ENGAGING THE DIPCORPS ON ECUADORIAN STABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000857

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EC OAS
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE DIPCORPS ON ECUADORIAN STABILITY

REF: A. QUITO 585


B. QUITO 852

C. QUITO 850

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Representatives from Quito's largest
foreign missions gathered April 18 to discuss the ongoing
political crisis in Ecuador. UN Judicial Rapporteur Leandro
Despouy, who visited Ecuador March 13-18 (Ref A),weighed in
via conference call. As non-US diplomats here are wont to
do, the majority of participants provided long-winded
analysis of Ecuador's problems but offered few ideas on
moving forward. Poloffs introduced various suggestions on
how diplomatic missions might help. Gaining greatest buy-in
was the issuance of a "Friends of Ecuador" communique,
calling for opposition-GoE dialogue, restraint by public
forces, and a commitment to crafting an independent,
effective judiciary. Support for an international mission to
Ecuador was more tepid. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) In late March, UN Mission Ecuador Director Mauricio
Valdes called an urgent gathering of foreign diplomats and
international organization officials. The purpose was to
provide a copy of the draft judicial independence report
Despouy was then presenting in Geneva, and discuss next
steps. Chilean Ambassador Nelson Haddad hosted, with
representatives from the embassies of the United States,
Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Holland (representing the EU),the
IDB, World Bank, UN FAO, and OAS attending. Valdes requested
a follow-up meeting April 18, and all but the Dutch and
Argentines came; Despouy participated via telephone.

--------------
Big Talk, Small Action
--------------


3. (C) Regrettably, the March performance proved the
participants excellent analysts, but reluctant problem
solvers (much like Despouy, in our opinion). Ecuador's
problems were Ecuador's alone, they claimed; Latin American
diplomatic tradition ruled out involvement in neighbors'
internal problems. We disagreed. Gutierrez welcomed counsel
from foreign leaders, and expressions of support from Lagos
or Lula might awaken the president to the gravity of the
situation and the need for real negotiation. Despite raising
interest, the meeting terminated without formalized next
steps.


4. (C) Attendees of the April 18 get-together were similarly
averse to talk specifics (although Spain's representative
arrived with his foreign ministry's April 16 declaration in
hand). The group agreed the situation had morphed from a
judicial battle -- Congress's "institutional majority" having
overhauled Ecuador's highest tribunals, perhaps
unconstitutionally -- to a full-bore political impasse.
Gutierrez faced a crucial week, with a handful of legislators
already threatening renewed impeachment efforts. Thankfully,
representatives had dropped their "no foreign involvement"
inhibitions, owing mainly to a recently-passed Congressional
resolution that vacated the Supreme Court and requested
"international oversight" over the selection of new justices
(Ref B).

--------------
Keeping Our Counterparts on Task
--------------


5. (C) Seeing an opening, Poloffs urged their colleagues to
display support for Ecuadorian political stability. Topping
their suggestion list was a declaration, to be issued by the
"Friends of Ecuador," that would call for serious
negotiations between political players, responsible behavior
by GoE military and police, and a commitment from all to
establish a working judicial system. As a base, the document
might use excellent statements earlier issued by the Embassy,
UN, and Spanish MFA.


6. (C) Foreign leaders still had roles to play, they
continued. It was regrettable but reasonable that Chilean
President Lagos had canceled his April 15-16 visit. Getting
Lagos here soonest was vital, however, in that it offered
Gutierrez a wonderful opportunity to appear presidential and
not petty. In the meantime, a Lagos call expressing support
and urging compromise looked promising; so too calls from
Lula and Spanish President Zapatero. Poloffs summarized
Embassy actions in attempting to defuse the crisis, from the
Ambassador's working breakfast with Gutierrez (Ref C) to
Emboffs' calls on the GoE high command.


7. (C) Last, Poloffs sketched out a possible high-visibility
international visit aimed at reducing political pressures and
fomenting dialogue. Despite a paucity of real results,
Despouy's Ecuador tour had bought the president time and
prompted hope that a negotiated solution was possible.
Gutierrez needed similar relief now. Recognizing that no
international organization would intervene sans a GoE
invitation, the Embassy was prepared to utilize its good
offices in convincing the president such international
intervention was needed.

--------------
A Cause for Optimism?
--------------


8. (C) Chilean Ambassador Haddad noted President Lagos
already had telephoned Gutierrez, apologizing for canceling
his visit but hoping to reschedule soon; on the need for
respect for democratic order and dialog, the Chilean leader's
talking points differed little from ours. Spanish diplomat
Xavier Conde informed the group the EU had agreed to issue
its own statement on Ecuador. GoS Foreign Minister Moratinos
had urged compromise in a call to GoE counterpart Patricio
Zuquilanda, Conde revealed, and he would pitch to Madrid a
potential Zapatero-Gutierrez telcon. Cesar Ocampo, the OAS
mission chief in Quito, agreed international "intervention"
held promise, but, fearing competing, counter-productive
initiatives, urged full coordination between organizations.
The World Bank rep, noting he too had canceled a high-level
official's visit to Ecuador, announced the organization's own
statement would soon emerge, its call for compromise tracking
closely with others. Only the Brazilian DCM demurred, seeing
little benefit from a Lula call (his Ambassador had been more
positive during the March meeting, however).


9. (C) All considered a possible "Friends" resolution worth
pursuing, although the IDB official recognized the difficulty
of clearing language through a dozen entities. UN Director
Valdes volunteered to shepherd its preparation and approval.
He would keep members apprised of progress at all times.
Valdes also intended to meet with Guillermo Landazuri (ID),
the author of the Congressional resolution calling for
foreign observation over the Supreme Court selection process,
in an attempt to clarify terms. Concluding the meeting, he
convoked an April 20 meeting of international judicial
assistance donors, the USG included, to coordinate possible
technical assistance.

--------------
COMMENT:
--------------


10. (C) Those present at the March and April gatherings
represent the cream of an otherwise cocktail-focused
diplomatic crop. While uncertain they'll soon take action,
the attitudinal improvement -- from "we don't want to get
involved" to "this is what we've done so far," convinces us
our counterparts are worth cultivating. With the savvy
Valdes taking the lead, we are optimistic the "Friends" will
generate at least a resolution draft. Obtaining support for
an international mission looks harder, however, owing to
institutional rivalry -- Valdes himself blanched when we
first raised a potential OAS role here.


11. (C) Yet Ecuador needs its neighbors' help. Political
polarization continues to worsen, with opposition Pachakutik
announcing its intention to seek Gutierrez's impeachment, and
protests now expanding outside Quito. Should the dipcorps
not back a multilateral mission, we are prepared to act solo,
and already are consulting with WHA and USOAS colleagues on
the possible value of an OAS "political peacekeeping" team in
Ecuador. In an April 19 telcon with the Ambassador,
President Gutierrez welcomed support from abroad. Should
Washington approve in theory, our next step entails coaching
the GoE on spin control, since the opposition could
conceivably paint the visit as proof Gutierrez cannot govern
Ecuador without outside help.
KENNEY