PUSHING GUTIERREZ TO VOTE YES ON CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000682

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV EC CU
SUBJECT: PUSHING GUTIERREZ TO VOTE YES ON CUBA

REF: QUITO 625

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Lucio Gutierrez has assured that
Ecuador will "no worse than" abstain on the upcoming UN Human
Rights Commission resolution on Cuba. A yes vote appears a
political Pandora's box, he believes, likely to unite and
embolden his many detractors across the political spectrum.
Although convinced abstention is the best he can offer,
Gutierrez promises to listen to further USG entreaties on
Cuba. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Over breakfast March 28, Gutierrez and the Ambassador
touched on topics ranging from OXY nationalization to travel
to Caracas (Septels); none mattered more than the Geneva vote
on Cuba, however. The Ambassador offered numerous reasons to
support sanction of Castro, highlighting a worsening human
rights situation on the island and the moral necessity to
condemn it formally. Ecuador had voted yes before (in 1999);
the USG hoped it would again. She planned to discuss the
Geneva resolution at length with FM Patricio Zuquilanda in a
meeting three days hence. The Ambassador concluded by noting
high-level Washington policymakers might soon be ringing the
president, seeking the GoE's support.


3. (C) Gutierrez seemed well-briefed on the UNHRC
resolution. Agreeing Castro was no defender of human rights,
he too deplored conditions in Cuba. Ecuador, Gutierrez
promised, would "no worse than" abstain when the resolution
came to the floor. But a display of support was a different
matter. To maintain political stability and minimize public
disturbances, Gutierrez needed to keep Ecuador's far-left and
indigenous off of the streets. Voting against Castro, he
claimed, would invite wide-scale protests in Quito, the Cuban
dictator's appeal spanning the political map..


4. (C) Despite his misgivings, the president remained open
to USG lobbying, asking only for an Embassy heads-up in
advance of calls from Washington. He also sought intel on
other South American nations' UNHRC voting positions, hinting
he might allow an anti-Cuba vote if Ecuador's neighbors
supported it. Gutierrez had heard, however, that Brazil was
dead-set against Castro condemnation, and was in fact seeking
hemispheric unity in opposing it.


5. (C) COMMENT: On Cuba, getting Ecuador to yes requires a
multi-front effort. We'll continue to push every local
button possible, from calls on Cabinet members to media
placement of anti-Castro messages. From Washington, telcons
with GoE leaders could help, as would pressing the Ecuadorian
embassy. We should continue lobbying in Geneva, as Ecuador's
overseas missions often exercise autonomy and vote counter to
home office instructions. To have a realistic chance of
attaining a yes vote, however, we must address Gutierrez's
core concern: his political vulnerability at home. END
COMMENT.
KENNEY