ECUADOR: DIALOGUE OVER; TIME TO STRIKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000795

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: DIALOGUE OVER; TIME TO STRIKE

REF: QUITO 781

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney. Reason 1.4 (b&d).


1. (C) Summary: Congress tried but failed to pass
legislation to resolve the Supreme Court issue on April 12.
Quito opposition leaders will therefore try to close down the
capital in protest, starting early on April 13. How long the
"general strike" will last is not clear. The private sector
in the capital is divided, some favoring an indefinite
strike, others fretting over costs. With Guayaquil deferring
its own protests until later this month, the Quito strike no
longer has any pretensions of national scope. Most here
believe the government can weather the protests, and thus far
the government has not over-reacted. We will monitor and
report strike developments closely. End Summary.

Dialogue Broken Off
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2. (C) After Minister of Government Oscar Ayerve had raised
hopes that the government and opposition were nearing
agreement on a formula to resolve the festering controversy
over the current Supreme Court, the opposition abruptly broke
off dialogue during the evening of April 11. Congressmen
Andres Paez (ID) and Luis Fernando Torres (PSC) blamed Ayerve
for the rupture, citing the government's resistance to the
opposition's proposed formula for a selection committee to
select new Supreme Court justices. Government and opposition
had agreed to vacate the current Supreme Court immediately,
and hold a referendum to ratify the formula to select new
judges. On the selection committee issue, however, they
differed. President Gutierrez issued a national call on
Congress to act on April 12 to terminate the Supreme Court.
Opposition members blamed the government in advance for the
failure of Congress to act.

Congress: No Action
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3. (C) On April 12, Congress went into session to debate
competing proposals over how to terminate the current Supreme
Court. The session concluded inconclusively however, after
the opposition proposal supported by the PSC, ID, Socialists,
DP and Pachakutik fell one vote short of success.
Independent deputies introduced a new bill on the court
issue, with government approval, which would require new
debate, called for April 13. Torres told us he felt tricked
by the government's "triple-discourse," and accused the
government of using bribes to defeat the opposition proposal.
He speculated that the government's maneuvers in Congress
could turn even the reluctant Guayaquil-based opposition into
the streets.

Strike to Start April 13
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4. (U) Assembly of Quito and Pichincha province leaders
announced on April 12 that a long-threatened indefinite
strike would shut down the capital and surrounding province,
as well as Azuay, Chimborazo and Imbabura provinces, from
midnight April 12. Indigenous groups have announced
"parallel" anti-government protests. Strike organizers said
they would close access roads into the capital, demonstrate
at nine "strategic locations," and likely will convoke a
protest march during the day. Military authorities assured
the Ambassador on April 11 that the Quito international
airport would remain open. A mayor from the Amazon region
threatened to turn off the capital's water supply as a form
of protest against the strike and in support of the
government. The Education Ministry declared all schools
closed for April 13. President of Congress Omar Quintana
told the press that counter-marches would be organized in
support of the government.

Guayaquil Hedges
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5. (U) Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot convoked an ad-hoc
Assembly of Guayaquil meeting on April 11 where he announced
that Guayaquil will coordinate with other coastal
municipalities to organize a protest march in favor of local
autonomy concerns. He did not set a date for the protest,
saying only that it should be "sooner rather than later" and
sometime during April. Guayaquil-based business groups had
strongly objected to any protest intended to stop work,
causing Nebot to choose a march over a strike.

Presidential Advisor Pessimistic
--------------

6. (C) Presidential Secretary Carlos Polit told the
Ambassador early on April 12 that a strike was inevitable.
Polit blamed the failure of dialogue squarely on Ayerve, "the
wrong man for the job." He described a call he had received
from ID congressman Andres Paez complaining about being
photographed with Ayerve, a man with "heavy political
baggage." Ayerve's bad political judgment included his
support for ex-president Bucaram's offer to turn his
supporters into the streets in support of the government
simultaneously with anti-government protests in Guayaquil.
This was a recipe for violence, he said, which could in a
worst-case scenario galvanize further anti-government
protests. Polit said he planned to recommend that President
Gutierrez deflate the protests by announcing a Cabinet
shake-up, including replacing Government Minister Ayerve with
Labor Minister Izurieta.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The conditions for real dialogue dissipated with the
approach of the opposition's threatened strike action, and
eventually talks reached an impasse. Congressional
non-action reflected worse on the government, since it
blocked the opposition's attempt to pass legislation to
resolve the issue. Some in the opposition were clearly
wedded to more confrontational tactics, especially the more
radical members of the Assembly of Quito.


8. (C) Squabbles for power and justice here are prone to
brinkmanship, but generally remain non-violent. General
strikes are particularly high-risk, given recent history
here. Two presidents have been deposed in the past eight
years after general strikes or mobilizations brought
opponents into the streets. But this strike, at least
initially, is not national in scope. In addition, no
destabilization attempt has succeeded in recent times without
indigenous mobilization and military support. By most
accounts Gutierrez retains firm control of the military, and
has effectively neutralized the indigenous. Until these
conditions change, street protests are not likely to shake
this government.
KENNEY