BURMA: U.S. BILATERAL INITIATIVES VICTIM OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000104

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND INL; DEA FOR OF, OFF;
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR MOPS KCRM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: U.S. BILATERAL INITIATIVES VICTIM OF
POST-KHIN NYUNT PURGE

REF: A. USDAO RANGOON BM 240926Z JAN 05

B. USDAO RANGOON BM 290508Z NOV 04

C. RANGOON 88 AND PREVIOUS

D. RANGOON 11

E. CDR JPAC HICKAM AFB HI 142210Z JAN 05

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: The GOB's new intelligence chief has
considerably less political stature and experience than
ousted Prime Minister and Military Intelligence Czar Khin
Nyunt and oversees a military intelligence apparatus with a
reduced mandate and less authority. It is unclear whether
the new apparatus is under instructions to forgo cooperation
with the international community or is simply incapable of
carrying out the expansive functions of the former Office of
the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI). However, the
result is a lack of GOB action on a host of issues formerly
facilitated by Khin Nyunt and his subordinates, including our
annual joint opium yield survey and WWII remains recovery
operations. GOB paralysis or stalling has led to the
cancellation of the survey and delayed the remains recovery
operations for FY2005, a setback to U.S. bilateral
initiatives in Burma that leaves very little common ground on
which to pursue more significant bilateral objectives in
democracy and human rights. End Summary.

Nothing Got Done Without Khin Nyunt and OCMI
--------------


2. (C) The October 2004 ouster of Prime Minister General Khin
Nyunt, and subsequent purge of his military intelligence
apparatus (the former Office of the Chief of Military
Intelligence, OCMI) has resulted in substantially reduced
interaction between the Burmese regime and the international
community. Prior to the purge, OCMI directly handled and/or
authorized most international assistance programs, contact
with senior SPDC officials, travel to the interior, and, in
the case of the U.S. mission, an annual joint opium yield
survey and WWII remains recovery operations. Diplomats, UN
agencies, and NGOs communicated with the GOB through relevant
ministries for routine matters, but OCMI involvement was a
prerequisite for all operational and substantive issues.


3. (C) In November 2004, Senior General Than Shwe abolished
OCMI and created a new Office of the Chief of Military
Affairs Security (MAS, ref B). However, the new chief, LtGen
Myint Swe (who also serves concurrently as commander of the
Rangoon regional military command),has considerably less
political stature and experience than Khin Nyunt and now
oversees a military intelligence apparatus that has a reduced
mandate, shrunken resources, and wields far less authority
than its predecessor, OCMI.


4. (C) The post-Khin Nyunt purge not only reduced the MI
structure to a shell of its former self, but it also swept
away thousands of officers and soldiers who formerly staffed
OCMI. Regime authorities detained or retired hundreds of MI
officers, and transferred others to regular military units.
By most accounts, the purge is unfinished; imminent trials
will apparently target a host of intelligence officers
charged with corruption and insubordination. One former MI
agent, recently transferred to a light infantry brigade, told
us that the purge extended "not just to the roots, but to the
soil attached to the roots," indicating that even privates
and corporals were ousted and their family members, who
previously resided on OCMI compounds, were sent packing.

Nothing Gets Done With Myint Swe and MAS
--------------


5. (C) Simultaneous to the purge, most diplomats and UN
agencies have experienced a substantial slow down in
communications with the GOB. Traditional OCMI contacts have
disappeared, their replacements are perpetually
"unavailable," correspondence goes unacknowledged, and
individual ministries deflect most inquiries and requests to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a poorly staffed bureaucracy
that has almost no influence within the GOB.


6. (C) The new Minister of Home Affairs, Maung Oo--appointed
in November as the senior GOB official responsible for most
issues of interest to the international community including
narcotics, immigration, and security--has failed to meet with
more than a handful of UN representative or diplomats.
According to several Embassy sources, Maung Oo told his staff
that he has "no interest or desire to meet with foreigners."
One rare exception was a December 29 meeting with the COM,
during which Maung Oo repeatedly declared that "all bilateral
issues must now be coordinated through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs" (ref D). However, he acknowledged that the
U.S.-Burma joint opium yield survey was a logistical
undertaking that required close coordination and he urged our
direct contact with MAS chief Myint Swe.

U.S. Bilateral Initiatives Fall to the Wayside
-------------- -


7. (C) Subsequent efforts by Emboffs to contact Myint Swe, or
his subordinates, to discuss the survey have failed. Due to
uncertain security issues in Wa territory, the 2005 opium
yield survey would likely have been restricted to sites in
Shan State outside of Special Region 2, the heart of poppy
cultivation (ref C). However, primarily as a result of a
complete lack of response from MAS (or anyone in the GOB),it
appears that the joint survey, scheduled for a ten-day period
in late February, will not take place for the first time
since 1997.


8. (C) The MAS office has been similarly unresponsive to U.S.
mission efforts to coordinate and execute the next phase of
WWII remains recovery operations. Scheduled to commence on
February 1 in Kachin State, the six-week recovery operation,
like the opium yield survey, is a significant logistical
undertaking and requires GOB cooperation and support. Due to
a variety of GOB stalling tactics (ref A) and a lack of any
significant response from MAS to mission inquiries, written
requests, and diplomatic notes, the Department of Defense has
delayed the February mission and plans no further recovery
operations for the rest of FY05 (ref E). However, in one
exception to GOB stalling, MAS and Myint Swe have agreed to
meet with DoD officials from Defense POW/Missing Personnel
Office (DPMO) in early March to discuss overall U.S.
objectives with remains recovery efforts.

Comment: Un-Common Ground
--------------


9. (C) It is unclear whether the GOB's new military
intelligence apparatus is under instructions to forgo
cooperation with the U.S. and other missions or is simply
incapable of carrying out the expansive functions of the
former OCMI. However, given the fate of Khin Nyunt and other
former OCMI officers who once manned the regime's front lines
with the international community, the new sheriffs in town
(MAS) are clearly unwilling to take the risks apparently
inherent in advocating to the SPDC hierarchy engagement with
"those foreigners."


10. (C) The cancellation of the 2005 opium survey and the
delayed WWII remains recovery operations are setbacks to U.S.
bilateral initiatives in Burma. Other than low-level
dialogue on law enforcement and counterterrorism issues,
there are few issues that can be described as "cooperative"
and, consequently, very little common ground on which to
pursue more significant bilateral objectives in democracy and
human rights. Although the GOB may be willing to revisit the
opium survey and remains recovery operations in 2006, and the
coordination meeting scheduled for early March may kick start
the latter, it will take considerable effort to regain lost
momentum. End Comment.
Martinez