If the government is rehabilitating the
extremists coming back from Iraq and letting them go, then
why can't it at least do the same with the Shi'a prisoners?"

6. (C) Al-Shayeb, who is also active in the liberal reform
movement, said that reformers were giving King Abdullah
breathing space so that he could introduce reforms without
additional pressure: "Let the Sunni extremists be the ones
who force the pressure on him for now." The reformers, he
said, were using this time to build more bridges at a
non-governmental level with international civil society,
citing as an example an upcoming seminar with the Washington,
DC-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, to be
held in Riyadh on December 29. Al-Shayeb noted on the other
hand that the perception of official U.S. efforts to promote
democracy in the region was "not positive," given people's
"skepticism" about U.S. methods and goals.

--------------
Iraq: A Good Example if Stability Prevails
--------------


7. (C) Al-Shayeb and Mahfoodh were optimistic that
developments in Iraq would have a good impact on the region
as long as stability was achieved. The Saudi Shi'a are glad
that Saddam is gone and that the Iraqi Shi'a will play a
major role in the new government, Al-Shayeb explained, but
"people are fearful about the extremists in Iraq, and worried
they will come back to Saudi Arabia as they did from
Afghanistan." Mahfoodh continued: "The central lesson from
Iraq is pluralism, that no one group can govern Iraq by
itself. There should be greater diversity and participation
in government throughout the region." Both argued that
moderate Shi'a, in the mould of Ayatollah Sistani, would
prove more influential in Iraq than extremist Shi'a as long
as stability prevailed.

--------------
"There is No Role for Iran Here"
--------------


8. (C) Asked by the CG what role Iran was playing among the
Shi'a in Saudi Arabia, Mahfoodh replied, "There is no role
for Iran here." In response to the CG's observation that
many Saudi Shi'a appeared to go to Iran for religious study,
Mahfoodh drew a distinction between the religious schools and
the government. "Each school is under the authority of the
marja', not the (Iranian) state," he explained. "It is the
marja' who funds the school and pays a stipend to the
student." Mahfoodh and Al-Shayeb noted that study in Qum did
not necessarily imply exposure to Iranian revolutionary-style
instruction or an inclination toward Iran's ideology. The
inability of the Saudi Shi'a to train their own "home grown"
clerics and the problems of sending students to Najaf for the
past fifteen years, they explained, had forced would-be Saudi
Shi'a clerics to study in Qum. They noted that in Qum there
are many schools, including schools run by followers of
Najaf-based clerics such as Sistani and Al-Najafi, and that
most Saudi students study in these schools rather than more
radical or activist schools run by Iranians.


9. (C) Al-Shayeb qualified Mahfoodh's distinction between
the religious schools and the government somewhat, noting
that the schools and students did have to interact with the
Iranian state on logistical issues like visas and permits and
conceding that Iran did have an opportunity to try to
influence students, "like we saw in the 1980s." He
acknowledged that Saudi Hezbollah still operated in Qatif but
said that it was now purely a social and cultural
organization, no longer interested in spreading revolutionary
political ideology. Mahfoodh opined that Shi'a throughout
the region identified closely with their country, citing the
example of a referendum in Bahrain in the 1970s when Bahraini
Shi'a rejected the idea of uniting with Iran.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) Ref B provides biographic information on Al-Shayeb
and notes that he appears to have a foot in both the liberal
and Islamist camps: on the one hand, he supports human
rights and political reform and has signed several petitions
advocating a liberal platform; on the other hand, he has
close ties to Hassan Al-Saffar and received strong support
from Shi'a Islamists in the municipal council elections.
Although we did not talk about Al-Saffar with Al-Shayeb, we
suspect that they are both involved in maneuvering to have
the Ministry of Justice replace Judge Khunaizi with someone
who is more aligned with them politically and/or religiously
(see ref A for Judge Khunaizi's attack on Al-Saffar and his
allies). Al-Shayeb's explanation of why the replacement was
in the interests of the Shi'a community at large - that
Al-Khunaizi could not represent its "new social forces" - was
vague and unconvincing, and he never clarified what he meant
by these "new forces" despite probing questions from the CG.
It may grow increasingly difficult for Al-Shayeb and
Al-Saffar to simultaneously position themselves as leaders of
the Shi'a community, to maintain strong connections with
liberal reformers throughout the Kingdom, and to derive
organizational and financial support from Shi'a Islamist
networks. We will follow the issue of Judge Khunaizi's
potential replacement closely, as we suspect it will be a
contentious and revealing issue in Qatif. End comment.

(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
OBERWETTER