DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES: BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001177

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, G, DRL, S/P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM BM
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES: BURMA

REF: A. STATE 16982


B. STATE 156961

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The promotion of democracy in Burma is this
mission's top priority as reflected in our Mission Program
Plan. Our support for promoting democracy and respect for
human rights has been long-standing and requires
perseverence. Although this strong support for democracy has
severely strained our relations with the Burmese military
regime, it has garnered us broad public support from the
Burmese people. Given the entrenched nature of the military
regime, we cannot promise dramatic changes in the short-term,
but believe we can effectively stretch the boundaries of the
possible to give more space for civil society to develop and
to give support and encouragement to the many supporters of
democracy in Burma to persist in their struggle. We run
already successful American Center programs that can be
expanded beyond Rangoon to the second major city of Mandalay
if we get Department approval. We also will receive $100,000
in FY06 for small grants that we will use to promote
democracy and civil society development. We also recommend a
diplomatic push to emphasize that a national referendum on a
new constitution will not confer any legitimacy on the regime
without the inclusion of representatives of all the Burmese
people in the drafting and a free, fair and open public
debate. End Summary.

Key Areas of Democratic Deficit
--------------


2. (SBU) Democratic Deficit understates the situation in
Burma today. The military regime retains all governing
authority, and the country has no free press, a complete
absence of basic human rights (including freedom of speech,
association, and movement),no rule of law, no independent
judiciary, highly controlled access to information, severely
restricted political party activities, and systematically
emasculated civil society institutions. Religious minorities
face increasing repression as the military tries to use
Buddhism to give itself greater standing. The population
remains subject to forced labor at the whim of military
authorities.


3. (C) Progress in Burma requires a long-term effort. Our
overall policy reamins focused on fostering a meaningful
political dialogue among Burma's diverse political forces,
aiming at achieving a peaceful transition to democracy. The
military regime, however, has rejected all bilateral and
multilateral efforts to promote an inclusive national
reconcilation dialogue, the free operation of political
parties, and the release of over 1000 political prisoners,
including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite
intermittent glimmers of hope that the message might be
getting through, the military appears determined to protect
its continued rule of the few over the many disenfranchised.


4. (C) This year marks the 43rd year of authoritarian rule
and 17 years under the current military regime, which came to
power promising a "quick" transition to democracy. The
regime generals in the past years have retreated further into
their collective shell of isolation. This retreat is
partially a response to international pressure, but also
reflects renewed attention to power sharing issues with the
country's ethnic minorities, a concern that remains
unresolved since Burmese independence. Although the military
convened a National Convention in 1993 to draft a
Constitution as part of its "roadmap to democracy," it
hand-picked the representatives, restricted debate, detained
and isolated the pro-democracy movement leaders, and harassed
and repressed democratic activists. The military has
announced that they will reconvene the National Convention
later this year in order to finalize a new Constitution. Yet
after 12 years, no one has seen any provisions in writing.


5. (C) The regime's open disdain for the UN system and the
international community has become more apparent. The regime
has prohibited a visit by the UNSYG's Special Envoy, Tan Sri
Razali Ismail, since March 2004. It has been two years since
UN Human Rights Rapporteur Paolo Sergio Pinheiro was allowed
to enter the country. In the interim, world leaders and
international organizations, inlcuding the UNSYG, the UNGA,
the UNCHR, and the ILO, have continued to press the regime,
unsuccessfully, for significant reform. The regime has also
imposed increased restrictions on UN agencies and
international NGOs operating inside Burma. The military
intimidates its citizens by questioning them about any
contacts with foreigners, including the source of funds for
programs they initiate. Foreign missions and visitors face
increasing delays and difficulties in obtaining routine visas
and residence permits.

Short-term Objectives
--------------


6. (C) Given the overall grim prospects for a transition to
democracy in the near future, we propose some modest steps to
stretch the boundaries to promote meaningful discussions
among the Burmese people and prepare them to control their
future. We propose to do this by expanding our successful
American Center programs to Mandalay and by utilizing
$100,000 in ESF funds already appropriated to give support to
civil society groups working inside Burma. In addition, we
recommend that a diplomatic effort be launched to forestall
the adoption of a new Constitution (drafting of which may be
concluded by the end of this year) after a sham referendum
designed to entrench the military in power.

Diplomatic and Programmatic Strategy
--------------


7. (C) Stretching the Boundaries: In spite of regime efforts
to paint the international community, and especially the
United States, as "enemies of the state," there is a
phenomenal thirst among Burma's diverse population for all
that we have to offer. The democratic opposition values U.S.
mission counsel and support. The ethnic minorities,
distrusted by the central government, value our efforts to
include them in our programs. The general population eagerly
avails itself of the abundant, accurate, and unvarnished
information we provide. Our American Center in Rangoon
(which houses the best, and one of the only, libraries in the
country) draws up to 8,000 visitors a week and has 12,000
enrolled members. Almost 400 Burmese, including opposition
activists and former political prisoners, have enrolled in
our English language and civics instruction programs.
Participants in our public diplomacy exchange programs in the
United States return to their NGOs and independent
associations with new leadership and management skills to
build a stronger civil society.


8. (C) We can do more:

--Increasing Outreach: We must turn away interested students
for our programs in Rangoon due to space limitations. We
should not be turning away any interested individuals seeking
the truth. The USG owns prime real estate in Mandalay,
currently unoccupied, that could serve as a center for
expanding our successful public diplomacey programs.
Mandalay is Burma's second largest city, the cultural
capital, and the gateway to Northern Burma and most ethnic
areas. China, Japan, UK, and France operate educational
programs there and China and India have active consulates.
We recommend expanding our successful American Center
programs (library and classes) to Mandalay in order to reach
many democracy activists and ethnic minorities who are
prohibited from traveling to Rangoon. We need to begin now
to seek the necessary approvals from the authorities(which
can take a very long time),while the Department coordinates
the necessary Washington approvals, so that we can get
Mandalay open soon.

--Training: Quick to recognize threats to its authority, the
military has closed universities for extended periods of time
and then dispersed them away from urban centers. The
military hand-picks the heads of business and professional
associations, even the monkhood, to avoid challenges. They
view the private sector as easy plunder rather than a force
for development. They discourage the reporting of bad news
as negatively reflecting on their rule, so data collection
has disappeared. They have begun moving to replace trained
civil servants throughout the bureaucracy with military
officers having no background or expertise in the jobs they
assume. As a result, leadership, decision making, and
management skills have withered in Burma. The regime's
repression and intimidation of the democratic opposition has
severely restricted the ability of political party leaders to
develop sufficient capacity to govern. Our American Center
has programs in place to teach English to democracy
activists, with an emphasis on governance and civics. We
have offered successful journalism training programs to
support professional development within a growing independent
media sector. We have oragnized an eMBA program for
progressive business leaders seeking the tools necessary to
make the private sector an engine of change for political and
economic reform. All these, plus more, can be expanded with
additional space and funding.
--International Visitors/Exchanges: The USG currently funds
six IVs annually. We could easily double or triple that
figure to accommodate strong candidates from independent NGOs
and civil society. Burma does not currently have a Fulbright
program, despite being one of the original Fulbright
countries in 1947. We should reactivate this program that
has demonstrated its outstanding record of success of
preparing future leaders around the world. We should also
consider funding non-GOB individuals to regional meetings on
democracy-related issues and support more regional speakers
to visit Burma for appropriate programs we could arrange here.

--Independent Information. The vast majority of Burmese
citizens, including government and military officials, obtain
the only available accurate information about domestic
developments and world news via the independent short-wave
radio broadcasts of Radio Free Asia (RFA),the VOA, the BBC,
and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB). The distribution of
radios inside the country would enhance broader access to
reliable information. We should also work with these four
Burmese-language radio services to broaden their democracy
and capacity-building programming and support efforts to
boost their signal strength.

--Burma Congressional Earmark: Tens of millions of dollars
in ESF and HA funds have been spent on Burmese refugees and
exiles in Thailand, a tiny percentage of the 50 million
people living inside Burma, and unlikey to return to Burma
anytime soon. We welcome the opportunity to use the $100,000
identified for this Embassy to use in promoting democracy
this fiscal year. We are in the process of identifying
independent homegrown NGOs working in Burma, so that we can
show what can be done from within to promote the
establishment of democracy and provide civil society
opportunities to develop the skills that a democratic Burma
will require.


9. (C) Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy: Annual UNGA
and UNCHR resolutions on Burma demonstrate the international
consensus on the need for change. The current efforts to
engage the UN Security Council on Burma have struck a nerve
in the military leadership. They have launched vituperative
attacks on the "outside forces" attempting to discredit the
regime (amusingly, printing the criticisms that they then try
to rebut). The democratic opposition, ethnic groups, student
leaders have all publicly endorsed the effort further
enfuriating the regime. We should continue to support
efforts such as this to keep Burma on the international
agenda, which serves to remind the military of their
illegitimacy.


10. (C) At the same time, we must launch an international
effort to forestall a sham referendum enshrining a
constitution tailored to order by the military (see para 4
above). The regime has announced plans to conclude the
drafting by the National Convention later this year; they
would then stage a referendum to ratify it. With all
opposition completely excluded from deliberations, debate
prohibited, and nothing in writing, this hardly portends a
free, fair and open decision by the Burmese people. Yet many
diplomats in Rangoon consider that it would be "good enough"
to gain the release of ASSK and future amendments could then
correct the flaws. We need to work with our European,
Australian, and Japanese partners to convince the Chinese and
ASEAN nations in particular that a flawed constitution at
this stage is "not good enough." The Chinese and ASEANs have
disagreed with many elements of our Burma policy, but they
should not be under any illusion that the international
community as a whole will recognize a sham. They themselves
recognize the many failures of the regime and their limited
influence on the regime despite their willingness to
"engage." Since stability seems to be a major concern to
them, remind them that any process that excludes a major
portion of the population will only ensure that conflicts
will continue and the economy will further deteriorate--thus
fueling instability. They should be telling the military, at
a minimum, that they only way to conclude this process is by
bringing in all the political players in advance to have an
open debate--maybe this could start the national
reconciliation so overdue in Burma.


11. (C) Humanitarian Assistance: Finally we wish to flag an
issue that merits Washington attention because it has an
impact on our bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Based on
our conversations with Europeans, Australian and Japanese
diplomats here, other donors have begun searching for other
ways that they can influence developments in Burma. They
have seized on Burma's serious humanitarian needs. They
recognize that the regime itself is largely responsible for
causing, or at least failing to address, a host of crises.
They also see a role for the international community to
alleviate the suffering of innocent people. The military
protects only itself, not the people. No one wants to
provide support that would in any way bolster the regime or
relieve the generals of their responsibility to undertake
fundamental reform. Nonetheless, credible international NGOs
make a compelling case that foreign assistance can not only
address humanitarian needs, but it can be delivered
independent of the government and in ways that also build
civil society and encourage grassroots democracy. Despite
our demonstrated track record of generous humanitarian
assistance around the world, many donors quietly point to us
as the obstacles in addressing humanitarian needs in Burma.
We should be willing to discuss with other donors their ideas
about how to move forward in Burma to advance our own ideas,
including exploring methods to broaden our humanitarian
assistance in creative ways to take advantage of this
"democracy building" space.

Flexibility, Creativity, and Persistence
--------------


12. (C) The regime will strongly resist overt efforts to
support the democratic opposition and those who seek an end
to military rule. The regime will equally resist efforts to
influence directly its own government and military ranks to
adapt or be more receptive to democratic practices. Thus we
have proposed a low-key approach that tries to expand the
boundaries in which can operate and open up space for the
Burmese people. We do not doubt that the military knows what
we are doing in our American Centers, yet they do not
interfere. Let's take advantage of that and probe where we
can do more. This will mean that we should not publicize our
specific intentions. That does not mean that we should not
speak out critically about this regime. Those words of
criticism for the abuses and the need for more freedom coming
from the President and Secretary are heard widely by the
Burmese people through radio broadcasts and welcomed as moral
support that they are not alone in their struggle.


13. (C) We must pursue our democracy objectives in Burma with
flexibility and creativity. While we can be bold and firm in
our bilateral relationship with the regime, our democracy
programming should not provoke the generals in a way that
would jeopardize the very people we are supporting or result
in further restrictions that close entirely the small space
in which we currently operate. We need to operate in
partnership with UN agencies and NGOs and through our
existing American Center and traditional public diplomacy
mechanisms. Expansion of our efforts may also require
"stealth" democracy programs which are carried out through
business development, humanitarian assistance, conservation,
and other projects that do not draw undesirable attention
from the authorities.


14. (C) The United States provides a voice and a source of
hope to the vast majority of the Burmese population who
oppose authoritarian rule and are inspired by core U.S.
values of good governance and respect for the rule of law.
They gain strength from the presence of our mission and from
U.S. policies. While tangible progress in achieving our
democracy objectives in Burma will be very difficult, we must
persist.
Villarosa