FINAL PUSH FOR GOE VOTE ON CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000779

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV EC CU
SUBJECT: FINAL PUSH FOR GOE VOTE ON CUBA

REF: A. QUITO 695


B. QUITO 682

C. QUITO 625

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) With the UN Human Rights Commission scheduled to vote
on the Cuba resolution April 14 or 15, our campaign to swing
Ecuador to "yes" has reached the home-stretch. In the last
10 days, Embassy efforts have included:

-- Calling on GoE President Lucio Gutierrez (Ref B).
Gutierrez promised "no worse" than an abstention, but noted
that domestic opposition to a yes vote was so fierce as to
box him in;

-- Lobbying Foreign Minister Patricio Zuquilanda on the OAS
SYG vote and Cuba resolution. On the latter, Zuquilanda
recounted a recent GoC demarche for a no vote and his "you
must be kidding" response. He offered no indication Ecuador
would shift from its traditional abstention position, however;

-- Pressing MFA Bilateral Affairs and Mulilateral Affairs
undersecretaries for condemnation of Castro in Geneva;

-- Informing Presidency contacts that the USG views
countries' Cuba votes with great interest and concern;

-- Approaching foreign diplomats (Spanish, Vatican, other EU)
to seek a coordinated lobbying campaign (Ref A).


2. (C) Where have we gotten so far? We believe Ecuador
remains a solid abstention, but has not entered the yes camp.
Reasons are essentially three: a GoE overriding belief in
"non-intervention" in the internal matters of other states; a
general affinity for Castro's Cuba amongst MFA diplomats; and
an Administration fear that a yes in Geneva would destabilize
an already teetering government.


3. (C) Countering Reasons 1 and 2 are long-term Embassy
goals we unfortunately won't reach by April 15. Regarding
Number 3 and Ecuador's current, overheated political
environment, Gutierrez is wise to avoid any measure that
brings the indigenous, about the only group still outside the
fray, into the streets. While we have no proof, we imagine
our Cuban Embassy counterparts and a visiting GoC
vice-minister (and perhaps the Venezuelans as well) already
have lobbied indigenous leaders to emerge en masse should
Ecuador back the U.S. resolution.


4. (C) Conversely, Gutierrez's domestic predicament might
also provide an opening for one last push on Cuba. At the
height of violent April 5-6 demonstrations in Quito, a
frantic Administration official telephoned us, having heard
the Embassy "had withdrawn its backing" for the president
(untrue). He worried a U.S. policy switch represented the
final Administration coffin nail and urged us to continue
supporting his embattled boss. Such fears are not
exaggerated; popular opinion holds that it was the
admonitions of a former U.S. ambassador that emboldened
Ecuadorians to depose former GoE President Abdala Bucaram in

1997.


5. (C) Of course we cannot go tit-for-tat with Gutierrez,
promising continued U.S. support in exchange for his Cuba
vote. But with careful language, we might imply that, by
showing backbone in Geneva, the GoE and its president would
earn significant USG gratitude. Washington would view
another abstention, however, as rejection of a key U.S.
policy initiative in the hemisphere.


6. (C) We understand that Political Undersecretary Burns
will receive Zuquilanda in Washington April 11, WHA A/S Roger
Noriega will pull him aside at the same-day OAS special
session, and that a senior State official might call
President Gutierrez, all conversations focusing on the Geneva
vote. Assuming WHA/CCA and DRL will provide basic points on
the resolution and the decaying human rights situation in
Cuba, we offer here suggestions to tailor the presentation to
Ecuadorian realities:

-- Push "principles over politics" to guilt Gutierrez and
Zuquilanda toward yes, perhaps focusing on the plight of
dissidents imprisoned for their ideals;

-- Note countries that favor the resolution, with focus on
hemispheric and, in particular, South American nations;

-- Spotlight supportive governments that also faced a
left-leaning, pro-Castro populace, and explain how they
overcame public opposition on the Cuba resolution;
-- Assert an Ecuadorian "yes" would send a strong signal to
U.S. policy makers and appropriators (without getting into
specifics).


7. (U) Any call to Gutierrez or meetings with his FM must
also tackle the evolving, volatile political situation in
Ecuador, lately exacerbated by an unpopular Supreme Court
decision to allow the once-exiled Bucaram to return.
Suggested talking points include:
-- Democracies require strong institutions -- including
independent legislatures and judiciaries -- in order to
thrive;

-- Thriving, stable democracies invite investment, spawn
economic growth;

-- Democracy by its nature is messy and difficult; dialog
between actors is key;

-- In the USG you have an ally that wants to help.
KENNEY