ILO WILL ANNOUNCE BURMA'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001215

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/IL; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ELAB PHUM BM
SUBJECT: ILO WILL ANNOUNCE BURMA'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW

REF: A. RANGOON 1174 AND PREVIOUS

B. RANGOON 1094

C. RANGOON 897 AND PREVIOUS

D. RANGOON 246

E. STATE 195514 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: A/DCM W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The International Labor Organization (ILO)
will issue on October 28 what its representative in Burma
calls an "explosive" report that reveals the GOB's intention
to withdraw from the organization, only the second time in
recent decades that a member state has quit the ILO over
labor-related criticism. The report--issued on the basis of
a recent, un-publicized two-day visit to Burma by a senior
ILO advisor aimed at resuming a dialogue on forced
labor--will also make public a series of death threats
directed at the ILO's Liaison Officer in Rangoon, note the
GOB's failure to take action on those threats, and draw
attention to the regime's anti-ILO propaganda campaign and
overall unresponsiveness on forced labor issues. A senior
GOB minister told the ILO envoy that the regime is no longer
worried about ILO pressure, but rather is deeply concerned
that the UN Security Council could decide to address Burma
issues. End Summary.

AN "EXPLOSIVE" REPORT


2. (C) On October 27, Richard Horsey, the ILO's Liaison
Officer, a.i. in Burma, called on the acting Charge and
Emboffs to inform, in confidence, that the ILO in Geneva will
release a report that summarizes findings of an un-publicized
Oct. 18-19 visit to Rangoon of the ILO Director General's
Burma advisor Francis Maupain. According to Horsey, the
report will be posted on Friday October 28 at 10:00 a.m.
local time in Geneva.


3. (C) Horsey said that Maupain had visited Rangoon at the
invitation of the GOB. In recent weeks, there have been
signs that the Burmese regime was stepping back from an
intense anti-ILO campaign, undertaken in the wake of the June
International Labor Conference (refs A-C). Minister of Labor
U Thaung, who had shunned the ILO for months, met recently
with Horsey on two occasions to discuss labor issues, and the
regime's mass-member organization, the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA),ceased its massive anti-ILO
rallies. The ILO, said Horsey, went ahead with the Maupain
visit as a low-key effort to resume a dialogue with the GOB,
de facto in suspension since the failed mission of a
high-profile senior ILO mission to Burma in February (ref D).


4. (C) According to Horsey, the ILO report on Maupain's
visit, which did not succeed in resuming a dialogue, will be
"explosive" and will make public ILO information regarding:

--the GOB's apparent decision to withdraw from the ILO (as
communicated in no uncertain terms to Maupain and Horsey by
the Minister of Labor);
--the regime's anti-ILO campaign, undertaken since June,
including mass rallies conducted by the USDA;
--a series of death threats directed at Horsey and the GOB's
failure to investigate those threats or take protective
measures (ref B); and,
--the GOB's overall unresponsiveness on forced labor issues.

A NOISY START TO A QUIET VISIT


5. (C) Horsey recounted that he and Maupain met twice with
the Labor Minister during Maupain's "very quiet" October
18-19 visit (the ILO reps and the Minister separately
consulted with their respective hierarchies overnight,
between the two meetings). Minister U Thaung shocked the ILO
envoy at the outset of the initial meeting by informing him
that senior SPDC authorities had already decided that Burma
would withdraw from the ILO. U Thaung claimed that he had
"gone out on a limb" with his superiors to delay official
notification of the decision, pending Maupain's visit and any
prospect that the ILO mission could offer other options.
Horsey said that news of a withdrawal was a complete surprise
since the visit was expected to lead to progress on a way
forward for the GOB to work with the ILO.

6. (C) Maupain told the Labor Minister that withdrawal from
the ILO would be a negative step and send a very bad signal,
not that the GOB was upset with the ILO, but rather that it
was not willing or able to eliminate forced labor. U Thaung
responded that the GOB was no longer worried about ILO
pressure, but rather was deeply concerned that the UN
Security Council would decide to address Burma issues (ref
E). The ILO reps countered that a GOB decision to withdraw
from the ILO could, in fact, spur potential UNSC action,
given that forced labor issues formed part of the basis for
such action. "If you quit the ILO," Maupain advised the
Minister, "you will embarrass the very countries that have
supported you at the ILO and are trying to keep you off of
the UNSC agenda." Maupain added that some countries had
defended Burma because they had seen some positive steps on
forced labor and wanted to encourage the GOB, but pulling the
plug on the ILO would make such support more difficult.

CONVINCE US OTHERWISE


7. (C) Minister U Thaung said that all relevant GOB agencies
had been consulted in making the withdrawal decision, but he
asked if the ILO could offer anything to convince the senior
SPDC leadership to do otherwise. Horsey said the ILO wanted
the GOB to look beyond the November Governing Body meeting in
Geneva and that a longer-term strategy was necessary to deal
with individual complaints of forced labor and other labor
issues. Horsey said the ILO offered that the joint Plan of
Action on forced labor, developed in 2003 but tabled after
the Depeyin attack against Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy,
would be the best way forward. Minister U Thaung, however,
rejected the Plan of Action and declared that it was no
longer a viable option (in what Horsey described as the GOB's
first acknowledgment that it had no intention of resurrecting
the Plan of Action).


8. (C) In the absence of a long-term strategy, Horsey said
the only existing mechanism for cooperation on forced labor
was his own ILO Liaison Office. There are serious
shortcomings with this mechanism, he said. First, it is an
ad hoc process, subject to allegations of bias and with no
guarantees of confidentiality for individuals who report
labor abuses. His role, Horsey said, should be to liaise
with the parties on forced labor issues, not to resolve
specific labor complaints. Second, the GOB has showed no
support for the ILO Liaison Office, but rather issued
diatribes against the ILO, condoned USDA anti-ILO rallies,
and ignored multiple death threats against Horsey and his
family. Therefore, the ILO reps told the Labor Minister,
using the Liaison Office mechanism would require three
conditions: a clear intent by the GOB to investigate the
death threats; a public GOB statement of support for the ILO
process to mitigate the anti-ILO rallies; and a full GOB
commitment to a meaningful dialogue with the ILO on forced
labor issues.

SEVERAL WAYS TO SKIN THE CAT


9. (C) Over the course of the two-day Maupain visit, said
Horsey, the GOB would not agree to undertake any of the three
conditions and the ILO concluded there was nothing further it
could recommend to the Labor Minister to convince the
"authorities" to reverse the withdrawal decision. Maupain
again cautioned the Minister against leaving the ILO and
advised that the GOB should avoid a "worse case scenario"
that involved withdrawal notification, closing the Liaison
Office, and eliminating dialogue during the mandatory
two-year period before withdrawal officially takes effect.


10. (C) Maupain told the Labor Minister that the GOB could
"minimize" the damage of a withdrawal by indicating in its
notification letter an intent to continue a dialogue with the
ILO. It would be better, Maupain added, to continue
discussions during the two year period to try and find a way
to resolve labor issues. Horsey noted that the GOB would
still need to address the current constraints facing the
Liaison Office, otherwise the "intent to cooperate" would not
be credible and would be perceived as simply buying more
time. Horsey told Emboffs that the ILO Director General
views his mandate as seeking to engage the GOB in a dialogue
and the ILO leadership doesn't support terminating Burma's
membership. Horsey observed, however, that if the Governing
Body (GB) viewed the ILO's efforts in Burma as obstructed,
members of the GB would most likely take action and seek to
pull the plug on the Liaison Office.


11. (C) Horsey acknowledged that Burma's withdrawal from the
ILO is "hypothetical," given that the GOB has not yet
submitted a formal letter of notification. He underscored,
however, that the October 28 ILO report would be entirely
factual, to include the Minister of Labor's unambiguous
statements to Maupain, over the course of two days, that
senior SPDC leaders had already made the decision to
withdraw. Minister U Thaung, Horsey said, fully understood
that the ILO would issue a report on the visit and that the
report would reveal the GOB's intentions to withdraw from the
ILO.

COMMENT: THE CONFIDENT MESSENGER


12. (C) Although the SPDC could react to the imminent ILO
report in unpredictable (and illogical) ways, to include
reneging on its notice to the ILO envoys, we note that Labor
Minister U Thaung has the basis to speak on behalf of the GOB
with some authority. A retired Colonel, and former
Ambassador to the United States, he is the longest serving
member of the GOB cabinet (since 1996) and is very close to
SPDC Chairman Than Shwe. Horsey observed that U Thaung spoke
with "extreme confidence" during the two sessions with the
Maupain and gave every indication that he was reflecting
senior SPDC thinking on the ILO issue. End Comment.
STOLTZ