Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05RANGOON1235
2005-11-02 05:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

ENGAGE BURMA: EUROPEAN VIEWS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL EAID SW FR GM UK YI IT EZ BM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 RANGOON 001235 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID SW FR GM UK YI IT EZ BM
SUBJECT: ENGAGE BURMA: EUROPEAN VIEWS

REF: A. RANGOON 1199

B. RANGOON 1198 AND PREVIOUS

C. RANGOON 1059

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 RANGOON 001235

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID SW FR GM UK YI IT EZ BM
SUBJECT: ENGAGE BURMA: EUROPEAN VIEWS

REF: A. RANGOON 1199

B. RANGOON 1198 AND PREVIOUS

C. RANGOON 1059

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Recent meetings with all European diplomatic
missions represented in Rangoon (plus two accredited missions
resident in Bangkok) revealed waning support for advancing
democracy and human rights in Burma, and growing interest in
expanding humanitarian assistance. The British join us as
the staunchest supporters of the democratic opposition and
the use of pressure as a means to seek change from the
current regime, though they differ somewhat on tactics.
Ennui best describes the attitude of the other Europeans
present in Rangoon. End Summary.

UNITED KINGDOM: SEARCHING FOR NEW WAYS TO PROMOTE CHANGE


2. (SBU) The Charge made her first courtesy call in Rangoon
(September 1) on British Ambassador Vicky Bowman. The UK
joins us as the staunchest supporters of the democratic
opposition, democracy, and human rights in Burma and our
encounters with our British colleagues are frequent. For
example, our respective policy teams met for a working lunch
on October 11 to discuss a range of political and economic
issues as well as public diplomacy efforts.


3. (C) The British not only share overall U.S. objectives in
Burma, they are easily the most visible and active supporters
of the democratic opposition among European missions (four EU
member states are resident in Rangoon and over a half dozen
missions, including the EC delegation, are accredited but
resident in Bangkok). In particular, British diplomats
regularly visit National League for Democracy (NLD)
headquarters and they often join us as the only diplomatic
missions in attendance at NLD party functions. The British
also have a robust public diplomacy program; their British
Council activities parallel many of those at our American
Center, including civics and democracy-building instruction

to members of the political opposition and to former
political prisoners.


4. (C) The British, particularly during Amb. Bowman's tenure,
have advocated more humanitarian assistance for Burma.
Although we share objectives, our tactics sometimes diverge.
Bowman, for example, believes the GOB should be a full
partner on most assistance projects. She recently secured
the assignment to Rangoon of a representative of the UK's
Department for International Development (DFID) to coordinate
growing British assistance activities.


5. (C) Bowman, on her second tour in Rangoon and a fluent
Burmese speaker, has become quite passionate about Burma.
She has sharply criticized the decision by the Global Fund to
withdraw from Burma. She freely expresses displeasure with
Burmese exiles and their supporters who lobby overseas to
oppose any collaboration with the GOB and its entities. She
organized a closed meeting at Wilton Park, in September, to
discuss new approaches to humanitarian assistance. (Note: The
UK tasked Michael Ryder to prepare a report on this meeting,
and follow-up discussions, for submission to the FCO at the
end of October. End Note.) As Chair of the UN Expanded
Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, Bowman has marshaled support for the
Fund for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar (FAHM),which partners with the
GOB's Ministry of Health. The UK is the largest donor to the
FAHM and contributed over $17 million last year; Sweden and
Norway are the other main donors.

FRANCE: "SANCTIONS FEEL GOOD, BUT DON'T DO GOOD"


6. (C) On September 19, the Charge called on French
Ambassador Jean-Michel Lacombe, who has been in Burma for two
years. Lacombe said that sanctions "feel good, but don't do
good," and are only effective if most neighboring countries
participate. He acknowledged that the only sanction that
really hurts is the visa sanction, referring to the EU
decision to deny the GOB Minister for Economic Development a
visa to attend an ASEM meeting. The visa sanction, he said,
highlights the regime's lack of legitimacy. Lacombe viewed
Secretary Rice's comments on Burma at the September ASEAN

SIPDIS
foreign ministers meeting in New York as helpful, but added
that sanctions give more influence to China, which is
"colonizing Burma," He said in Burma, the West is "not
fighting the junta, but fighting Chinese diplomacy." The
Charge observed that China wants stability in Burma, but also
must confront a flow of cross-border drugs and disease.


7. (C) Amb. Lacombe described the Global Fund's withdrawal
from Burma as a "U.S. Congressional decision" and said the
action will hurt the ability of NGOs to work in country. The
international community should let in humanitarian aid, urged
Lacombe, because the situation is no worse in Burma than it
is in Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam. Lacombe, who has also
served in Georgia and Bangladesh, added that donors give aid
to some other countries knowing up that up to 70 percent goes
into government coffers. The Charge countered that donors
should not provide any assistance in Burma without capable
people to deliver the aid. She also observed that if the
international community remains divided on this issue, it
only serves to bolster the GOB's interests.


8. (C) Lacombe said that the regime has no real interest in
democracy and described the National Convention as a sham
exercise. He opined that former Prime Minister General Khin
Nyunt had attempted, but failed, to address the concerns of
the international community, so the only remaining hope for
political change in Burma today is the new generation of
military officers. However, Lacombe added, the SPDC makes a
valid point in emphasizing its important security role
because ethnic divisions do threaten national unity.
Alluding to cease-fire arrangements over the past 17 years,
Lacombe said that the regime is slowly extending central
authority to the country's borders.

GERMANY: OSTPOLITIK REDUX


9. (C) On September 26, the Charge called on German
Ambassador Dietrich Andreas, a new arrival in Burma, who
transferred here directly from Dhaka in July. Andreas
complained that Burmese exile groups have an "opinion
monopoly" controlling Western policy. He observed that
Western nations have "isolated" themselves from contact with
the GOB, while the regime benefits from supportive contact
with countries with which it enjoys closer relations.


10. (C) In response, the Charge noted that the GOB is
extremely inwardly focused and that even those countries that
maintain close contact do not seem to have much influence.
The Charge noted that other autocratic ASEAN countries have
recognized that standards of living could improve with more
open policies. This did not seem to be the case in Burma.
She suggested that the international community, which concurs
on most long-term objectives, should not waste time arguing
over short-term tactics, since it allows the GOB to divert
the argument from its own failures to international
differences on Burma.


11. (C) Discussion shifted to the next generation of military
leaders and whether they shared the same inward focus of the
current generals. The second tier officers seemed to all be
"yes-men," according to the Charge, who are part of the same
system and want to share its spoils. Perhaps younger
officers recognize how far Burma has fallen behind. Andreas
said that the Germans have had some contact with third tier
officers, but their views remain cryptic. He added that the
decline in education standards in Burma severely limited the
potential of successor generations. The Charge agreed,
noting that the regime leaders sent their own children and
grandchildren abroad, while driving the Burmese educational
system backwards.


12. (C) The German Ambassador asserted that sanctions had not
won any more freedom for Aung San Suu Kyi. He asked what
would result in any change in U.S. sanctions policy, and
whether there are any differences among the legislative and
executive branches in the United States and the U.K. on this
issue. The Charge described the overwhelming bipartisan
agreement on Burma policy in the U.S. She reiterated that
forward leaning engagement had shown no results either,
adding that U.S. and EU policies also had the important
result of denying the SPDC the legitimacy it craves. Andreas
observed that the opposition remains weak and passive. The
Charge replied that it is hard to be active when many of its
members are in jail.


13. (C) Based on his involvement in the reunification of
Germany in 1990, Andreas stressed the importance of talking
to all parties, in order to move quickly when the right time
comes. The Charge said that the U.S. placed a high priority
on promoting a dialogue inclusive of all Burmese to produce
genuine national reconciliation. She pointed out that the
U.S. reaches out to a wide range of Burmese citizens today
through our American Center programs. However, she noted, it
is not the West, but rather the Burmese Government that bans
exiles and most legislators from visiting and engaging in
public dialogue here. More sharing of information would
benefit all.

ITALY: ISOLATION IS WHAT THE REGIME WANTS


14. (C) Italian Ambassador Raffaele Miniero, during the
Charge's courtesy call on September 29, said that after three
years in Rangoon he believes the SPDC regime is now "in a
perfect situation, right where they want to be." He said the
regime generals are isolated by the international community,
"free from outside pressure, so they are capable of doing
whatever they want to do." He observed that the practical
outcome of Burma's membership in ASEAN was that the "Burmese
generals exert influence on ASEAN, rather than the other way
around, as was anticipated."


15. (C) Miniero advocated engagement with the regime, but
acknowledged that he had given up on his own efforts at
dialogue, with either GOB officials or with opposition
figures. "It's completely useless to try and talk with these
guys," he said. Miniero criticized the Global Fund for
terminating its Burma programs, assessing that even if some
funds went to the regime, "at least some of the assistance
benefited the Burmese people."


16. (C) Miniero also criticized the EU decision to deny a
visa to the Burmese Minister for Economic Development to
attend the September ASEM Economic Ministerial. "This great
mistake," he said, "creates solidarity among the ASEAN
countries on Burma and reduces communication with the
regime." (Note: Miniero has told others that the Dutch visa
decision was unilateral, rather than in accordance with the
EU's Common Position on Burma. End Note.) The Charge cited
the utility of reminding the senior generals that they are
not legitimate leaders and pointed but that Miniero had
already commented that there was no point in even talking to
the Ministers.


17. (C) Ambassador Miniero agreed that political change must
come from inside Burma, but added that "this won't happen;
there's no movement among students or within the military."
He criticized the Burmese people for being passive, "unlike
the Latin Americans, who can fight." He observed that there
will be no political change as long as China and India
maintain a policy of engagement and assistance. "As a matter
of survival," Miniero added, "the generals will continue to
rely on these two neighbors."


18. (C) The Charge disagreed with the Italian Ambassador's
assessment on the future of Burma, noting that many observers
had also been skeptical that militaries would give way in
Indonesia and Thailand. They changed. Even in Burma, she
said, large numbers of people grew so frustrated in 1988 that
they took to the streets, where they risked machine gun fire
to express a desire for democratic government. "The military
acts in its own interests," she added, "and if the winds
change, there could be officers and soldiers who change also."

SWEDEN: WE ONLY WANT TO HELP BURMA


19. (C) On September 28, the Charge received Swedish
Ambassador Jonas Hafstrom, who resides in Bangkok and has
been accredited to Burma since June. Hafstrom questioned the
Dutch/EU decision to deny visas to senior regime officials,
adding that many in the EU thought it was time to review the
policy. "We can have a tough policy," he said, "but we don't
want to look foolish (by denying visas, but agreeing to meet
the Burmese elsewhere)." He regretted the Global Fund
withdrawal from Burma, saying that the international
community needed to provide help, especially in the education
and health sectors. In this regard, he added, the European
Commission would soon post an aid officer (ECHO) to Rangoon
to facilitate assistance programs.


20. (C) The Charge acknowledged that dialogue is important,
but countered that a genuine dialogue requires that the GOB
produce interlocutors who are willing and capable of
exchanging serious views. "The problem," she said, "is that
the regime refuses to discuss anything that makes it
uncomfortable." She noted that ASEAN members preach
engagement with the regime, but "even they don't get access
to top leaders." The Charge added that sanctions denied the
regime generals the legitimacy that they craved. She
encouraged the EU to maintain a visa ban when reviewing its
Common Position on Burma.


21. (C) Responding to the Swedish Ambassador's plea for
assistance in Burma, the Charge acknowledged the country's
humanitarian needs, but cautioned that donors must avoid
benefiting the regime. As an example of the need for
vigilance, she cited a World Food Programme (WFP) report
earlier this year that revealed the GOB had diverted millions
of dollars in aid by surreptitiously taxing WFP's local
procurement of food. Ambassador Hafstrom described Sweden as
the largest donor on the Thai-Burma border and added that the
EU was considering a new plan that could involve up to 20
million euros in assistance annually. He acknowledged that
Burma would continue to have a serious problem absorbing
humanitarian assistance, but was encouraged by the Charge's
assessment that there are ways to make a difference in the
country without strengthening the regime, primarily by
working through responsible NGOs.

CZECH REPUBLIC: STILL BELIEVES


22. (C) Czech Ambassador Jiri Sitler injected a refreshing,
positive note when he met with the Charge on October 14.
Also resident in Bangkok, he expressed regret that he had not
had many opportunities to visit Burma. He requested
suggestions on how the Czechs could effectively provide
assistance. He mentioned that visits to the Burmese exile
community in Thailand revealed many differences among those
advocating democracy in Burma.


23. (C) The Charge mentioned that the Havel-Tutu report had
touched a nerve with the regime, which indicated that the
military was more sensitive to outside criticism than it
liked to admit. Sitler replied that former President Havel
was amused by the bad poetry the military had published in
the New Light of Myanmar (official regime newspaper)
criticizing the report. He added that Havel was very sincere
in his desire to promote democracy in Burma. Sitler provided
us with a copy of Havel's booklet, entitled "Power of the
Powerless," which had been translated into Burmese. The
Charge suggested that a Burmese translation of at least the
executive summary of the Havel-Tutu report would be eagerly
devoured.


24. (C) After describing our American Center programs, the
Charge suggested that we might be able to work together to
arrange programs for Czech speakers. Sitler seemed very
interested, assuming the speakers would get visas. He knew
of speakers, familiar with the Czech Republic's transition
from authoritarian to democratic rule, who could discuss how
journalists handled censorship or how to build coalitions and
the art of compromise. He also offered to provide English
translations of books like "The Good Soldier Schweik" that
lampooned autocratic regimes and videos of comedians
satirizing government.
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: WHY IS HE HERE?

25. (C) The Charge made a brief courtesy call in late
September on Dragan Janekovic, Charge d'Affaires for Serbia
and Montenegro. Janekovic, considered a cartoonish
lightweight among the local diplomatic corps, especially by
other European representatives, offered no real observations
on Burma's domestic political or economic situation. He
claimed that Serbia had a strong interest in Southeast Asia,
but revealed no details, other than to say that Serbia and
Montenegro wanted to export agricultural machinery and
electronics. (Note: Although they have had a presence in
Rangoon since the 1950s, Serbia's small diplomatic presence
in Rangoon is widely considered to be aimed at supporting
Serbian commercial arms sales to the Burmese military.
Janekovic did not address this topic. End Note.)

COMMENT: OUT OF SYNCH WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE?


26. (C) Close coordination with the EU member states in
essential for advancing Burma policy. Their support for
democracy and human rights provides a crucial multilateral
context to our own policy efforts. Their local advocacy of
engagement with the regime, however, strikes us as being out
of synch with their own public (which several of the
Ambassadors acknowledged and summarily dismissed). The
private grumbling and pointed criticism we've heard over the
EU visa decision and the Global Fund's withdrawal from Burma,
for example, do not correspond with the EU Common Position on
sanctions nor with the EU's well-prepared annual draft of the
UNGA resolution. Perhaps it requires Europeans, like the
Czechs, still reveling in democracy. Fortunately, our
European friends who have enjoyed democracy for much longer
do appreciate the power of the people, even if their
diplomats do not. We should ensure that our public diplomacy
programs in these EU countries emphasize shared interest in
promoting democracy and human rights in places like Burma,
and make sure that Burma remains sufficiently high-profile in
order to avoid getting sidelined by bored diplomats. End
Comment.
VILLAROSA