BURMA: A TOUGH WEEK AND A MISERABLE YEAR FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000224

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: BURMA: A TOUGH WEEK AND A MISERABLE YEAR FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION

REF: A. RANGOON 201

B. RANGOON 196

C. RANGOON 185

D. 04 RANGOON 1647 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: It's been a long week for the democratic
opposition: Burma's most influential pro-democracy ethnic
leader is behind bars; the regime put NLD leader U Tin Oo on
notice that he, like Aung San Suu Kyi, will likely spend a
third consecutive year in detention; the NLD, possibly to
forestall a further regime crackdown, expelled 18 of its key
members; and the regime reconvened its sham National
Convention, completely ignoring the NLD and snuffing a
potential boycott by the ethnic cease-fire groups. It's also
been a long year: the regime has banned the UNSYG's special
envoy for nearly 12 months and the last visit of the UN's
human rights envoy is a distant memory; Burma's neighbors
increasingly favor a pro-engagement approach (a tremendous
boost to the regime generals); and the SPDC's campaign of
harassment, intimidation, and arrest perpetuates a climate of
fear, rendering the democracy movement disunited and
dispirited. Local anticipation that Burma's 2006 ascension
to the ASEAN chair will be an opportunity for change, or that
the regime itself will implode, are the only sources of a
steadily waning light of hope at the end of the opposition's
long tunnel to democracy. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Nearly two years have passed since GOB-sponsored
thugs attacked Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK) convoy of National
League for Democracy (NLD) party members and supporters in
northern Burma. That dramatic event in May 2003 was a
watershed for the pro-democracy movement, which was
subsequently forced further underground and increasingly
marginalized by a Burmese military regime that has lowered
the tolerance bar for dissent to an all-time low.


3. (C) The continued detention of its primary
leadership--namely ASSK, U Tin Oo, and now Hkun Htun Oo--has
rendered the democracy movement hopelessly disunited and
dispirited. Continued harassment, intimidation, and arrests
of political party members and supporters perpetuates a
climate of fear--making dissent palatable only for those
willing to risk losing their paltry incomes, their property,
their families, or even their own lives. Since March 2004
the regime has banned a visit by the UN Secretary General's
Special Envoy (Razali),perceived by the opposition as
ineffective but nonetheless an important link to the outside
world. The last visit (November 2003) granted to the UN's
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights (Pinheiro),who
championed the cause of Burmese political dissidents, is a
distant memory.


4. (SBU) Furthermore, the pro-engagement posture of China,
India, and ASEAN continue to boost the regime's perceived
legitimacy and deny democracy activists their hopes for
regional solidarity. The SPDC generals appear more confident
than ever that the democratic opposition is the least of
their worries, choosing to ignore the NLD altogether and
instead focus efforts on bringing the country's restive
ethnic groups under full central authority, building bridges
and dams, and perpetuating military rule.


5. (C) It's been a very tough year, but February 18 brings to
a close a particularly depressing week for Burma's
beleaguered democracy movement. Among the low points:

--On February 9, authorities arrested Hkun Htun Oo, the
country's most influential pro-democracy ethnic leader, and
several other members of his Shan Nationalities League for
Democracy party (ref C); and arrests of other ethnic leaders
are also in the works (authorities detained U Ohn Tin, leader
of the Arakan League for Democracy, on February 18).
Security agents this week raided Hkun Htun Oo's home and
office, shut down his private courier business, detained and
interrogated members of his family and his employees,
transferred him to prison, and apparently charged him as a
"subversive threat" under Section 10(a) of a 1975 law
"Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Subversive
Elements." Rarely have detainees charged under this
provision served less than twelve months in prison; most
languish behind bars for years.
--On the night of February 13, a half dozen GOB authorities
visited the home of NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo, where he has
been detained under house arrest since an eight-month prison
stint following the May 2003 convoy attack. According to
sources, the authorities read U Tin Oo an official decree,
reportedly signed by the Minister for Home Affairs,
prolonging his detention for another year under Section 10(b)
of the "Subversive Elements" law. The regime similarly
extended ASSK's house arrest in December 2004 for another
year (ref D).

--On February 7, authorities arrested officials of the Shan
State Peace Council (SSPC),the political wing of two Shan
State cease-fire groups (ref A). Pro-democracy activists
were initially heartened when the two groups, the Shan State
Army North (SSA-N) and the Shan State National Army (SSNA),
threatened to boycott the National Convention (NC) and
perhaps lead other CFGs to follow suit. However, on February
15, SPDC representatives pressed four SSNA delegates to
relocate to the Convention site north of Rangoon, where they
will remain essentially "captive" for the duration of the
session. The SSA-N delegation, on the other hand, has to
date still refused to attend the NC, but in order to avoid
the wrath of the generals, submitted an official "leave
request" which allows the regime to identify the organization
as registered ("99.44 percent Convention attendance of all
delegates," trumpeted the official media on opening day,
February 17). A dramatic boycott of the NC by the cease-fire
groups, therefore, appears to be a bust.

--On February 16 and 17, the Central Executive Committee of
the NLD circulated internal decision memos dismissing a total
of 18 members from the party, including four Members-elect of
Parliament. Although there are rumors the NLD leadership is
unhappy with internal dissent, the move appears to be
connected to the party's efforts to distance itself from an
exile-led, underground movement to announce the formation of
a parallel government inside Burma (ref B). Some of the
dismissed NLD members had previously called upon party
leaders to declare a parallel government, though it is
uncertain whether they had any contact with "unlawful (exile)
organizations." In any case, the NLD has in the past taken
such draconian steps as a measure to protect party members
from near-certain arrest or to deter the SPDC from banning
the party outright (indeed, the NLD was forced to "expel"
ASSK and U Tin Oo from the party while they were in detention
during the 1990 election period). Nonetheless, the NLD
ouster of 18 key members, including nine party youth greatly
needed to replenish aging leaders, was another blow to the
morale of the party's rank and file.

--On February 17, the SPDC reconvened the National
Convention, on hiatus since July 2004. The overwhelming
majority of Burmese recognizes the NC for what it is: a
concocted sham to rubber stamp a pre-determined constitution
that enshrines a perpetual, preeminent governance role for
the Burmese armed forces. Nonetheless, it is the only
political show in town and, in the process of plowing ahead
on its "road map to a disciplined democracy," the SPDC has
completely disregarded the democratic opposition. Unlike the
weeks preceding the May 2004 reconvening of the NC, this time
around the regime did not even bother to extend token
invitations to selected pro-democracy party members, initiate
insincere back-channel negotiations, or criticize the NLD's
stance. Although many local observers believe the NLD, and
the ethnic democrats, are just and righteous in their refusal
to partake in the charade, the reality is that they will be
on the distant sidelines in the coming weeks and months as NC
delegates dither and pontificate over a new, albeit
pre-packaged, constitution.

Comment: Which Way to the Elysian Fields?


6. (C) Is there a light at the end of the opposition's long
tunnel to democracy? If there is, it has dimmed considerably
over the past year, and events this past week have seemingly
pushed the democracy movement's modest objectives for genuine
political dialogue even further out of reach. The detention
of opposition leaders is perhaps the most harmful to the
movement, leaving the reins of pro-democracy efforts in the
hands of an aging leadership in fragile health (the NLD) or
often less capable politicians (the ethnics). The only
short-term hope for an improvement in the situation appears
to be local anticipation that Burma's ascension to the ASEAN
chair in 2006 will force the region to address seriously the
embarrassing behavior of the SPDC. The only medium- to
long-term hope we hear from democracy activists is that the
regime itself will implode. The current generals, however,
have doggedly held on to "temporary" power for 17 years. It
will take more than hope to pry their fingers loose. End
Comment.
Martinez