Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05RABAT2004
2005-09-23 13:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

Favorable Views of U.S. surge upward in Arab/Muslim

Tags:  KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV KMPI CVIS ECON MO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 RABAT 002004 

SIPDIS

For R U/S Hughes from Ambassador
Also for NEA, NEA/PPD, NEA MAG, and IIP/G/NEA/SA


E.0.12958:N/A
TAGS: KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV KMPI CVIS ECON MO
SUBJECT: Favorable Views of U.S. surge upward in Arab/Muslim
Morocco. What Went Right?

Ref: 2004 Rabat 2171

-------
Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 RABAT 002004

SIPDIS

For R U/S Hughes from Ambassador
Also for NEA, NEA/PPD, NEA MAG, and IIP/G/NEA/SA


E.0.12958:N/A
TAGS: KPAO SCUL OIIP PGOV KMPI CVIS ECON MO
SUBJECT: Favorable Views of U.S. surge upward in Arab/Muslim
Morocco. What Went Right?

Ref: 2004 Rabat 2171

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. The Pew Global Attitudes Project survey published in
July 2005 recorded a startling 22-point increase in
favorable attitudes toward the United States among
Moroccans. 49 percent of Moroccans held favorable views of
the U.S., compared to only 27 percent in each of the two
prior years. Morocco had the most favorable views of the
U.S. of any predominantly Muslim country, and is the only
such country in the Pew study where favorable views of the
U.S. outnumber unfavorable views (49 percent favorable
versus 45 percent unfavorable). In the 18-34 age group, a
majority of Moroccans-53 percent-reported positive views of
the U.S. The percentage of Moroccans viewing the U.S.
favorably was greater than that in traditional U.S. allies
including France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands.


2. Although the Embassy views such survey results with
healthy skepticism, even if the reality is less dramatic
than the survey suggests, a combination of factors in
Morocco appears to be having a positive impact on public
attitudes toward the U.S. The Embassy has analyzed Moroccan
views of the U.S. (including via the use of focus groups in
the year prior to the 2005 survey) to try to better identify
factors that may be having a positive impact.


3. Our conclusion is that some improvement may have
resulted from external events, and that domestic improvement
most likely resulted not only from public diplomacy efforts
per se, but from a multi-faceted government and non-
government engagement with Morocco that has de-emphasized
policy differences between Morocco and the U.S. and
projected our countries as equal partners, in trade, in
promoting democracy, in military relations, and in direct
interaction between cities and individuals. Outreach
efforts buttressed by a media plan to bring the Ambassador
and Mission personnel in direct contact with Moroccans
throughout the country may also have played a role.



4. We also believe that cultural engagement with Morocco,
aimed at a youth audience that appreciates American people
and their way of life, has been an important, positive
factor. Radio Sawa, the number one station in Morocco,
appears to be having a major impact. Rapid, visible
American response to humanitarian disasters has also helped.
U.S. engagement in conflict resolution may also have a
positive impact subsequent to the survey; U.S. facilitation
of the release of the 404 remaining Moroccan prisoners of
war held by the Polisario has generated an outpouring of
goodwill toward the U.S.


5. Based on this review, the Embassy in the coming year
will:

--expand cultural diplomacy and outreach to youth through
American performing artists, including via participation in
cultural festivals and sports exchanges;

--support public and private U.S.-Morocco partnership,
especially via the Chicago-Casablanca sister city program
and similar private initiatives, the Peace Corps, support
for Moroccan democratic reforms, and by publicly aligning
the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account with Morocco's Human
Development Initiative;

--continue extensive nationwide public outreach via travel
of the Ambassador and other Mission personnel, establishing
at least four American corners, opening an American Presence
Post in Marrakech, and regular programming in Dar America;

--provide diplomatic support for the continued operation and
expansion of Radio Sawa;

--persist in providing and publicizing U.S. humanitarian
relief via military and other programs;

--keep listening to and learning from those whom we are
trying to reach.


6. The most important support we could receive from the
Department to achieve these goals would be additional staff
(two additional officers for our public diplomacy section to
support American Corners, media outreach, and expanded
cultural programming, and an officer to staff an American
Presence Post),and expanded funding for cultural exchanges,
especially to bring more American performing artists and
other cultural envoys to Morocco.

End summary.

--------------
What Happened and Did It Really?
--------------


7. A Pew Global Attitudes Report published on July 14, 2005
provided startling news: Favorable views of the United
States among Moroccan citizens, according to the report, had
surged upward by 22 points during the previous 12 months.
Whereas only 27 percent of Moroccans had viewed the U.S.
favorably in the March 2004 and May 2003 Pew surveys, 49
percent of Moroccans surveyed held a favorable view of the
U.S. in the survey conducted in June 2005.


8. A closer look at the number brought more welcome news.
Favorable views of the U.S. outnumbered unfavorable views,
49 percent to 44 percent, the only predominantly Muslim
country where that is the case. Moreover, favorable views
of the U.S. were strongest among the young. Among the 18-34
age group, a majority (53 percent) viewed the U.S.
favorably. Among Moroccans age 35 and older, 45 percent
viewed the U.S. favorably. Favorable views of Morocco were
proportionately greater than in countries traditionally
allied with the U.S. including France, Germany, Spain and
the Netherlands.


9. Those who live in the desert learn to suspect that any
vision of an oasis may be a mirage. In this vein, our
Mission must assess the survey with healthy skepticism and
careful acknowledgement of what we know and do not know
about the results. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is
conducted and published by a nonpartisan research
organization in the U.S., and is co-chaired by former
Secretary Madeline Albright and former U.S. Senator John C.

SIPDIS
Danforth. Data collection in Morocco was carried out by the
Pan Arab Research Center, which conducted face to face
interviews with adults 18 years and older from June 6 to 16

2005.

10. The 1000 survey respondents were disproportionately
drawn from urban areas, and the study reports a margin of
error of three percent. We do not know whether the result
is sustainable, what the trend line looks like, whether it
is currently moving up or down, whether the result
represented a "spike," or what factors specifically
influenced the views of the respondents. But we do think it
is credible that attitudes toward the US are softening, and
that our own efforts to reach and connect with a broader
cross-section on non-elites are having positive results.

--------------
First, We Listened
--------------


11. Embassy Rabat first took notice of the Pew survey in
March 2004, when the survey found not only that Moroccans
held strongly negative views of the United States, but more
troubling, that a strong majority of Moroccans opposed the
U.S. led war on terror, and that 45 percent held favorable
views of Osama bin Laden. The findings did not square with
our observations of Moroccans-especially young people-coming
together in the aftermath of the Casablanca terrorist
bombings to oppose terrorism, a commitment brought to life
by a nationwide "Don't Touch My Country" campaign carried
out by a youth group network with support from the Moroccan
government.


12. To better understand the 2004 results, the Embassy
commissioned two focus groups to further explore Moroccan
attitudes toward the U.S. and terrorism (reftel). One group
was composed of young, poor and poorly educated men age 18-
25 from slum districts-a demographic deliberately designed
to resemble that of the young people who carried out the
Casablanca terrorist bombings. A second group was drawn
from the middle and upper-middle income classes and had high
school or higher levels of education. The local office of
the National Democratic Institute conducted the focus groups
in Rabat in May 2004. The participants had contact only
with Moroccan interviewers, and had no knowledge of U.S.
sponsorship of the study.


13. Via these focus groups, the Embassy learned that even
poorly educated urban Moroccans had some knowledge of U.S.
foreign policy, although they tended to ascribe negative
motives to U.S. goals. The focus group study also confirmed
what has been stated elsewhere-that like their counterparts
throughout the Arab world, young Moroccan men strongly
disapproved of U.S. policy and action in the Middle East,
but admired the American people and their way of life.
Focus group participants strongly condemned terrorism, and
viewed poverty, ignorance and lack of education as factors
that rendered young Moroccans susceptible to recruitment by
extremists. The focus group participants linked the U.S. to
violent acts directed against Palestinians.


14. Moroccans' positive views of U.S. lifestyle and
economic opportunity are also reflected in the record number
of Moroccans who have won the annual diversity visa lottery,
with 3083 winners in 2003 and 5069 in 2004. 347,000
Moroccans applied for the diversity visa lottery in 2004 and
443,000 have applied in 2005. For many young Moroccans who
would have responded to the Pew poll, the U.S. symbolizes
hope for a better life. In fact, one of the focus group
participants told us, "Everyone dreams of winning the (visa)
lottery to go to the U.S."

--------------
Accentuate the Positive
--------------


15. The Embassy country team used the Pew survey and focus
group findings as the basis for a September 2004 off-site
review of public diplomacy objectives. Our conclusion was
to recognize but minimize in terms of public diplomacy the
concentration on our differences concerning policy in the
Middle East, and to try to capitalize upon those facets of
American life that Moroccans admired, emphasizing cultural
and educational engagement with non-elite, especially young
Moroccans. By emphasizing what Moroccans like about U.S.
society (educational opportunity, pop culture, sports, youth
exchange programs, economic opportunity),we hoped to
nurture positive impressions. The Embassy adopted an
increase in favorable views of the U.S. as a performance
measure in our Mission Program Plan.


16. To our knowledge, there have been no formal studies on
market penetration for radio and television audiences in
Morocco. It is generally recognized among media contacts
that most Moroccans get their information first from the
radio, followed by television and print media. Satellite
dishes are widely used in Morocco, and the Government does
not impede reception of foreign broadcasts. The most
watched and respected news media are almost certainly Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiyah. No reliable statistics on print
media readership available, but newspapers and magazines are
believed to reach a very small percentage of the total
population, in part due to extremely high illiteracy rates.

--------------
Showing Up - With Reporters
--------------


17. During the period in which favorable attitudes toward
the U.S. increased, the Mission conducted two major nation-
wide outreach efforts, in addition to travel and public
diplomacy conducted by the Ambassador and mission officers
throughout the year.


18. The first such effort occurred in August 2004, when the
Ambassador took advantage of the traditional August lull in
Rabat to travel to remote areas of Morocco. Over a period
of four weeks, the Ambassador and other Mission officers
traveled to the cities of Oujda, Nador, Al Hoceima,
Marrakech, Agadir and remote rural areas to emphasize U.S.
partnership with Morocco. Visiting Peace Corps sites, AID
projects, local government officials and civic and business
organizations, the outreach visits visibly demonstrated U.S.
interest in Morocco beyond Rabat and Casablanca.


19. A media plan was developed for each visit, and
reporters from national media were invited and assisted to
come along on the trips, resulting in extensive and
favorable national media coverage. Interviews for local
reporters were also arranged at each stop. Anecdotal
feedback highlighted Moroccans' appreciation for the
Ambassador's interest in what was happening throughout the
country. Visits to many other locations continued
throughout the year.

20. By a large margin, the topic that resulted in the most
news coverage during the twelve-month period was the U.S.-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA). There had been a steady
significant stream of negative press coverage leading up to
and immediately following the conclusion of negotiations in
March 2004, with the media focused on the risks to Morocco
posed by the agreement. However, the tide turned decisively
toward positive coverage of what both countries stood to
gain from the agreement after the Embassy launched a major
outreach program, the "FTA Caravan," in September 2004.


21. The caravan was a road show in which the Ambassador,
Embassy officers, experts from the U.S., and Moroccan
government officials participated. Caravan participants
interacted directly with students, businesspeople and
workers throughout Morocco, and generated 76 positive news
articles on the FTA, as well as significant nightly
television coverage of caravan events. In a series of
cities throughout Morocco, the group held business round
tables, met with students and journalists, toured factory
floors, answered questions and distributed information
packages in French and Arabic to explain the benefits of the
agreement. By providing seats on the bus to a national
television crew and a journalist from the Moroccan national
news agency, the Embassy ensured daily media coverage of
this six-day information blitz.

--------------
Partnership, Not Paternalism
--------------


22. Formal public diplomacy activities were only one
portion of what may have influenced an increase in favorable
attitudes toward the U.S. In fact, Mission public affairs
functions experienced significant staffing gaps during the
year, and some projects, including Mission plans to launch
American Corners in Morocco, progressed more slowly than
desired. Instead, opinions of the U.S. appear to have been
influenced through a broad range of factors with a unifying
theme: partnership.


23. The Free Trade Agreement negotiation illustrated this
theme as did other initiatives: American-Moroccan co-
chairmanship of the first Forum for the Future, the U.S.
decision to designate Morocco as a Major Non-NATO Ally, and
the restoration of the Peace Corps program.


24. After the FTA, The Forum for the Future was the second
most heavily reported U.S. related news story during the
twelve-month period. Although initial media reaction to
prematurely leaked U.S. proposals for supporting democratic
reform in the region were very negative, of 44 news items
the Embassy collected by the time of the Forum itself, a
large majority were generally positive. Embassy believes
this result was due in part to media outreach by the
Ambassador and other Embassy officers, and the Moroccan
government.


25. The Major Non-NATO Ally designation was reinforced in
the media by positive coverage of Moroccan participation in
large scale U.S. and NATO naval exercises, and by coverage
of U.S. military humanitarian assistance projects throughout
the country.


26. Another vital partnership initiative has been the
resumption of the Peace Corps program in Morocco, one of
only two such programs in the Middle East/North Africa
region. After a security-driven suspension prior to the Iraq
War, the Peace Corps was restored its full program of more
than 140 volunteers in rural areas of Morocco. Although the
Mission does not publicize volunteers' locations or specific
activities, the work of the Peace Corps is well known by
word of mouth, and the impact is nearly universally
favorable.

--------------
Private Partnership and Sister Cities
--------------


25. The single most successful non-Federal government
activity projecting Morocco and the U.S. as equal partners
with common interests has been the Chicago-Casablanca sister
city program, which received crucial support from the
Mission and appears to be among the most successful sister-
city relationships in the world.


26. Private sector resources were used to bring a variety
of organizations and individuals from the two cities closer
together through professional, educational and cultural
exchanges. High schools in both cities were paired,
professionals in the areas of urban planning and medicine
traded expertise, Chicago brought American basketball
trainers to Morocco, and elected officials, students and
academics traded visits with the goal of sharing solutions
for common problems. Under Sister City auspices, Chicago
opticians provided eye examination clinics and eyeglasses
for Casablanca's poor.


27. Moroccan television and print media coverage of the
Chicago-Casablanca sister cities program has been abundant
and consistently positive. One particular program that
sparked high media interest and saw both flags flying over
the signing ceremony in Casablanca's main square was "CASA-
BASKET" a ten-year basketball training program co-sponsored
by the U.S. sports organization "One on One Basketball," and
launched in December 2004. Each year CASA-BASKET will teach
basketball to 900 children from Casablanca's poorest
neighborhoods.


28. Moroccan print press sports pages, probably the most-
read pages of any newspaper by young Moroccan males, carried
photos of the program launch for several days following the
signing. Similarly, Chicago's South Shore Drill Team gave
seven performances to an estimated 60,000 Moroccans in three
cities, and "jammed" with young Moroccans from Casablanca's
impoverished neighborhood schools.


29. The activities of private American charities operating
in Morocco, such as Operation Smile and Bridge to Morocco,
appeared regularly in the Moroccan media in 2004. A State
Department-assisted private sector effort that was widely
praised by the Moroccan press, civil society associations
and individual beneficiaries was the Wheelchair Foundation,
which donated over 600 wheelchairs for poor Moroccans
between July 2004 and July 2005.


30. American generosity was an antidote to damaging stories
that appeared in the Moroccan press 2004/2005, such as the
Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Editorial comment in Moroccan
media, particularly print media, noted that the sort of
humanitarian activity exemplified by the Wheelchair
Foundation provided an image of America completely different
from the perceived negative images related to Iraq.
--------------
Impact of Radio Sawa and Al Hurra Television
--------------


31. For many reasons, including a high illiteracy rate,
most Moroccans get their information from radio and
television. Radio Sawa, launched in Morocco in August 2003,
rapidly became the most popular radio station in Morocco.
According to the latest ACNielsen surveys, 53% of 15-29 year
old Moroccans in the broadcast area tune in every week. 59%
of Radio Sawa listeners said that its news was reliable, and
74% said Radio Sawa was one of their top news sources. Many
Moroccan news articles, and Mission employees, have noted
Radio Sawa's omnipresence in Moroccan taxis and cafes.


32. Contributing to the rise in Radio Sawa's popularity in
Morocco during the twelve-month period was Sawa's expansion
during 2004. Under an agreement with the Moroccan
government, the International Board of Broadcasters
installed transmitters in five new cities between April and
August 2004, for a total of seven transmitters throughout
Morocco. In addition, Radio Sawa introduced a Morocco-
specific stream with news reports and "Sawa Chat" comments
in the Moroccan dialect.


33. The attraction of American pop music that Radio Sawa
broadcasts and the use of "neutral" vocabulary in its Arabic
language news broadcasts may be making headway in changing
perceptions of the U.S. among its many Moroccan listeners.
The broadcast sector in Morocco is undergoing
liberalization. There are currently only three other radio
stations. The test of Radio Sawa's staying power may be its
market-share after other stations, including European
competitors, begin broadcasting, which is likely to occur in
early 2006.


34. While most Moroccans prefer to watch satellite
television for entertainment, and Al Jazeera in particular
for 24/7 Arabic news coverage, the Alhurra satellite network
funded by the U.S. Congress has made some headway since
beginning broadcasting in 2004. In the latest ACNielsen
survey, 27% of adults (over age 15) surveyed said they
watched Alhurra at least once a week, and 70% of those said
its news is reliable.

--------------
Rapid U.S. Disaster Response
--------------


34. Although they prefer to watch satellite television
stations, Moroccan viewers still tune in to the two state-
run television stations for local and national news.
Embassy Rabat was featured on both stations and in the print
media in a positive light for U.S. rapid response to two
humanitarian crises in Morocco: the Al Hoceima earthquake
and the locust invasion. The earthquake occurred before the
twelve-month period under review, but the Embassy's timely
humanitarian response (ahead of almost any other country,
including the EU) was well remembered and highlighted by the
Ambassador's follow-up visit to Al Hoceima in August 2004
(and again in July 2005) where he and his wife were given
extensive media coverage working alongside a group of
American volunteers rebuilding damaged homes. In addition,
the U.S. was the only country to contribute on a bilateral
basis to combating last year's locust infestation, garnering
wide, favorable media coverage.

--------------
Expanding Cultural Diplomacy

--------------


35. --
MMission Morocco has an unusual public diplomacy asset that
undoubtedly contributed to Moroccans' favorable views of the
U.S.: "Dar America" in Casablanca, one of the last remaining
U.S. cultural centers in the Arab world. Dar America
continues to attract more than 20,000 students every year to
its many activities. The October 2003 Report by the Advisory
Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (the
"Djerejian Report"),whose members visited Morocco in August
2003, including the Casablanca slums that produced the
suicide bombers, singled Dar America out for its
contribution to public diplomacy, and called for expanded
use of cultural diplomacy to influence attitudes toward the
United States.



36. It is impossible to know whether U.S. Embassy/Dar
America youth programs actually touched directly any of
those surveyed by Pew in 2004. However, among other steps
taken consistent with the Advisory Group's recommendations,
the Embassy doubled the number of Moroccans sent on exchange
programs (including International Visitor, Voluntary
Visitor, MEPI Youth Leadership, P4L programs and other
educational/press exchange programs),and expanded in 2003
and 2004 participation in Foreign Press Center-sponsored
press reporting tours to the U.S.




37. In addition to continuing diverse cultural programming
in 2004/05, including a well-received Jazz Ambassador's
program, the Embassy added several highly successful
cultural events targeting a younger audience that may have
had some influence on young Moroccans' perceptions of the
U.S. For example, in March 2004, one of New York City's
finest modern dance troupes, the Battery Dance Company
(BDC),performed twice to packed theaters in Rabat and
Casablanca, winding up the Rabat show with several dozen
Moroccan teens joining the BDC dancers on stage for a
spontaneous hip-hop performance. The Embassy estimates that
the trendy artists directly reached 2,700 Moroccans through
their live performances and 13 dance workshops. Extensive
television coverage of the performances amplified this
program's positive effects on an estimated television
audience of up to 30 million viewers. The dance company
received 18 favorable newspaper articles.


38. As part of our effort to expand cultural diplomacy, we
targeted Moroccan cultural festivals that garner
particularly good media coverage. More importantly,
participation of U.S. artists in cultural festivals
throughout the country, like the travel of Mission officials
to remote areas, conveys U.S. respect for Moroccan culture.
U.S. performing artists-some U.S. government sponsored and
some not-participated in cultural festivals in Rabat,
Casablanca, Asilah, Fez, and Marrakech during 2004.


39. Country-Folk duo Bob and Tucker Livingston, who played
at the 2004 Asilah cultural festival and a youth festival in
Mohammedia, reached an audience of 60,000 in Mohammedia,
north of Casablanca, in August 2004. In February 2005, the
Basketball Cultural Envoys reached approximately 2,250 young
sports fans and generated a spike in positive media coverage
for the Mission. The May 2005 Embassy-sponsored "I Love Hip
Hop in Morocco" tour directly reached an estimated 36,000
young Moroccans via performances in three cities and also
received extraordinarily upbeat media coverage. A privately
organized American Christian rock festival in Marrakech in
May 2005 drew an estimated 100,000 concert goers over three
days.

--------------
Help From Friends
--------------


40. Less easy to measure, or even define, are
characteristics particular to Morocco that could be shaping
attitudes toward the U.S. Easily the most influential
individual in Morocco is the popular reform-minded King
Mohammed VI, who has guided the country toward economic,
political and social liberalization since inheriting the
throne in 1999. Through his public statements, the King has
contributed to the general view that government-to-
government bilateral relations with the U.S.-including the
King's visit to the White House in July 2004--are excellent
and the "trickle down" effect of this view, regularly
projected by state-run television and print media, cannot be
discounted. According to some Embassy contacts, the U.S. is
perceived as "behind" the democratic reforms in Morocco
because the U.S. government, from President Bush down, has
lauded them frequently, and U.S. support for democratic
reform is perceived as having a positive influence on
Morocco's future.

--------------
The Way Ahead
--------------


41. Over the coming year, the Embassy will continue efforts
to identify strategies that build upon the strengths of the
U.S. image in Morocco, and direct resources to support those
strategies. We will continue to actively target youth with
programs that emphasize what Moroccans most like about the
U.S. This means utilizing American performing artists to
expand cultural diplomacy (especially through U.S.
participation in Moroccan cultural festivals). It also
means seeking opportunities to highlight U.S. partnership
with Morocco via the Chicago-Casablanca sister city program,
the Peace Corps, public outreach by the Ambassador and other
Mission personnel, the establishment of at least four
American corners, and the opening of an American Presence
Post in Marrakech as forecast in our Mission Program Plan.


42. The dramatic and highly publicized August release of
the remaining Moroccan 404 Prisoners of War held by the
Polisario in July generated extensive favorable coverage of
the U.S. role in facilitating the release. The event
prompted spontaneous phone calls and letters of appreciation
to the Embassy, and may have been among the most significant
public diplomacy accomplishments of the Mission in years.


43. Morocco's eligibility for Millennium Challenge Account
funding will provide another opportunity to focus on
partnership, especially as the Moroccan government seeks to
align the Millennium Challenge Account with King Mohammed's
Human Development Initiative.


44. As Morocco's broadcast sector undergoes liberalization,
the Embassy will continue to provide diplomatic support for
the operation of Radio Sawa, to ensure the station's
continued viability and support its market expansion.


45. Department support to sustain the apparent improvement
in favorable attitudes toward the United States is critical.
In post's estimation, the most important resources that
Washington could provide are people. The Mission has been
severely understaffed for the past two years, partly as a
result of Department need for personnel in places like
Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq. For extended periods, public
staffing country wide has hovered near 50 percent. To
maintain and sustain favorable attitudes toward the United
States, the resource we most need is reinforced Mission
staffing. Our highest priorities in this regard would be
two additional officers for public diplomacy to support
media operations, expanded cultural programming, and
implementation of American corners. In addition, a
generalist officer to staff an American Presence Post in
Marrakech is needed. The position the Mission had
previously identified for this function has instead been
required on a nearly full time basis to manage programs to
support reforms in Morocco and the Broader Middle East and
North Africa region, including MEPI and other regional
initiatives.


46. Finally, and most importantly, as we move ahead we will
continue to listen and learn. The Ambassador and Mission
officers will continue to engage in dialogue with Moroccans
throughout the country, highlight these efforts by engaging
the participation of the media, and demonstrate U.S. concern
and interest in the process. The Embassy intends to conduct
additional focus groups to try to better understand what
influences Moroccan views of the United States. We believe
that by obtaining and acting upon this knowledge, we will be
better able to support U.S. national objectives. Riley