WESTERN SAHARA: EMBASSY RABAT VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 002008

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, PRM; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: EMBASSY RABAT VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS

REF: A. RABAT 1776 AND PREVIOUS


B. ALGIERS 1793

C. STATE 73908

D. ALGIERS 866

E. RABAT 278

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) The August 18 release of the remaining 404 Moroccan
POWs from Tindouf closed an important humanitarian file in
the Western Sahara conflict. In Morocco, the United States
gained considerable goodwill from our involvement in the
effort; in fact, we believe this is certainly one of the most
positive public diplomacy acts -- it seemed to genuinely
touch the Moroccan people -- we have facilitated in Morocco
in years. Numerous embassy contacts, including other
ex-POWs, have told us privately how much they appreciate what
the US did, and how they hope this accomplishment heralds
movement toward a resolution of the broader political
conflict.


2. (C) While the prisoner release has altered the political
landscape in a positive way, and does create momentum
(despite the sour grapes attitude on the part of the senior
Moroccan leadership),it did not appear to diminish the
climate of mistrust that prevails between the two sides, and
between King Mohammed and President Bouteflika in particular
-- which is a fundamental stumbling block to improved
Moroccan-Algerian relations. We believe there will be little
serious engagement between the two sides without a thawing of
the personal relations between the two leaders. Both the
Moroccan leadership and numerous contacts have expressed the
pessimistic view that real progress in bilateral relations is
not likely to come until Bouteflika passes from the political
scene. FM Benaissa, while often an overly dramatic
raconteur, has remarked to us "it will take a generation" for
any real progress to take place, as not only Bouteflika but
the people around him move off the political stage. The
image of the King returning empty-handed from Algiers in
April ("like a beggar," King Mohammed told Senator Lugar),
when the GOM believes it has made all of the gestures to
Algeria, is something the Moroccans will aggressively seek to
avoid repeating.

The Border
--------------


3. (C) Of critical importance to the Moroccans is the
re-opening of the border with Algeria, a point re-emphasized
by FM Benaissa in his September 21 meeting with U/S Burns.
In Moroccan eyes, this is probably the most significant step
the Algerians could take to demonstrate serious engagement
with Morocco. The Moroccan senior leadership continues to
complain, as the King did with Senator Lugar (ref A) that the
Algerians are constantly shifting the goalposts on what they
need to re-open the border. But there is no question that
opening the border is not only a symbolic step forward but is
firmly in US interests and facilitates opportunities for
exchanges that can bolster ties in a myriad of ways.


4. (C) For the most part, the Moroccans see Larbi Belkheir's
appointment as Algerian Ambassador to Morocco as a positive
sign. The King mentioned Belkheir several times in his
meeting with Senator Lugar (Ref B) as a possible discreet
channel between Morocco and Algeria, though he complained
that the Algerians had never followed up to allow a back
channel to exist. Nevertheless, we concur with Embassy
Algiers' assessment that this designation represents a step
forward.

Coordination with the Europeans
--------------


5. (C) We see opportunities for greater coordination between
the US and key European players -- especially the Spanish and
French -- on Morocco-Algeria relations and the Western
Sahara. We believe our message to the Europeans during UNGA
-- join us in pushing for Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement --
is the right one.

The Autonomy Plan
--------------


6. (C) The other key piece of the equation is pushing the
GOM to produce a credible autonomy plan -- one that goes
beyond what the GOM offered PRSG Baker in late 2003. We
believe that a central message from PRSG Van Walsum to the
Moroccans, as he takes up his mandate, is to press the GOM
for an expansion of their previous concept of autonomy. The
Moroccans have intimated on many occasions that they are
looking at a variety of autonomy models, but they have yet to
produce anything concrete. Since there appears to be
substantial consensus within the USG and elsewhere that
autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the best political
solution to the Western Sahara conflict, the international
community needs to force Morocco's hand to produce a credible
plan that can serve as the basis for negotiations.


7. (C) Thus we believe the preparation of a credible
Moroccan autonomy plan -- recognizing that the GOM will not
do so seriously until there is an improved climate of trust
with Algeria -- should move to the center of our efforts on
the Western Sahara. The GOM does not want to be seen to be
negotiating autonomy with itself and is unlikely to expand on
its autonomy proposal without strong pressure or incentives.
We see little value in PRSG Van Walsum, for example, spending
a lot of time "taking the temperature" of the parties; Alvaro
De Soto did that for a year. While Van Walsum -- and we in
conjunction with our European friends -- press Morocco to
"stretch its thinking" on autonomy, the PRSG should be
pressing the Algerians and the Polisario for ideas on how to
meet their needs on self-determination short of a full-scale
return to the Baker Plan.

A Census
--------------


8. (C) One way to incentivize the Moroccans on the autonomy
issue is to redouble our efforts to press for a census in the
Tindouf camps. At Department request (Ref C),Embassy
Algiers raised this issue with the GOA and the Polisario in
May. The Polisario is on record (Ref D) as committing to
provide full cooperation "in any effort to count the
refugees," though Polisario "Ambassador" Beisat said the
census was the sole responsibility of Algeria. We should
revitalize this effort, building on the Polisario's stated
commitment -- both to gain a more accurate picture of the
dimensions of Polisario political authority and support, and
to ensure accountability of US funds dedicated to support the
refugee population. As part of the effort, we can call on
the Moroccans to provide solid evidence of their
long-standing claims that international food aid is being
sold on the market to line Polisario pockets. Now is the
time for a serious international effort to pursue this.

Other Initiatives
--------------


9. (C) As we have reported in the past (ref E),there are
other concrete steps we should encourage the two sides to
take, some of which are areas that offer potential for joint
action with the Europeans:

-- encourage greater Algeria-Morocco military to military
engagement, including direct communication on issues
concerning the border, terrorism, and illegal immigration.
The US-Morocco-Algeria naval exercises in June-July in the
Mediterranean were a small but significant step forward in
this regard.

-- continue to press for the resumption of the
confidence-building measures in the Western Sahara, which the
US has committed funding for.

-- actively encourage the two countries, through the
bilateral commissions, to develop joint strategies for common
concerns, especially illegal migration and human trafficking.

-- promote further exchanges between business representatives
from both sides, building on the September 20-22 OPIC
regional investment conference in Marrakech. We believe
significant increases in investment activity from the US and
EU will result if the Morocco-Algeria border is re-opened.





RILEY