Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO835
2005-04-15 22:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

ECUADOR: PUBLIC DISGUSTED WITH POLITICIANS

Tags:  PGOV ASEC EC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000835 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PUBLIC DISGUSTED WITH POLITICIANS

REF: A. QUITO 781

B. QUITO 805

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney. Reason 1.4 (b&d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000835

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PUBLIC DISGUSTED WITH POLITICIANS

REF: A. QUITO 781

B. QUITO 805

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney. Reason 1.4 (b&d).


1. (C) Summary: President Gutierrez missed an opportunity
for conciliation after the opposition failed to turn great
crowds out for the protest strike on April 13. His recent
intemperate statements led the opposition to court (and
nearly attract) PRIAN support for a new, blatantly partisan
proposal. Ultimately, the PRIAN backed out, after Gutierrez
threatened to fight any such resolution "to the death." In
disgust, thousands spontaneously joined night protests
against the government, and more are expected tonight. We
are starting to hear disconcerting noises of divisions within
the Armed Forces. With the situation very fluid here, and
given Gutierrez' current tone deafness to dialogue, we will
make clear to him our concern that any move to dissolve
Congress would have grave consequences, and look for
opportunities to renew our call on both sides to set aside
partisan interests and re-engage in dialogue. End Summary.

Taking the Low Road
--------------


2. (C) As protest strike actions were petering out on April
13, President Gutierrez inflamed a frustrated opposition with
intemperate public remarks. The strike had proven most
Ecuadorians were more interested in work than protest, he
said in a national address, and the government would not cede
to a small minority of troublemakers. Minister of Government
Oscar Ayerve, the GoE's point man for dialogue, had earlier
been quoted calling the Quito strike a "total failure."
These statements had the predictable effect of prolonging
street protest action late April 13 and fueled spontaneous
overnight protests (police estimate around 4,000 people)
again April 14. More (and bigger) night protests are
expected April 15.

Opposition Tries (Again) to Capitalize
--------------


3. (C) The government tried and failed to win any opposition
votes (it mustered only 35 in favor) for its "go slow"
proposal to terminate the current Supreme Court and select a
new one when Congress re-opened on April 14. After Congress
adjourned, the opposition reopened the session and made a
play for the votes of banana magnate Alvaro Noboa's PRIAN.
On offer was a commitment to permit the Supreme Electoral

Tribunal (TSE) to select new Supreme Court justices, after
re-divvying up the membership of the TSE and Constitutional
Court among the opposition and PRIAN. The PRIAN flirted with
the idea all afternoon, generating frantic media attention,
until finally imposing deal-breaking conditions (that the
Congress vote on new supreme court justices) at 10:00 PM. At
that time, middle class citizens of Quito spontaneously
turned out in the thousands to peacefully express frustration
and disgust with the government, banging pots and pans while
chanting "Fuera Lucio." When radical Quito councilor (ID)
Antonio Ricaurte attempted to join the throng, he was booed
and left. No other opposition politicians attended.

Dissenters in the Military?
--------------


4. (C) The Quito strike was led by mayor Paco Moncayo, a
former high commander of the Armed Forces. Prior to the
strike, Moncayo had called publicly on the Armed Forces to
cease supporting the Gutierrez government and respect the
right of protest (Ref A). On April 14, however, an
uncharacteristically agitated Joint Chief VADM Victor Rosero
told MLGRP Commander that the Army had become politicized and
expressed worry about the unresolved debate in Congress. The
ex-military leaders lining up with Moncayo had influence over
some active-duty officers, he said. DATT subsequently called
Army Chief Luis Aguas to express concern, and was told the
Army would respect constitutional order. Later in the day,
Defense Minister Herrera publicly reaffirmed the military's
loyalty to constitutional order. SOUTHCOM Commander Gen.
Craddock also called Adm. Rosero on April 14 to urge the
military to exercise restraint and professionalism.

Comment and Embassy Action Plan
--------------


5. (C) President Gutierrez missed an opportunity for
conciliation in the wake of the unimpressive April 13 strike
action (Ref B). Rather than focusing on how to move toward
resolution of the court issue, Gutierrez went again with his
gut instinct for taking the offensive. We are concerned that
in doing so, he could prove all too ready to overstep
constitutional bounds, for example by dissolving an
uncooperative Congress, if need be. Thankfully, that
decision point was avoided after the PRIAN flinched last
night, but without a change in strategy, that point could
come again. Meanwhile, the nightly protests appear to
reflect a new element of citizen outrage, and the military
appears to be getting uncomfortable. The indigenous, on the
other hand, remain largely absent from protests, at least in
the capital.


6. (C) With the situation still fluid and evolving, we see
an important role for U.S. Mission activism and opportunities
to advance US interests in stability and democratic values in
the days ahead. The Ambassador has a breakfast meeting with
President Gutierrez on April 18. To the president, she will
signal that dissolution of congress and declaring a state of
emergency are USG redlines. Having let ex-president Bucaram
return, Gutierrez should not permit the PRE to make the
situation worse. Instead, the GoE must urgently address the
court issue, and deprive the opposition of a rallying point.
That would require real dialogue with the opposition and
firmness with the PRE. She will also inquire about the
status of a rumored Cabinet shakeup, urging he consider a
Cabinet more open to dialogue.


7. (C) Separately, the Ambassador plans to call Defense
Minister Herrera to build on Gen. Craddock's helpful message,
and will call on VADM Rosero early next week. Another
opportunity to influence Gutierrez is indirect, through the
visit of President Lagos of Chile, April 19-20. We will also
suggest to Chile's Ambassador that Lagos counsel Gutierrez
against any rash actions.


8. (C) Other Embassy elements have a role to play as well.
CG Guayaquil will reach out to opposition contacts there to
monitor temperatures and preach conciliation on the coast.
MILGRP and DAO will reach out to mid and brigade-level
contacts to monitor military views and deployment. RSO is in
constant contact with national police to monitor
ever-shifting protests. POL will reach out to the opposition
in Congress to gauge prospects for renewed dialogue (or
confrontation),and counsel moderation to presidency
contacts. ECON will emphasize the economic costs of
political instability. PD will tap the pulse of the media,
and seek opportunities to reiterate our call for non-partisan
dialogue.


9. (C) A/S Noriega and other Department officials made
democracy points to GOE Ministry of the Presidency on April
15 in Washington. Based on intel we gather and protest
actions this weekend, we will offer thoughts on additional
ways Department principals could interact with the GOE to
reinforce the democracy and stability message.
KENNEY