Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05RANGOON1307
2005-11-17 11:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

JAPAN IN BURMA: PROFILE IN COWARDICE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ECON BM JA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001307 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P AND EAP; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON BM JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN IN BURMA: PROFILE IN COWARDICE

REF: A. TOKYO 6026

B. TOKYO 5853 AND PREVIOUS

C. TOKYO 5850

D. RANGOON 1216

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001307

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P AND EAP; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON BM JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN IN BURMA: PROFILE IN COWARDICE

REF: A. TOKYO 6026

B. TOKYO 5853 AND PREVIOUS

C. TOKYO 5850

D. RANGOON 1216

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Ambassador to Burma said he
used recent meetings with senior GOB officials to pursue GOJ
objectives on democratization, human rights, and economic
reform. He believes he succeeded in convincing Burma to
reconsider its ILO withdrawal, but indicated that he did not
raise Aung San Suu Kyi in order to help ensure that his basic
message got delivered to senior SPDC generals. The
Ambassador agreed with us in principle on the need for
international unity on basic objectives in Burma and for
closer U.S.-Japan collaboration. He criticized Western
sanctions, however, and grew visibly uncomfortable at the
notion of Japanese and U.S. diplomats in Rangoon meeting more
regularly to share views, indicating that he feared GOB
retribution. Apparently, he views maintaining "friendly
relations" with Burma as outweighing shared U.S.-Japan
values. End Summary.


2. (U) Charge and the Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Nobutake
Odano, exchanged views on November 16 during a lengthy
conversation that covered respective Burma policies, recent
political developments in Burma, and senior-level U.S.-Japan
dialogue on Burma strategies. P/E Chief and Japanese pol
counselor Ichiro Maruyama also participated in the meeting.

JAPAN DISCOURAGES BURMA'S ILO WITHDRAWAL


3. (C) The Charge told Ambassador Odano that she was keen to
discuss ways to cooperate with the Japanese Embassy on
sharing information and perhaps coordinating strategies,
noting that Burma had been a topic addressed recently between
U/S Burns and MOFA Deputy Minister Nishida (refs A, C),among
other senior officials. The Charge asked Odana about the
substance of his recent meetings with the Labor and Foreign
Ministers.


4. (C) Amb Odano said that he used these meetings to raise
Japan's goals on democratization, human rights, and economic
reform. He had explained to the ministers that, as a

"long-standing friend" of Burma, Japan advised the GOB to:
accelerate its road map process and allow the participation
of all political parties; protect human rights; and pursue
steps toward a full market economy. "More foreign
investment," Odano told the Charge, "could allow creative and
talented Burmese to become agents of change."


5. (C) Odano focused most of his efforts on reversing the
recent Burmese decision to withdraw from the ILO (ref D). He
discouraged Burma from withdrawing, which would lead to
"negative effects on many fronts," by observing that Japan's
own withdrawal from the League of Nations had led to the
destruction of his country. The Minister of Labor responded
that GOB-affiliated organizations, such as the USDA, had been
"upset" by the ILO's treatment of Burma and had "pressured"
the GOB to quit, but he added that no final decision had been
made. "It appears the GOB has taken our advice," said Odano,
offering that he had heard earlier in the day that the GOB's
representative in Geneva had told the ILO that Burma would
remain a member if the ILO carries out its mandate
"properly." (Note: We subsequently received a copy of a
letter from the Labor Minister to the ILO stating that the
GOB remained open to alternatives. End Note.)

BUT DID YOU RAISE ASSK?


6. (C) The Charge pressed Amb Odano to provide more details
on his message to the GOB on democratization. "Did you
address, for example, the National Convention process or the
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi?" she asked. Odano responded
that the GOB had already committed to its own seven step road
map. So he urged the GOB to speed up the process, pointing
to quick progress achieved in Afghanistan and in Iraq on new
constitutions. "As for political prisoners," said Odano, "my
mission won't be successful unless the ministers deliver my
message to senior SPDC generals, so I didn't put everything
on the table at once."


7. (C) Addressing Odano's message to speed up the road map,
the Charge noted that the process must be inclusive to have
any credibility. Odano replied that the regime's plan for a
referendum on a new constitution would provide an opportunity
for the Burmese people to participate. A referendum,
responded the Charge, would be meaningless without open
debate. Furthermore, she added, the regime had lost the last
election in 1990 and would surely take measures to avoid a
similar outcome again. "Well," said Odano, "I'm not sure we
had very much debate in Japan when we produced a new
constitution after the war," stating that the Burmese people
first needed the opportunity to vote. They could modify
constitutional language later, he asserted, citing the
examples of Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian countries.

DISSECTING THE GREAT CAPITAL MOVE


8. (C) The Charge observed that she saw little logic in the
generals' decision making. Amb Odano agreed and cited three
leading theories, which he had gathered from press reports,
behind the SPDC's sudden relocation of the country's capital
to Pyinmana: to create a defensive stronghold against a U.S.
invasion; to isolate the GOB from domestic anti-goverment
threats; and to respond to the advice of palm readers. He
added a view that the move might also reflect closer ties
with China, observing that the two countries were in a
"marriage of convenience."


9. (C) Odano said China must play a more constructive role in
Burma. Claiming that "China won't listen to Japan," he
suggested the United States could have some influence, having
succeeded in securing Chinese cooperation on North Korea.
The Charge responded that all three countries--China, Japan,
and the United States--were involved in the Six-Party Talks,
noting that the North Korea case might be a model for how "we
can all work together on Burma." She observed that Chinese
influence and interest in Burma has its limits, because the
PRC desires above all stability and the current political
situation doesn't inspire much confidence.

SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND


10. (C) The Charge, responding to Odano's request for
thoughts on strategies, replied that the international
community should be united on basic goals with regard to
Burma to send a clearer signal to the regime. A good case
can be made, she said, that all members of the broader
international community, while having different approaches to
the problem, fully agree on the need for democracy, respect
for human rights, and overall reform. The rest of the ASEAN
countries, she said, look outward and are increasingly
accountable to their own citizens. In her introductory
meetings with other Ambassadors she had found broad agreement
that the regime must move toward a more open system.


11. (C) A united international community would be good, said
Odano, but if the approach is one of sanctions and pressure,
it won't help the country and will only push the generals
further into the trenches. "We need to show them that we are
here to help," he said, "and that is why Japan has a robust
humanitarian assistance program." He lamented the ouster of
former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, describing the former head
of military intelligence as a "progressive element" who
"still got bashed" despite his efforts to reach out. "Even
when the generals are ready to take bold initiatives, the
international community discourages them," said Odano,
insisting that Burma would have done "something positive" had
it not relinquished the 2006 ASEAN chair.


12. (C) The Charge responded that she had not approached Amb
Odano to pursue collaboration on sanctions, which are not in
any case the source of Burma's woes - regime policies are.
She reiterated that "we need to work together in a positive,
constructive manner to achieve shared objectives." For
example, she said, Japan's apparently successful efforts to
get the GOB to rethink the utility of staying in the ILO were
positive, and could help keep the regime from rolling back
progress that had been achieved on forced labor. She also
noted reports that Burma would pursue a "no action" measure
on the annual UNGA Burma resolution and observed that Japan
had discouraged such behavior in the past by convincing the
regime that it was not in the country's interest to work
against the international community.

SURELY BURMA CAN'T DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN


13. (C) The Charge offered to host a lunch for the Japanese
and U.S. Embassy policy teams to compare notes and exchange
views. Amb Odano noted that President Bush and Prime
Minister Koizumi, meeting that day in Tokyo, had collaborated
on many security and regional issues. Despite contributing
to "many" briefing papers for his PM, however, he asserted
Burma had not come up in the meetings with the President.
"We have the same goals," he said, "but it is very difficult
to agree on how to reach them." Odano said that the GOB had
friendly ties with Japan, but continued to be resentful over
the suspension of Japanese aid. "This makes our access to
the cabinet very difficult," he said, appealing to the Charge
to "keep our conversation among the four of us (in this
room)."


14. (C) The Charge said that U.S.-Japan cooperation was "no
secret" and noted that the Bush-Koizumi meetings would

SIPDIS
generate substantial press. She pointed out that at many
posts Japanese and American diplomats meet regularly and
collaborate on a number of sensitive issues. "Surely," she
said, "the Generals cannot drive a wedge between us." Odano
responded that the GOB has "no sophistication to drive a
wedge between Japan and the United States," but added Burma
thinks that Japan is "already under U.S. influence, and I
don't want to give them any more reason to think Japan
responds to U.S. pressure." Japan, he said, pursues
democracy and human rights in Burma "because these are
Japanese values."


15. (C) Lunch with the Americans, Amb Odano allowed with
obvious discomfort, would be fine, "but first I need to
digest these recent negative developments, such as the UNSC
debate, the ILO issues, and the GOB relocation to Pyinmana."
The Charge offered that perhaps January would be a more
convenient time to get together and Odano responded, "Well,
the National Convention will still be going on then," before
changing the subject.

COMMENT: SPEAK SOFTLY AND CARRY A PAPER SWORD


16. (C) This was our second substantive discussion with
Ambassador Odano in recent weeks (the Charge made an
introductory call on September 19). On both occasions, Odano
expressed similar views on engagement and a perceived growth
in Chinese influence. Nevertheless, his visible discomfort
at the mere notion of a lunch with U.S. Embassy policy
officers was startling. He made it clear that he fears
retribution from the GOB, and yet Japanese diplomats have
told us that following the 2004 ouster of Khin Nyunt and the
demise of military intelligence, GOJ access to the regime has
been severely curtailed. So what does Amb Odano seek to
avoid? Apparently he views his primary mission as
maintaining "friendly relations" with Burma, and so will not
risk displeasing the ruling generals by meeting with the U.S.
to discuss shared values. End Comment.
VILLAROSA