A CHINESE FLY-ON-THE-WALL VIEW OF THE BURMESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001108

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/B; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PHUM CM BM
SUBJECT: A CHINESE FLY-ON-THE-WALL VIEW OF THE BURMESE
REGIME

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: A courtesy call on the departing Chinese
Ambassador to Burma, who has the greatest access among the
diplomatic corps to senior GOB officials, gave us unique
insight into the mind set of the regime's top generals.
Although his views reveal little common ground between China
and the United States on the most effective approach to the
Burmese regime, he acknowledged that many of the SPDC's
current practices do not guarantee long-term stability, a
major concern for China's interests in Burma. The Chinese
Ambassador agreed with us that the generals need to pursue,
rather than evade, dialogue with the international community
and he committed to raising this notion during his remaining
farewell calls with senior officials. End Summary.

THE MISUNDERSTOOD GENERALS
--------------


2. (SBU) The Charge, joined by P/E Chief and visiting EAP/MLS
Director, made a September 21 courtesy call on departing
Chinese Ambassador to Burma, Li Jinjun. Li, who noted that
the Charge is the third U.S. chief of mission that he has met
while in Burma, is in the final weeks of a tour that has
lasted over four and a half years. He has traveled widely
throughout Burma during his tenure and has gained greater
access to top SPDC generals and GOB officials than any other
diplomat in Rangoon.


3. (C) Ambassador Li said that few people, "even in China,"
understand the mentality of the Burmese generals or make any
real effort to get to know the country. Most people, he
said, expect the SPDC to behave like other military regimes
which have seized power. The SPDC, however, is unique in
that the top generals did not undertake a coup (in 1988) to
gain short-term wealth, but rather to shift away from (former
dictator General Ne Win's 26 years of) authoritarian rule to
a leadership based on "strategic thinking and interest in
political and economic reform."

INTEREST GROUPS
--------------


4. (C) The SPDC generals, according to Li, sit at the top of
"the country's largest interest group," the armed forces and
its many members and dependents. "We can't look only at the
senior generals," said Li, "because the decisions of SPDC
Chairman Than Shwe effect not only the (12-member junta),but
also several million Burmese who have tied their fate to the
regime." The generals, he added, want to "find a way out"
and transfer power to an elected government, but they must
protect their commercial interests, meet the needs of the
entire armed forces community, and gain assurances there will
be no retribution against those who now rule.


5. (C) The Charge said that while some people benefit from
the regime and its rule, it is a small fraction of the 50
million Burmese who have suffered from a steadily declining
standard of living. She noted that in order to prepare for
an eventual transition, the Burmese people need education,
access to health care, and basic infrastructure. The regime
has denied such services to the vast majority of the
population as a means of perpetuating, not ending, military
rule.

17 YEARS AND COUNTING - JUST THE SHORT TERM
--------------


6. (C) Li disagreed with outside observers who reject the
SPDC's road map to democracy. He related that Than Shwe has
told him in private that military rule is only planned for
the short term and that the SPDC sees a need to return to
civilian rule, "but not so abruptly that chaos forces the
military to return quickly to power." Li added his personal
perspective that there is no difference between the
objectives of Than Shwe and ousted Prime Minister General
Khin Nyunt, "they just had different tactics." As an
example, Li said that the SPDC did not reject Khin Nyunt's
road map, but actually speeded up implementation following
his October 2004 "resignation."

7. (C) Ambassador Li asserted that Than Shwe is "very aware
of the big picture" and much stronger than Khin Nyunt ever
was. "Never look down on, or underestimate the Senior
General," advised Li, "it is impossible to isolate him and
pressure him to change." Li added that the West believed,
incorrectly, that external pressure had been a factor in
convincing the SPDC to relinquish the 2006 ASEAN Chair.
"This was actually a victory for Than Shwe," he asserted,
"hosting ASEAN would have required that the generals make
some changes to accommodate the international community."

HAVE GUNS, WILL TALK
--------------

8. (C) In addressing the role of the democratic opposition,
Li said that the regime does not allow the participation of
Aung San Suu Kyi in the road map process "because her
influence with the ethnic groups is significant and would
retard the GOB's progress." Furthermore, he said, the SPDC
must contend with the ethnics because "they have weapons, and
ASSK does not." Li added that he previously had "indirect"
contact with ASSK, but denied her 2002 request for a dialogue
"because this would have upset the SPDC." Li said he
suggested that ASSK put her proposals in a letter to Than
Shwe in order to build trust, "but instead she regrettably
went on a nationwide tour and encouraged her supporters to
provoke the regime."


9. (C) Li said it was a just a matter of time ("not if, but
when") before the generals resolve relations with the ethnics
and turn their attention back to ASSK and her party, the
National League for Democracy (NLD). "The generals will let
ASSK participate in the final steps of the road map," said
Li, "but for now she represents the minority, and the
majority is responsible for finishing the constitution." He
added that the responsibility for poor relations between the
GOB and the NLD lies not only with Than Shwe, but also with
ASSK. "She is a good statesman," said Li, "but she's not
God; the NLD needs to be a 'cooperative opposition' and they
can't be one under a leader who is out of touch and under the
influence of the West."


10. (C) The Charge countered Li's notion that the SPDC places
a priority on dealing with the ethnics because they are armed
and the NLD is not. "The generals fear the democratic
opposition because they fear ideas and those who advocate
change," she said, pointing out that the SPDC's greatest
surprise since assuming power has been the widespread
popularity of ASSK and those who advocate for democracy. She
added that it was disingenuous to blame ASSK for poor
relations, "since she is in detention and denied any role
whatsoever; it is the military that has denied her access to
information."

LOOKING FOR SOME LOVE
--------------


11. (C) The U.S. media, according to Li, has a fundamental
misunderstanding of China's interests in Burma. "It is
wrong," he said, "to assume that one-party China wants to
perpetuate military rule in Burma." He offered that China
places a priority on stability, given its long border with
Burma. "Without interfering, we want a peaceful environment
and Beijing will maintain the same good relations we have now
with a future democratic Burma." The Charge responded that
the U.S. and China can agree that Burma needs stability, "but
China should be concerned that the regime's tactics and
policies are leading to greater poverty and instability."
Stability requires a government that is representative of all
the people.


12. (C) The Charge continued that the generals claim Burma is
"misunderstood," but they refuse to see most diplomats and to
engage with the international community. She encouraged
Ambassador Li to use his high-level access to press the
generals to open up. Li agreed to do so, but added, "To be
frank, whenever the regime opens up, the United States and
the EU respond with sanctions." Li said after May 2003 Than
Shwe held his hand and asked "Why do they sanction me - I
have no villas and no foreign bank accounts, and yet they
idolize a female (ASSK) who has done nothing for the country?"


13. (C) The Charge replied that the last round of U.S.
sanctions, under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, was
imposed in response to the May 2003 violent attack on ASSK
and her convoy, "hardly an effort by the regime to open a
dialogue." She added that it was wrong, and unproductive,
for the Burmese regime to target ASSK. "She represents the
hopes and desires of the majority of the people," the Charge
said, "and the generals should see that it is in their best
interests to work with her, and not against her."


14. (C) Bio Note: Ambassador Li rarely socializes with the
diplomatic community, perhaps because he has much better
access and so does not feel compelled to discuss the latest
rumors with other diplomats. He speaks at great length about
his European expertise, particularly in Germany where he
studied at Heidelberg University in the mid-1970s. Burma was
his first SE Asian experience, and he goes to Manila next.
While he understands a bit of English, he heavily relies on
an interpreter. He is married and his wife is officially
based in Beijing, where she is involved in prison
administration. End Bio Note.

COMMENT: THE STATUS QUO
--------------


15. (C) Ambassador Li, and presumably the Chinese government,
accepts the Burmese military's desire to hold on to power.
He also understands, however, that in closing ranks to
protect their own positions the generals cannot succeed in
the long term. Ambassador Li acknowledged the irony of his
recognition that Burma needed to become more democratic.
Perhaps he figures that a gradual opening, a la China, would
enable the military to maintain control and provide
stability. Unfortunately, the Burmese regime is not
providing improved standards of living to garner any public
support and Ambassador Li did not dispute the fact that
economic conditions are deteriorating for most Burmese. So
it appears that his confidence that the military leaders will
continue to hold on to power rests on their having the
weapons, which China, among others, continues to supply. End
Comment.
Villarosa