Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO842
2005-04-17 19:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

ECUADOR: PRESIDENT ENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY

Tags:  PGOV ASEC EC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000842 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PRESIDENT ENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY

REF: QUITO 840

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney. Reason 1.4 (b&d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000842

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PRESIDENT ENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY

REF: QUITO 840

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney. Reason 1.4 (b&d).


1. (C) Summary: President Lucio Gutierrez revoked the state
of emergency declared on April 15 the following day.
Anti-government citizen protests continued after the lifting
of the emergency, though generally peacefully. The political
situation here remains fluid--a special session of Congress
will take place this afternoon, but is unlikely to achieve
common ground. Police and military acted with restraint
during the state of emergency, and no violence or suspension
of civil rights has been reported. Ongoing intensive and
coordinated USG actions are focused on contributing to
peaceful resolution of political conflict.

State of Emergency Lifted
--------------


2. (U) In the face of universal condemnation of his April 15
state of emergency declaration for Quito and surrounding
Pichincha province, President Gutierrez on April 16 lifted
the state of emergency in Quito. In doing so, at
approximately 1700, Gutierrez said his action was in
recognition of the progressive return of tranquility in the
country. He also said the action was in response to a
request from the President of Congress, who had convoked a
special session of Congress for April 17. The agenda for the
session would be legislative action to vacate the current
Supreme Court (already dismissed by Gutierrez' April 15
decree) and to begin debate on the President's proposed
reforms to the Judiciary Law, which would determine how to
select a replacement court. Gutierrez also thanked the
Ecuadorian people for their understanding, called for unity
and calm, and called on Ecuadorians to seek solutions to
Ecuador's problems in the spirit of brotherhood.

Reaction
--------------


3. (U) The opposition appeared more emboldened than
mollified by Gutierrez' about-face on the state of emergency.
PSC leader Leon Febres-Cordero exhorted citizens to continue
protests calling for Gutierrez' resignation. Guayaquil mayor
Jaime Nebot convoked a mobile demonstration in defense of
democracy and for a return to rule of law in Guayaquil and
surrounding provinces for April 18. Forty-eight opposition
Congress members forcibly crossed police lines to enter
Congress on April 16, but could not initiate a special

session for lack of a quorum. After another false start on
April 17, opposition legislators announced that they would
instead participate in the special session convoked by
Quintana later that day. The Church issued a statement
criticizing the government's actions, warning that "mistakes
and violations cannot be corrected with more of the same."
Effects on the Street
--------------


4. (U) The lifting of the state of emergency in Quito will
have little noticeable effect because few provisions of the
state of emergency decree were actually implemented. There
were no reports of arrests or suspension of civil rights.
Freedom of expression was not abridged, and the government
did not move against the anti-government radio station (Radio
Luna) of dubious provenance which has been exhorting citizens
into the streets and setting the agenda for ongoing protests.
There was no visible military presence in the city except in
the vicinity of the national palace and on transport arteries
along the periphery of the city. Even the police presence in
the capital was limited during the emergency and police acted
with restraint in the face of peaceful protests.


5. (U) After the lifting of the emergency, peaceful protests
(8,000 in one location, 3-4,000 in another) continued into
the evening of April 16. EmbOffs observed the main
celebratory protest, noting that participants were initially
predominantly middle class families making noise together and
showing support by draping their cars in toilet paper (the
protest gimmick of the day). Opposition political figures
did not participate, knowing they were not welcome at this
non-partisan event. After midnight, however, a smaller group
of approximately 3,000 converged on the heavily-guarded
presidential palace. Police obstructed their progress using
tear gas.

US Mission Actions
--------------


6. (U) As a precautionary measure, RSO restricted mission
personnel to their homes on the evening of April 16, and
extended the measure on April 17. There were few inquiries
from AmCits during the state of emergency and no untoward
incidents were reported. Elsewhere, Peace Corps volunteers
remained in their villages, also reporting no incidents and
little echo of the political turbulence at the village level.
Anti-government protests did reportedly take place in
several cities outside the capital, again without incident.


7. (C) Mission outreach during the state of emergency was
extensive and coordinated by the country team. The
Ambassador spoke with President Gutierrez (RefTel),and
Minister of Finance Yepez (who was in Washington at the
time). CONS issued a warden message, quelling AmCit concerns
by reducing uncertainty. PAS issued a statement early on
April 16 signaling USG concern and calling for dialogue,
which was well received. MILGRP and DAO were in constant
contact with the armed forces leadership, monitoring signs of
internal dissent and effectively urging restraint. POL
monitored evolving attitudes of the opposition and ECON
reached out to government economic officials and the private
sector. The Am-Cham issued a helpful call reinforcing the
Embassy's call for dialogue.


8. (C) US officials in Washington and Miami contributed
significantly to USG outreach efforts, with Department
officials expressing strong USG concern to the Ecuadorian
Embassy. SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Craddock urged restraint on
the Ecuadorian armed forces in a call to Ecuadorian Joint
Chief VADM Victor Rosero, reinforcing mission actions here.

Next Steps
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador will breakfast with President
Gutierrez on April 18. She will emphasize USG concern that
the state of emergency damaged the government's credibility
and is not an appropriate substitute for real dialogue, and
strongly warn the president that any move to dissolve
Congress would be unacceptable. Progress to resolve the
court issue will require greater efforts to find common
ground with an increasingly emboldened opposition. The
Ambassador will also meet later the same day with Joint Chief
Rosero, to reinforce the military's restrained and
professional behavior during the emergency. With rumors that
Army Chief Luis Aguas opposed the measure, she will also use
the occasion to gauge whether internal dissent remains an
issue in the Army.

Comment: Prospects for Peace
--------------


10. (C) Many here see the hand of ex-president Bucaram
behind the state of emergency decree; few believe Gutierrez
would risk dissolving the Supreme Court without a prior
accord with Bucaram. Gutierrez' lifting of the emergency in
conjunction with the re-opening of debate on the court issue
in Congress would have been coordinated with Bucaram, through
his henchman Congress President Quintana. The government's
current dependence on Bucaram for its political survival is
worrisome, especially given that Bucaram recently called
publicly for the dissolution of Congress, if necessary, to
prevent the opposition from hi-jacking the president's agenda.


11. (C) We are convinced that the real issue in play between
Bucaram, Gutierrez and the opposition is not the exalted
independence of the courts but rather the permanence of the
controversial decision permitting Bucaram to return. It
appears Gutierrez and Bucaram now have an agreement on how to
dump the discredited court, essential to ensure this
government's survival, without reversing its decisions.
Passing that into law, however, requires cooperation of some
segment of the opposition, which after the state of emergency
appears unified (with the exception of Alvaro Noboa's PRIAN)
in seeking to bring Gutierrez down.


12. (C) The situation here remains fluid, given the level of
polarization and animosity on both sides. With the state of
emergency lifted, our efforts must now focus on contributing
to political stability by preventing the government from
further missteps (esp. any move against Congress) and
encouraging both sides toward dialogue and compromise. To
succeed will require renewed efforts here and continued
engagement from Washington.
KENNEY