WELCOME TO ECUADOR, GENERAL MYERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000773

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC
SUBJECT: WELCOME TO ECUADOR, GENERAL MYERS


Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) On behalf of the Mission Ecuador team, General,
please accept a hearty welcome to Ecuador. Into your three
hour stop we have packed a bilat with GoE President Lucio
Gutierrez, a press conference with your joint chief
counterpart, and a working lunch with the Ecuadorian high
command; the tight schedule unfortunately precludes a visit
to the Cooperative Security Location in coastal city Manta,
one of the largest U.S. military facilities south of the Rio
Grande. In your public and private commentary, we suggest
you focus on praising Ecuador's contributions to the War on
Drugs and hemispheric security, as evidenced by the
buttressing of its border with Colombia and GoE troop
contributions to peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Haiti and
elsewhere. You and I can discuss on arrival the current
political situation and how you might use your public
comments to support democracy, dialogue, and stability.

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Instability the Norm
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2. (U) Few hemispheric nations rival Ecuador for sheer
political instability. Since 1996, six or nine (depending
how you count) presidents have held office, several deposed
on quasi-constitutional grounds. "Fractious" describes
Ecuador's political environment; over a dozen parties hold
seats in Congress, and some 150 groups fielded candidates in
October 2004 regional elections. Instability and Ecuador's
endemic corruption go hand in hand, as many victors,
believing their time in office brief, endeavor to raid the
trough early.


3. (SBU) Ecuador's economy is equally volatile, as bad
statistics have leveled administrations and sent presidents
into exile. Gutierrez has been fortunate, however, that oil
prices have skyrocketed on his watch, permitting the GoE
leeway to meet payrolls, pay off political rivals, and reduce
debt. The windfall has masked structural inadequacies,
however, and allowed postponement of needed reforms. The oil
sector is a perfect example, where declining production in
government-run fields has kept Ecuador from exploiting
petroleum's price rise. Other concerns are the dismal
investment climate here, judicial insecurity, and habitual
disrespect for contracts.

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And Peaking Upon Your Arrival
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4. (SBU) You arrive at a difficult juncture, with Ecuador's
shallow-rooted democracy again under fire from the nation's
numerous, me-first political actors. The current instability
could threaten U.S. counter-narcotics and security assistance
programs, should a populist "solution" arise. As usual, both
government and opposition are attempting to drag us into the
debate. Our response? The United States supports Ecuadorian
institutions, not individuals, and certainly not one party
over another.


5. (SBU) President Lucio Gutierrez took office in January
2003 with popularity ratings approaching 60 percent. The
honeymoon was short-lived, however. Owing to the president's
turn toward fiscal austerity and his "cozying up" (their
term, not ours) to Washington, Gutierrez's left-leaning
coalition lasted a scant six months. Since, he's pacted and
unpacted with parties spanning the spectrum, sometimes to
secure legislation packages but mostly to save his own skin.
He has reason to: Ecuador's political elites despise the
mestizo former Army colonel.


6. (U) Gutierrez looked ready to fall in November, when the
opposition attempted to impeach him on suspect grounds. Not
only did he survive, though, he mounted a counter-offensive
to build a Congressional majority and overhaul Ecuador's
highest tribunals, which he claimed were corrupt and beholden
to political masters. However, Gutierrez's moves against the
judiciary backfired, uniting his opponents in a drive to
replace (again) the still-politicized Supreme Court, perhaps
taking down the president down in the process.


7. (U) A recent Court decision absolving exiled ex-president
and Gutierrez ally Abdala Bucaram further infuriated the
opposition. Large disturbances occurred April 5-6, with
protesters clashing with police outside government buildings.
The "Assembly of Quito," an ad hoc alliance of disparate
opposition elements led by Quito Mayor (and former Ecuadorian
Joint Forces Commander) Paco Moncayo, is demanding
Gutierrez's ouster, claiming the time for dialog over.
Further protests are scheduled this week, and Assembly
leaders have called for an April 12 national strike.
Gutierrez reportedly considered, but ruled out declaring a
state of emergency in response.

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Suggestions on Substance
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8. (C) Owing to pressing political problems, Gutierrez might
be distracted from discussing bilateral pol-mil specifics
during your palace call. He is not apt to engage on
controversial initiatives, whether Article 98 or Ecuadorian
contributions to the coalition against terror. We therefore
recommend you raise positive security developments occurring
on his watch, from ratcheting up Ecuador's northern border
troop presence to capturing and deporting to Colombian FARC
leader Simon Trinidad in 2004.


9. (SBU) Prospects for productive talks look better with
Admiral Victor Rosero, your counterpart as Ecuadorian joint
forces commander. Savvy and U.S.-friendly -- he regularly
refers to stints in Newport and Washington as career-making
postings -- Rosero understands the changing threats Ecuador
faces and the need to confront them. Not the president's
favorite, we continue to worry his tenure might be cut short.
We therefore hope your joint press availability with the
affable admiral raises his public profile.


10. (C) Perhaps his greatest challenge, Rosero seeks to
"re-invent" Ecuador's military before his CJCS term ends in

2006. He has welcomed support from the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS),affiliated with the
National Defense University in Washington. To ensure
success, however, we have endeavored to keep CHDS's
participation under the radar, as nationalists would view any
U.S. restructuring role as meddling. In your private remarks
with Rosero, we suggest you request a readout on re-invention
progress and offer continued USG support.


11. (C) Another Rosero initiative is to increase the
Ecuadorian military's hemispheric stature via participation
in multilateral exercises and operations, especially
peacekeeping. Ecuadorian combat engineers deployed to Haiti
last November as part of the MINUSTAH contingent. The GoE
has renewed its Haiti commitment an additional six months; we
suggest you raise PKO in your public comments and ask Rosero
privately if Ecuador remains amenable to future
contributions. War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq were unpopular here, however, meaning USG efforts to
recruit Ecuadorian forces for Coalition PKO duties there are
likely wasted breath.


12. (C) Domestic politics re-appear vis-a-vis security
cooperation with northern neighbor Colombia. Plan Colombia
is widely misunderstood and wildly unpopular across Ecuador's
political spectrum, and "involvement in Colombia" a political
third rail. Rosero hopes you not use the term
"narcoterrorists" in your public commentary, as Ecuador has
not such labeled the illegal armed groups (and he fears
backlash from the left). Nonetheless, Ecuador's northern
force posture has tripled recently, units are patrolling the
frontier's difficult terrain, and there have been no
large-scale FARC incursions into Ecuador. Recent media play
has questioned the large expense the GoE incurs in the border
deployment, however. We therefore recommend you push a "stay
the course" message.


13. (C) Had your schedule permitted, I would have liked to
show off the Manta Cooperative Security Location (CSL),a
counter-narcotics U.S. Forward Operating Location on the
Ecuadorian coast. On-line since September 2002, CSL-launched
aircraft have provided intelligence contributing to numerous
drug-runner takedowns. The facility will never be popular
here, especially among elites -- what Latin American nation
wants foreign troops on its soil? -- but interagency efforts
have resulted in a great increase in CSL acceptance. The
agreement granting us use of Manta expires in 2009; while
we've received no instructions to renegotiate, we are
attempting to reduce barriers to successful talks.


14. (C) "All Ecuador wants a Manta," Rosero has told me
privately, referring mainly to the economic renaissance the
city has enjoyed since the CSL's establishment. Coordination
improvements between Ecuadorian and U.S. air forces is also a
source of pride, and our hosts are considering a formal
request that CSL aircraft gather northern border intelligence
for GoE use. Hoping to keep the public spotlight off the
facility, however, Rosero wishes you minimize its reference
in your public comments. I have some ideas on how we can
meet his request while still "selling" bilateral Manta
benefits.


15. (C) I cannot avoid mention of Article 98. Few efforts
have frustrated similarly; the Embassy initiated Article 98
discussions before my arrival at post, yet is no closer to a
deal now than then. Reasons are many, ranging from Ecuador's
counterproductive sovereignty concerns to a December 2002
shooting involving an official American that called into
question foreigners' immunities. We've targeted various
pressure points for our lobbying effort, including the
Foreign Ministry, armed forces, Congress, and Gutierrez
himself. The diplomats and legislators ignore our
entreaties, the uniforms claim it's a diplomatic matter, and
Gutierrez says he wants a deal, but has yet to energize his
negotiators.


16. (C) We continue to re-think tactics and approach fresh
interlocutors. That said, I see little hope until the
president nears the end of his term (2007). As Ecuador's
constitution prevents consecutive re-election, a lame-duck
Gutierrez might prove receptive to signing Article 98.
Meanwhile, ASPA sanctions, especially those restricting U.S.
training opportunities (IMET),are costing us influence with
the Ecuadorian military. Rosero is hoping that limitations
on IMET be lifted and will be interested in hearing your
views.
KENNEY