Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO666
2005-03-23 22:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

CNIES UPDATE: ECUADOR DISMISSES STOCK TEXT

Tags:  SNAR MOPS MASS PREL EC EARI 
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232241Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000666 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015
TAGS: SNAR MOPS MASS PREL EC EARI
SUBJECT: CNIES UPDATE: ECUADOR DISMISSES STOCK TEXT

REF: A. QUITO 491


B. QUITO 444

C. QUITO 257

D. 04 QUITO 3032

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold Chacon, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000666

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015
TAGS: SNAR MOPS MASS PREL EC EARI
SUBJECT: CNIES UPDATE: ECUADOR DISMISSES STOCK TEXT

REF: A. QUITO 491


B. QUITO 444

C. QUITO 257

D. 04 QUITO 3032

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold Chacon, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Attempting to dissipate confusion and spur
movement on CNIES negotiations, Embassy officers called on
Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) leaders March 22 and worked
through the USG boilerplate line-by-line. The FAE remains
convinced, however, that current agreement language does not
reflect Ecuadorian realities. They offered to draft
counter-text focusing more on provision of CNIES data and
prohibitions on its use, and less on aerial interceptions,
lethal or non-lethal. Fearing negotiations otherwise dead,
we recommend hearing the FAE out. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Embassy's Pol-Mil Officer and USAF Mission Chief
visited FAE HQ March 22 for a meeting with Brigadier General
and Chief of Air Operations Jorge Moreno. Their intent was
two-fold; to explain that Washington was averse to the FAE's
proposed CNIES text changes, and to identify which sections
were causing confusion and consternation among FAE leaders.
Interrupting, Moreno claimed Ecuador considered the CNIES
system useful, in that it showed high-level leadership --
both military and civilian -- how narcotraffickers
increasingly used eastern Ecuadorian airspace. He hoped the
FAE could continue to receive the signal. CNIES aerial
tracks did not arrive in real-time, however, but rather some
15 minutes after-the-fact. Moreno therefore argued the data
was of no use in aerial interdiction.


3. (C) The FAE general loved the idea of ramping up an
Airbridge Denial-like program in Ecuador. He would need a
massive infusion of USG cash to do so, of course, to provide
for A-37 refurbishment, new radar installations, and
communications upgrades. He was cognizant that U.S. aerial
interception aid was not forthcoming, instead using his
discourse to introduce his fundamental problem with the
proposed CNIES accord. If, he asked, our intention was to
govern use of CNIES data, why did the agreement feature but
one or two paragraphs on CNIES, but three pages on
interdiction provisions? Ecuador's moribund aircraft fleet
precluded Peru-like lethal interceptions, he added.


4. (C) Moreno's CNIES accord would be one-fourth the length
of ours. A salutary paragraph, a definition of the CNIES
systems and its capabilities, a provision or two governing
how Ecuador could and could not utilize the aerial tracks,
and a closing -- no more. He offered up his staff to draft
the counter-text, and asked for detail on the U.S.
legislation governing (and potentially penalizing)
interceptions conducted with "USG assistance."


5. (C) Emboffs countered by claiming that a half-dozen Latin
American nations already had inked the agreement, as-is. If
the CNIES data did not assist in shoot-downs, and if the
FAE's fleet was so decrepit as to make interceptions
impossible, why protest the current language? They
emphasized that Washington was unlikely to accept wholesale
changes to the U.S.-proposed text. Seeing the Ecuadorians
dug in, however, Emboffs floated another idea: a change to
the GoE's dipnote response, more closely hewing to Ecuadorian
"realities." Positively, they secured Moreno's buy-in to
what we believe our key goal in the negotiations: Ecuador
agreeing it would not conduct lethal and/or ICAO
non-compliant interceptions utilizing CNIES data or other
USG-provided assistance.


6. (C) Concluding, Emboffs asserted they could buy Ecuador
no more CNIES time. If an agreement could not be reached
shortly, the USG would flip the system switch. Moreno again
offered his staff's full cooperation in finding mutually
acceptable agreement text.


7. (C) COMMENT: We aimed to clear confusion with our visit
to Moreno; we believe we succeeded. Unfortunately, we have
reached a substantive impasse with our FAE interlocutors that
looks unbreakable without USG flexibility on text. We
therefore recommend giving the FAE counter-proposal a
serious look, especially if it satisfies our basic CNIES
liability concerns. If it does not, however, we won't
protest a system shutdown. END COMMENT.
CHACON