NLD VIEWS ON CAPITAL RELOCATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001276

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM
SUBJECT: NLD VIEWS ON CAPITAL RELOCATION

REF: A. RANGOON 1265


B. RANGOON 1233

Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: In an exchange of views on November 8 with
NLD leaders, party Secretary U Lwin expressed befuddlement
over the regime's relocation of Burma's capital to remote
Pyinmana. He revealed, however, his own participation in
military exercises under a former Burmese dictator that had
concluded "in every case" Pyinmana was the best strategic
location for command headquarters in the event of a foreign
invasion. NLD leaders also offered views on the regime's
National Convention, efforts to engage the UN Security
Council on Burma, and the recent sentencing of Shan
politician Hkun Htun Oo. End Summary.

PYINMANA - TO THE BUNKERS


2. (C) P/E Chief met on November 8 with NLD Central Executive
Committee members U Lwin and U Nyunt Wei to exchange views on
recent developments. The NLD elders were befuddled by the
regime's announcement on November 7 that it had commenced the
relocation of Burma's administrative capital to remote
Pyinmana (ref A). "I suspect that Than Shwe has again been
taking the advice of his fortune-teller," said U Lwin, adding
that "there is no good reason to move the capital."


3. (C) U Lwin, a former Deputy Prime Minister and defense
attache, revealed some history behind the selection of
Pyinmana as a "command and control" center. "Even in my time
(as a military and government leader under former dictator Ne
Win)," said U Lwin, "we went through endless war-gaming
exercises that addressed a potential invasion by China,
India, or even the United States." In every case, he said,
decision makers agreed that the most strategic location for a
war-time military headquarters, based on its central location
and natural barriers, would be Pyinmana

FAREWELL TO ARMS?


4. (C) The NLD leaders affirmed that the SPDC had made no
effort to reach out to the NLD, or to other pro-democracy
parties, in advance of the reconvening of National
Convention, scheduled for December 5 (ref B). U Lwin, saying
the party has not heard "in quite some time" from General
Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house arrest,

SIPDIS
opined that the upcoming session of the NC "will be the last"
and suggested that the regime is anxious to conclude the
process.


5. (C) U Lwin and U Nyunt Wei both noted that it would be
impossible for the SPDC to follow the NC quickly with a
referendum on a new constitution, unless the cease-fire
groups agree to surrender their arms. "The problem," U Lwin
added, "is that the armed groups will resist and say that
(former Prime Minister) Khin Nyunt never mentioned such a
requirement when negotiating the cease-fire agreements."


6. (C) U Lwin said he was perplexed that the SPDC had ceased
its annual dry season military offensives against remaining
insurgent groups. "Maybe the Burmese regime has lost its
spirit for fighting," said the former Burmese Army colonel,
"or maybe their efforts at diplomacy with the ethnics are
actually producing results."

PESSIMISM OVER UNSC EFFORT


7. (C) We observed that the NLD had issued a special appeal
on October 28, urging members of the UN Security Council to
support the findings of the Tutu/Havel report. U Lwin said
that he personally doubted the UNSC effort would succeed. He
noted that while Tutu and Havel are respected statesmen,
"they are not from this region" and annual UNGA resolutions
have no support beyond the West. U Lwin said he was still
bitter over a letter he received from the UN in 2003 that, he
claimed, described the UNSYG as having "no mandate on Burma
because no one from ASEAN supports UN resolutions." U Lwin
concluded that, while the UNSC "might consider the Burma
question," real action will be thwarted by "the veto of two
countries (China and Russia)."
HKUN HTUN OO


8. (C) We shared with the NLD leaders the Department's
November 7 statement on recent sentences handed down for SNLD
Chairman Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan political leaders. The
NLD leaders said they had had virtually no contact with
ethnic Shan pro-democracy parties in recent months and had no
observations on the fate of Hkun Htun Oo.


9. (C) After our meeting, the NLD distributed a declaration
by the Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP)
that criticized the long-term imprisonment of Hkun Htun Oo
and Sai Nyunt Lwin as "harmful to efforts aimed at building
national reconciliation and unity among the country's
nationalities." The SNLD, which expressed gratitude to
Emboffs for the Department's statement, issued its own press
release on November 9 that demanded the unconditional release
of Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan leaders, criticizing the SPDC
for equating "the expression of opinions and views with
conspiracy and treason."


10. (C) Comment: Sadly, our exchange with the NLD leaders
reflects the tenor of our recent meetings with the country's
leading opposition party. They have a great deal to offer
with regard to historical events and thinking. Strategic
views, however, seem to be lacking, especially about how the
NLD could take advantage of a potential emerging vacuum as
the GOB heads packing, literally, for the proverbial hills.
End Comment.
VILLAROSA