Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05RANGOON358
2005-03-25 07:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

DFM TANAKA'S BURMA VISIT: READ-OUT FROM THE

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV BM JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000358 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV BM JA
SUBJECT: DFM TANAKA'S BURMA VISIT: READ-OUT FROM THE
JAPANESE EMBASSY

REF: A. TOKYO 1695 AND PREVIOUS


B. STATE 50731

Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000358

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV BM JA
SUBJECT: DFM TANAKA'S BURMA VISIT: READ-OUT FROM THE
JAPANESE EMBASSY

REF: A. TOKYO 1695 AND PREVIOUS


B. STATE 50731

Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) On March 25, Japanese Embassy political counselor
Ichiro Maruyama provided a full read-out on Deputy Foreign
Minister Hitoshi Tanaka's March 22-24 visit to Rangoon, his
fourth visit to Burma spanning the past three decades.
Maruyama's brief on Tanaka's meeting with Prime Minister Soe
Win generally paralleled the read-out Embassy Tokyo received
on March 24 (ref A). In addition, Maruyama, who accompanied
Tanaka to all of his meetings in Burma, addressed the DFM's
encounters with Foreign Minister Nyan Win and Deputy Foreign
Minister Kyaw Thu.


2. (C) Tanaka's primary incentive in visiting Burma at this
time, according to Maruyama, was in preparation for the May
6-7 ASEM foreign ministers meeting in Kyoto. Tanaka had been
personally engaged in the effort to accord Burma membership
in ASEM and feels compelled to ensure that, although
membership was unconditional, the SPDC understands the need
to take important political steps. (Maruyama noted that FM
Nyan Win expressed a "willingness" to attend the Kyoto ASEM
meeting, but did not commit, an indication that the SPDC
generals have yet to make a decision on Burma's
participation.) Highlights of Maruyama's read-out:

--On March 23 Tanaka met separately with, in order, PM Soe
Win (15 minutes),DFM Kyaw Thu (30 minutes),and FM Nyan Win
(45 minutes). DFM Kyaw also hosted a dinner that evening for
Tanaka. The GOJ had also asked for a meeting with SPDC
Secretary-1 Lt Gen Thein Sein, but was told he was "busy with

SIPDIS
the National Convention (NC) and not available." The GOJ had
considered requesting meetings with SPDC Chairman Than Shwe
and Vice Chairman Maung Aye, but concluded that the GOB was
unlikely to be responsive.

--Tanaka, briefed by his Embassy that he would probably only
have three or four minutes to get his points across, began
each of his meetings with a "quick and clear" message: The
international community, including Japan, has concerns about
the current political situation in Myanmar (Burma). In light
of Burma's taking of the ASEAN chair in 2006, the GOB should
endeavor to take three important, immediate steps: 1)
release Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK); 2) relax limits and
restriction on the National League for Democracy (NLD); and
3) allow participation of ASSK and the NLD in the road map
process, particularly the ongoing NC.

--Maruyama said that the three GOB officials responded to
Tanaka's points in "almost identical fashion." None of them
gave any indication that there would be a possibility of
ASSK's and/or the NLD's participation in the political
process. Each of the GOB officials said that the GOB had
invited the NLD to join the NC, but "ASSK and the NLD
rejected our offers." Each official also delivered a
predictable "explanation" of Burma's historical woes and the
regime's efforts to control armed groups and unify the
country.

--PM Soe Win stated that the "basic policy" of the GOB is to
take steps toward democratization. However, said Maruyama,
the PM did not respond directly to Tanaka's points nor did he
make any link between GOB steps, which were unspecified, and
the GOB's role as ASEAN chair. At the end of the meeting,
according to Maruyama, PM Soe Win said he would "take to
heart" DFM Tanaka's message. "Who knows what that really
means," added Maruyama in his read-out.


3. (C) When asked how Tanaka measured the success of his
visit, Maruyama said the DFM planned to meet with Embassy
Bangkok on March 25 and would likely share his personal views
there. However, Maruyama said that, from his own
perspective, Tanaka accomplished his mission by raising
important points "clearly and up front." However, Maruyama
emphasized, the GOB had not given any indication that it
would act on any of Tanaka's three points.
McMullen