RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SEES A DIFFERENT BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001129

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SEES A DIFFERENT BURMA


Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: the Charge,s initial courtesy call on
Russian Ambassador Oleg Kabanov on September 27 revealed that
U.S. policy and Russian policy toward Burma remain poles
apart. Amb. Kabanov echoed the Burmese regime,s assertions
that only the military can maintain order in the country and
that democracy can only lead to chaos and collapse &in such
a backward country.8


2. (C) The Charge d,Affaires called on Amb. Kabanov on
September 27 at his residence within the Russian Embassy
compound, a Stalinist-style bunker next to the Foreign
Ministry in downtown Rangoon. The Russian mission,s views
of Burmese politics seem stuck in the same Stalinist frame.
Kabanov began by asking about the pending referral of the
situation in Burma to the UNSC, calling that a &serious move
that could lead to new sanctions.8 The Charge explained
that Nobel laureates Havel and Tutu had helped raise the
issue to recent prominence. Many people agreed that a
discussion of how the UN could play a more constructive role
to promote dialogue in Burma would be useful in light of the
fact that the current situation in the country is unstable
and adversely affects its neighbors.


3. (C) Kabanov agreed that past international efforts to get
the Burmese regime to engage in dialogue had been
unsuccessful, but urged that we reconsider our position on
the GOB,s own seven-step Road Map and constitutional
convention. The Charge noted that any lasting solution has
to include all the people and ethnic groups of Burma, and to
date the GOB,s process was exclusionary and scripted, not
representative and open.


4. (C) The Russian Ambassador said that, in his view, the
choice in Burma was not between perfect and imperfect but
between &any8 and &none.8 He said the constitutional
convention was the only remaining chance for political reform
in Burma. The process had taken longer than expected, he
surmised, because the GOB sought to extract additional
concessions from the ceasefire groups (CFGs),with limited
success since the ouster of Khin Nyunt. The portions of the
constitution he had seen leaked, Kabanov said, called for a
more independent judiciary, the disbanding of all ethnic
armies and a single Armed Forces of Burma. The hardest thing
would be persuading the CFGs to give up their arms and
financial privileges, he added. The Charge responded that
secret negotiations hardly create a transparent

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constitutional process that reflects all views, so the ethnic
groups resist giving up their weapons under such
circumstances.


5. (C) Ambassador Kabanov expressed the view that the regime
generals were not trying to fool the world with their Road
Map, but only need more time to negotiate internally. He
conceded that they will not willingly give up any of their
own economic interests. He said the GOB would not release
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and negotiate with the NLD because
they &cannot fight on two fronts, and the ethnic groups are
more formidable and a greater threat since they have arms.8
The Charg responded that the continued imprisonment of ASSK
and over one thousand others indicates that the military
fears ideas more than guns.


6. (C) Kabanov expressed confidence that when the
constitutional draft is released, it would provide an
opportunity for public engagement on reform. The Charge
asked whether he thought the GOB would ever be willing to
permit a real public debate on the constitution and allow a
free flow of information to facilitate informed choice. He
said that a public discussion of the constitution would open
up new opportunities for opposition groups to return to the
political process. He conceded Aung San Suu Kyi would easily
win if an election were held in Burma at this time and
surmised the regime would seek to prevent such a result in a
future vote. The Charge said that, in such a case, the
election would have no credibility and achieve nothing.


7. (C) Growing more exercised, the Russian Ambassador
complained that Western countries are &too impatient now.8
He noted that it took centuries for democracy to develop in
Europe and that it could take a very long time here, too. He
added that in 1988, the military had &been forced8 to
restore order in Burma when &chaos erupted from public
demonstrations8 after the ouster of Ne Win. The Charge
disputed Kabanov,s allegations and termed the military,s
murder of hundreds of unarmed people engaged in peaceful
protest as completely unjustified. Kabanov claimed that he
had learned from a former Russian diplomat here that there
were &hooligans8 among the demonstrators and that street
crime was widespread in August 1988. The Charge reiterated
that the victims were unarmed and protesting peacefully; it
was the military that was out of line.


8. (C) COMMENT: the Russians, primary objective in Burma is
intelligence gathering and arms sales. Russia might agree at
higher levels to not block UN discussion of Burma, but the
Russian Ambassador in Rangoon clearly follows the regime
line. Kabanov seemed nostalgic for the era when his country
was also an autocracy; he told the Charge that he keeps the
55-volume set of Lenin,s collected works in his office,
noting that it took years in exile for the Bolsheviks to plan
and organize &reform8 of the Russian political system. He
dismissed NLD as having no plan, instead seemingly content to
wait for change on the military,s terms. End comment.
Villarosa