Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO590
2005-03-15 16:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

OPENING ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 98 FRONTS

Tags:  PREL PGOV SNAR PTER EC CO KICC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000590 

SIPDIS

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

WHA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGER NORIEGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR PTER EC CO KICC
SUBJECT: OPENING ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 98 FRONTS

REF: 04 QUITO 3028

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000590

SIPDIS

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

WHA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGER NORIEGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR PTER EC CO KICC
SUBJECT: OPENING ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 98 FRONTS

REF: 04 QUITO 3028

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) DEAL REMAINS FAR OFF: With Guinea-Bissau's February
2 signing, 99 countries have reached Article 98 agreements
with the United States. Regrettably, we doubt it's Ecuador
that cracks the century mark. Despite our numerous and
varied overtures, the GoE continues to consider Article 98's
political costs greater than its material benefits. Since
our last update in December (Reftel),Ecuador's Congress has
refused to consider the issue in serious committee or plenary
debate. Media requested and received our Article 98 and ICC
fact sheets, yet maintained their negative and inflammatory
tone in the few stories surfacing since. The Foreign
Ministry continues to dodge our calls. And President
Gutierrez talks a good game but shows no willingness to risk
his mandate over the issue.


2. (C) ASPA PAIN REAL: American Servicemember Protection
Act sanctions have begun to hit hard. Especially impacted
is "soft" assistance, where we and Ecuador most feel ASPA's
bite. The International Military Education and Training
program (IMET),for example, represents perhaps the most
cost-effective manner to influence Ecuador's armed forces.
ASPA mandated we suspend IMET in Ecuador, and while Milgroup
has utilized other training programs to maintain outreach,
theirs is at best a stop-gap alternative. We are concerned
that other nations, especially China, have rushed to fill the
gap.


3. (C) BUT SO IS THE PRESIDENT'S: Strife between Gutierrez
and the opposition continues at a fever pitch, limiting the
GoE's room to maneuver on Article 98. The president gained
the upper hand in November, fighting off an impeachment
attempt and initiating an impressive counterattack. Yet his
majority remains wafer-thin and his focus self-preservation;
little of substance is occurring now in Ecuador, save the
ongoing debate on restoring legitimacy to its highest courts.

Gutierrez agreeing to serious Article 98 negotiations would
present his enemies a potent weapon to use against him in the
battle for public opinion.


4. (C) ANOTHER EMBASSY TACK CHANGE COMING: We center our
hopes on two recent developments. First, formal announcement
of Nethercutt Amendment sanctions would propel Article 98
back into headlines, for better or worse (and we can't do
worse than not talking at all). USAID programs here are well
received, and imminent cutbacks might spur the GoE to
reconsider their "ignore them, they'll go away" strategies.
They might also spawn sanctions blowback, however, as we're
using the same big stick to spur movement on TIP. We
understand that Nethercutt guidance, currently under
deliberation in Washington, might soon be released to posts,
and will await its arrival before proceeding.


5. (C) Ecuador's naming of former Finance Minister Mauricio
Pozo to head its DC embassy was a positive development. We
enjoy excellent relations with the pragmatic, intelligent
Pozo; he in turn has access to Gutierrez and is well known in
Washington. At lunch March 8, I pressed the
ambassador-designate for movement on Article 98. While we
understood the political risks that visible Quito
negotiations entailed, I told him, we encouraged that he
engage early with key DoS and DoD interlocutors in the United
States, to determine what sort of text might mutually
satisfy. Assuming successful agrement, we are seeking Miami
consultations for Pozo at Southcom HQ. I have suggested to
Ecuador's military leaders that they concurrently lobby their
newest envoy for movement on Article 98.


6. (C) AND HOW YOU MIGHT HELP OUT: Another option to throw
out for your consideration: Secretary Powell, in Quito last
June for the OAS General Assembly, discussed Article 98 with
President Gutierrez. The Secretary referenced his earlier
correspondence, which the Ecuadorian leader had not yet
answered. Gutierrez told Powell a response was in the works;
first, however, he was seeking a Congressional opinion on the
legality and appropriateness of Article 98 negotiations.
Congress has refused to give its opinion, preferring to let
Gutierrez shoulder all the political risk. A follow-up piece
from Secretary Rice to President Gutierrez, making reference
to the "unanswered Article 98 mail," might spark the GoE to
re-engage. Any such letter should of course cover other
components of the bilateral relationship with Ecuador, both
positive and negative.


7. (C) A "deliverable" or two also might help in the fight
for 98. Coming first to mind is the extradition/deportation
portfolio where, despite some recent progress, we've seen
none of the "corruptos" sent back (we will provide a summary
of cases and statuses Septel). I realize they are complex
undertakings and understand that our legal system provides
detainees necessary protections. But watching a crook like
Padre Carlos Flores, suspected of embezzling perhaps $10
million, extend his stay at Krome to fifteen months by
switching attorneys incessantly (and now requesting asylum)
both riles me and damages the bilateral relationship. We
argue that a interagency full- (or fuller) court press on
deportations is vital.


8. (C) You might help us with Pozo as well. Agrement is
going slow, mostly for bureaucratic reasons. This would
present no problems except that media allege we are stalling,
reasoning we "have something" on the capable official. We
expect the Pozo request to reach the White House by March 18,
and would much oblige your intercession on his behalf.


9. (C) Last up, and hardest to tackle in this time of
competing priorities, are the imminent cutbacks in
Ecuador-bound USG assistance, especially from the Andean
Counter-drug Initiative (ACI) account. We depend heavily on
ACI to fund Embassy activities on Ecuador's northern border,
imperative if we hope to prevent Colombian conflict
spillover's destabilizing effects. NAS sees its counter-drug
funding nearly halved in out-years, for example. Ecuadorian
media, perhaps tipped off by the GoE's Washington embassy
regarding USG budget requests, have already talked of the
coming assistance drop-off, "proof" that Washington's only
Andean cares lie in Colombia. A re-look at Ecuador aid might
tone down their vitriol.


10. (C) FINAL WORDS: Any and all elements of our action
plan might kick-start stalled Article 98 talks. But our
bottom line? We'll keep pushing, but prospects are limited
until Gutierrez gets closer to the end of his term (January
2007). Ecuador's constitution prohibits sitting presidents
from running for re-election, and a lame-duck Gutierrez just
might be amenable to inking an accord.
KENNEY