Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO748
2005-04-05 19:14:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Quito
Cable title:
CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
B. QUITO 680
C. QUITO 589
C...
id: 30154
date: 4/5/2005 19:14
refid: 05QUITO748
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 05SECSTATE43965
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
B. QUITO 680
C. QUITO 589
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
B. QUITO 680
C. QUITO 589
C...
id: 30154
date: 4/5/2005 19:14
refid: 05QUITO748
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 05SECSTATE43965
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
-------------- header ends --------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
B. QUITO 680
C. QUITO 589
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (U) SUMMARY: Separated by only a thousand miles and led
by ex-colonels from similar backgrounds, Ecuador and
Venezuela nonetheless aren't closest of friends. Commercial,
cultural, and people-to-people ties are slight, compared to
those of other near-neighboring countries. There is genuine
dislike between Presidents Gutierrez and Chavez, due mainly
to the latter's Machiavellian manipulation of the personal
relationship; the GoE leader thus shies away from most joint
appearances and recently assured us he had no intention of
visiting Caracas soon. Ecuadorian media regularly lambaste
Hugo's efforts to silence and/or co-opt Venezuela's fourth
estate.
2. (S) Chavez is not without allies here, however.
Ecuador's indigenous and traditional left are both numerous
and potent; despite no personal affinity for the Bolivarian
despot, they delight in his anti-imperialist, gringo-bashing
message. The GoV embassy is ably led and is utilizing Cuba's
long-established Ecuador inroads to further Chavez interests.
Evidence seems to tie the Venezuelans to a spate of violence
against the Gutierrez opposition, its aim to foment an even
more violent response. Finally, Ecuador's political
cannibalism and general (and worsening) instability plays
right into Chavez's hands. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Unlike his Havana Idol, No National Hero...
--------------
3. (U) Ecuador and Venezuela would appear natural allies.
Only southeastern Colombia separates them physically.
History ties them together, as both formed part of Gran
Colombia, the short-lived megastate arising upon independence
from Spain in the early 1800s. Each produces petroleum,
although Venezuela's reserves dwarf Ecuador's. And both
feature ruling classes dominated by European-origin citizens,
mestizo and mulatto masses, and marginalized indigenous and
Afro-origen underclasses.
4. (U) Yet despite such similarities, country links are few.
Limited expat communities exist in each, for example. Few
direct flights connect Quito and Caracas. While former
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) employees in 2004 provided
advice to PetroEcuador executives on increasing production
and profits in state-owned fields, they were in fact
"ex-"perts earlier purged from the Venezuelan parastatal, and
the initiative soon stalled. Trade between the two nations
is relatively small and tilts favorably to Venezuela. And
cultural and academic contacts are limited.
5. (SBU) Hugo Chavez and Lucio Gutierrez were decorated
soldiers later imprisoned for coup leadership. Both
rededicated themselves to acquiring their respective
presidencies constitutionally, and both achieved success.
Yet they are far from friendly. Perhaps cognizant that a
chummy relationship would alarm Washington, Gutierrez has
attempted to keep his Caracas counterpart at arm's length.
Chavez attended Gutierrez's January 2003 inauguration, for
example, but was deprived of a useful photo-op. Eighteen
months later, when Quito hosted the OAS General Assembly, the
Venezuelan embarrassed his host by leading large, "fuera
Lucio" rallies not far from the assembly site. Relations
have since chilled further, thanks to Chavez's shenanigans
surrounding their now-aborted Caracas summit (Ref B).
6. (U) Nor do media here cut Chavez much slack. While
reporting his antics and anti-American diatribe factually,
the Venezuelan colonel rarely receives positive front or
editorial page coverage. Both print and broadcast outlets
damn his efforts to emasculate Venezuelan media. And when
Gutierrez takes turns they consider dictatorial, commentators
often tar him as "Chavez-lite."
--------------
But Not Lying Down, Either
--------------
7. (C) Regardless, Chavez considers Ecuador a fertile export
market for his Bolivarian revolution. He is encouraged by
genuine Ecuadorian admiration for Fidel Castro and the
goodwill the Cuban regime's doctors, teachers, and coaches
have earned, especially amidst highlands indigenous
communities. It's no secret Chavez bankrolls Uncle Fidel's
activities hemisphere-wide. Yet there are indications the
Venezuelan wants more than silent partner status in Ecuador.
8. (S) Venezuelan destabilization-related activities have
spiked in Ecuador since September 2004. Perhaps an
indication that Chavez has prioritized Ecuador, Oscar Navas,
the GoV's ambassador in Quito, is a former Venezuelan Army
colonel and Hugo confidant. Embassy sources report increased
contacts between GoV, Cuban, FARC, homegrown terrorist, and
far-left political groups, a dangerous mosaic. While not yet
a coherent whole, the nascent subversion campaign bears
watching.
--------------
A Two-Front Order of Battle
--------------
9. (S) Broadly, GoV efforts take two forms: bolstering
far-left, anti-U.S. political forces, and developing
terrorists' capabilities in Ecuador. Regarding the former,
sources state that Venezuelan money and logistics back much
of the anti-Free Trade Agreement opposition in Ecuador. A
key actor in the GoV effort is Venezuelan DCM Gustavo
Bastardo. Bastardo works closely with many Ecuadorian
leftist groups in recruiting converts to the Bolivarian cause.
10. (S) The last twelve months have witnessed a low-level
wave of political violence in Quito, impacting mainly
Gutierrez's opposition but affecting government and allies'
officials as well. Unknown assailants fired shots at the
homes and businesses of outspoken administration critics.
Gunmen opened fire on a Congressional deputy as he drove home
from work. And ski-masked thugs at Quito's Central
University (UCE) roughed-up former VP and current Gutierrez
opponent Leon Roldos. Ecuadorian police have made little
headway investigating the seemingly unrelated crimes (Ref C).
However, reliable Embassy contacts claim UCE radicals are
behind the violence campaign; our sources are but one piece
of evidence short of linking it to GoV henchmen (the Chavez
goal being to foment instability by provoking a drastic
reaction from the Ecuadorian opposition).
11. (S) Even more ominous, the Embassy believes that GoV
money has financed guerrilla training in Venezuela for
Ecuadorian radicals. Prior Quito reporting has detailed
former Administration official (and Gutierrez brother-in-law)
Napoleon Villa's efforts to establish Bolivarian Circle-like
groups in Ecuador (Villa has mostly faded from the political
scene, thankfully). Another former Gutierrez insider,
disgraced and disgruntled ex-Minister Patricio Acosta,
publicly has admitted to attending FARC meetings, with
Gutierrez, prior to the 2002 presidential campaign. Acosta
is a regular traveler to Caracas.
--------------
Tasking Specifics
--------------
12. (C) GoE visa/immigration requirements for Venezuelan
passport holders: Venezuelans neither receive special
migration benefits nor face additional requirements. For
entry into Ecuador, for example, they need only to present a
passport (with at least six months' validity) and a return
ticket.
-- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned
bilateral border security agreements between the Venezuelan
and Ecuadorian governments.
-- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned
bilateral information/intelligence sharing agreements between
the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments.
-- Mil-Mil cooperation between GoV and GoE forces is scant.
At the highest levels -- the joint commander and service
chiefs, for example -- Ecuadorians view ominously the overt
politicization of the Venezuelan military, believing it
grossly unprofessional and potentially destabilizing to the
region. Venezuelan attaches serve here, but they are not
particularly active or high-profile. There have been no
recent bilateral military exercises between the militaries,
and we are unaware of any planned bump-up in GoV military
assistance.
13. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Caracas.
KENNEY
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
B. QUITO 680
C. QUITO 589
C...
id: 30154
date: 4/5/2005 19:14
refid: 05QUITO748
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 05SECSTATE43965
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
-------------- header ends --------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
B. QUITO 680
C. QUITO 589
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (U) SUMMARY: Separated by only a thousand miles and led
by ex-colonels from similar backgrounds, Ecuador and
Venezuela nonetheless aren't closest of friends. Commercial,
cultural, and people-to-people ties are slight, compared to
those of other near-neighboring countries. There is genuine
dislike between Presidents Gutierrez and Chavez, due mainly
to the latter's Machiavellian manipulation of the personal
relationship; the GoE leader thus shies away from most joint
appearances and recently assured us he had no intention of
visiting Caracas soon. Ecuadorian media regularly lambaste
Hugo's efforts to silence and/or co-opt Venezuela's fourth
estate.
2. (S) Chavez is not without allies here, however.
Ecuador's indigenous and traditional left are both numerous
and potent; despite no personal affinity for the Bolivarian
despot, they delight in his anti-imperialist, gringo-bashing
message. The GoV embassy is ably led and is utilizing Cuba's
long-established Ecuador inroads to further Chavez interests.
Evidence seems to tie the Venezuelans to a spate of violence
against the Gutierrez opposition, its aim to foment an even
more violent response. Finally, Ecuador's political
cannibalism and general (and worsening) instability plays
right into Chavez's hands. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Unlike his Havana Idol, No National Hero...
--------------
3. (U) Ecuador and Venezuela would appear natural allies.
Only southeastern Colombia separates them physically.
History ties them together, as both formed part of Gran
Colombia, the short-lived megastate arising upon independence
from Spain in the early 1800s. Each produces petroleum,
although Venezuela's reserves dwarf Ecuador's. And both
feature ruling classes dominated by European-origin citizens,
mestizo and mulatto masses, and marginalized indigenous and
Afro-origen underclasses.
4. (U) Yet despite such similarities, country links are few.
Limited expat communities exist in each, for example. Few
direct flights connect Quito and Caracas. While former
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) employees in 2004 provided
advice to PetroEcuador executives on increasing production
and profits in state-owned fields, they were in fact
"ex-"perts earlier purged from the Venezuelan parastatal, and
the initiative soon stalled. Trade between the two nations
is relatively small and tilts favorably to Venezuela. And
cultural and academic contacts are limited.
5. (SBU) Hugo Chavez and Lucio Gutierrez were decorated
soldiers later imprisoned for coup leadership. Both
rededicated themselves to acquiring their respective
presidencies constitutionally, and both achieved success.
Yet they are far from friendly. Perhaps cognizant that a
chummy relationship would alarm Washington, Gutierrez has
attempted to keep his Caracas counterpart at arm's length.
Chavez attended Gutierrez's January 2003 inauguration, for
example, but was deprived of a useful photo-op. Eighteen
months later, when Quito hosted the OAS General Assembly, the
Venezuelan embarrassed his host by leading large, "fuera
Lucio" rallies not far from the assembly site. Relations
have since chilled further, thanks to Chavez's shenanigans
surrounding their now-aborted Caracas summit (Ref B).
6. (U) Nor do media here cut Chavez much slack. While
reporting his antics and anti-American diatribe factually,
the Venezuelan colonel rarely receives positive front or
editorial page coverage. Both print and broadcast outlets
damn his efforts to emasculate Venezuelan media. And when
Gutierrez takes turns they consider dictatorial, commentators
often tar him as "Chavez-lite."
--------------
But Not Lying Down, Either
--------------
7. (C) Regardless, Chavez considers Ecuador a fertile export
market for his Bolivarian revolution. He is encouraged by
genuine Ecuadorian admiration for Fidel Castro and the
goodwill the Cuban regime's doctors, teachers, and coaches
have earned, especially amidst highlands indigenous
communities. It's no secret Chavez bankrolls Uncle Fidel's
activities hemisphere-wide. Yet there are indications the
Venezuelan wants more than silent partner status in Ecuador.
8. (S) Venezuelan destabilization-related activities have
spiked in Ecuador since September 2004. Perhaps an
indication that Chavez has prioritized Ecuador, Oscar Navas,
the GoV's ambassador in Quito, is a former Venezuelan Army
colonel and Hugo confidant. Embassy sources report increased
contacts between GoV, Cuban, FARC, homegrown terrorist, and
far-left political groups, a dangerous mosaic. While not yet
a coherent whole, the nascent subversion campaign bears
watching.
--------------
A Two-Front Order of Battle
--------------
9. (S) Broadly, GoV efforts take two forms: bolstering
far-left, anti-U.S. political forces, and developing
terrorists' capabilities in Ecuador. Regarding the former,
sources state that Venezuelan money and logistics back much
of the anti-Free Trade Agreement opposition in Ecuador. A
key actor in the GoV effort is Venezuelan DCM Gustavo
Bastardo. Bastardo works closely with many Ecuadorian
leftist groups in recruiting converts to the Bolivarian cause.
10. (S) The last twelve months have witnessed a low-level
wave of political violence in Quito, impacting mainly
Gutierrez's opposition but affecting government and allies'
officials as well. Unknown assailants fired shots at the
homes and businesses of outspoken administration critics.
Gunmen opened fire on a Congressional deputy as he drove home
from work. And ski-masked thugs at Quito's Central
University (UCE) roughed-up former VP and current Gutierrez
opponent Leon Roldos. Ecuadorian police have made little
headway investigating the seemingly unrelated crimes (Ref C).
However, reliable Embassy contacts claim UCE radicals are
behind the violence campaign; our sources are but one piece
of evidence short of linking it to GoV henchmen (the Chavez
goal being to foment instability by provoking a drastic
reaction from the Ecuadorian opposition).
11. (S) Even more ominous, the Embassy believes that GoV
money has financed guerrilla training in Venezuela for
Ecuadorian radicals. Prior Quito reporting has detailed
former Administration official (and Gutierrez brother-in-law)
Napoleon Villa's efforts to establish Bolivarian Circle-like
groups in Ecuador (Villa has mostly faded from the political
scene, thankfully). Another former Gutierrez insider,
disgraced and disgruntled ex-Minister Patricio Acosta,
publicly has admitted to attending FARC meetings, with
Gutierrez, prior to the 2002 presidential campaign. Acosta
is a regular traveler to Caracas.
--------------
Tasking Specifics
--------------
12. (C) GoE visa/immigration requirements for Venezuelan
passport holders: Venezuelans neither receive special
migration benefits nor face additional requirements. For
entry into Ecuador, for example, they need only to present a
passport (with at least six months' validity) and a return
ticket.
-- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned
bilateral border security agreements between the Venezuelan
and Ecuadorian governments.
-- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned
bilateral information/intelligence sharing agreements between
the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments.
-- Mil-Mil cooperation between GoV and GoE forces is scant.
At the highest levels -- the joint commander and service
chiefs, for example -- Ecuadorians view ominously the overt
politicization of the Venezuelan military, believing it
grossly unprofessional and potentially destabilizing to the
region. Venezuelan attaches serve here, but they are not
particularly active or high-profile. There have been no
recent bilateral military exercises between the militaries,
and we are unaware of any planned bump-up in GoV military
assistance.
13. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Caracas.
KENNEY
=======================CABLE ENDS============================