PRESIDENCY MINISTER WORKING TO KEEP GOE ON TRACK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000468

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2014
TAGS: PTER PGOV EC
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER WORKING TO KEEP GOE ON TRACK


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires A.I., Arnold Chacon. Reason 1.4 (b&d)


1. (S) Summary: On February 25 CDA followed up on earlier
calls to GOE presidential minister Carlos Polit to assure
that the GOE took action to keep FARC suspects in custody.
Polit assured the CDA that the GOE would do so, and
understood the importance for GOE anti-terrorist cooperation.
On other issues, Polit acknowledged recent political
mis-steps, signaled more cabinet changes, and said president
Gutierrez' commitment to dialogue with the opposition was
real. He said president Gutierrez had been impressed with
OAS SecGen candidate Paco Flores during a February 24
meeting. End Summary.

GOE Doing Right on FARC
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2. (S) CDA invited Polit to breakfast on February 25 to
follow up on an earlier call to congratulate the GOE for the
arrest of a dozen FARC on February 23 in Quito. He also
emphasized the importance of protecting the GOE police
anti-terror unit, which had developed the intelligence for
the successful operation, from political interference. Polit
said he had spoken personally with president Gutierrez about
the imperative of continued anti-terror cooperation with
Colombia and the U.S.

President Losing Patience with Opposition
--------------


3. (C) Polit said Gutierrez was losing patience with
opposition tactics to pressure the GOE and Congress to act on
the court issue. He singled out civil society leader Cesar
Montufar for special scorn, and requested USG assistance to
get Montufar to drop confrontational tactics such as the
ongoing "honk to change the court" campaign outside Congress.
Montufar's actions, and his reluctance to enter into
dialogue with the GOE on the court issue, were clearly an
indication of his own political aspirations, Polit asserted.
Polit worried that the opposition's goal was to provoke the
GOE to over-react in an authoritarian manner. This strategy
was strengthening the hand of hard-liners in the GOE, making
it harder to convince Gutierrez to pursue political
compromise.


4. (C) CDA defended USG support to NGOs working to
strengthen democratic institutions, such as Montufar's
Citizens Participation group, and said it would continue. He
suggested that the Foreign Ministry's request for an official
USG response to alleged use of AID funds for the February 16
protest march was not helpful. Montufar has assured us that
he had been misquoted by press; he had made clear that no USG
funding was used for the protest march.

Political Mis-steps Worsen Situation
--------------


5. (C) Polit acknowledged that the GOE had hurt itself
politically in recent days. The arrest and subsequent
release of General Gallardo (SepTel) had been a blunder.
Supreme Court president Guillermo Castro had acted on
fugitive ex-president Bucaram's behest. Minister of
Government Ledesma had dropped the ball. The case would
resurface to cause the GOE more damage, he predicted.
Similarly, the move against the Jesuit charity had been a
fiasco. President of Congress Omar Quintana was losing
control of Congress. In response to the CDA's expressed
concern about corruption allegations against the president's
brother, Polit said Gilmar Gutierrez was naive and being used
by others.

Commitment to Dialogue is Real
--------------


6. (C) Polit said Gutierrez' commitment to political
dialogue with the opposition was real. Polit, Ledesma and
Gutierrez himself were eager to begin that dialogue, and
willing to "put everything on the table." (We later relayed
this information to Montufar, who said only that he would
ponder the offer.) Recognizing the need for conciliation,
Gutierrez had agreed to fire controversial Social Welfare
Minister Antonio Vargas and his confrontational
Undersecretary Bolivar Gonzalez shortly.

Gutierrez Impressed with Flores
--------------


7. (C) Polit said Gutierrez had spent two hours with
visiting former Salvadoran president Flores, and had been
very impressed. Should Chilean candidate Insulza drop out
after first-round voting, the GOE would give Flores serious
consideration. In light of the meeting, Polit expressed
understanding of USG support for Flores, and thanked the
Ambassador for her continued engagement with president
Gutierrez on this matter.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Polit is a lonely voice of reason in an embattled
government, and an ally on key USG interests. He said the
president was anxious to meet with the Ambassador on these
issues, perhaps to add further balance to his circle of
advisors. We are encouraging the opposition to engage with
Polit first, to explore possibilities for dialogue on the
court issue. Polit's read-out of Gutierrez' meeting with
Flores tracks with Flores' own to PolChief on February 24.
Polit and FM Zuquilanda have cautioned, however, that
newfound enthusiasm over Flores' candidacy would come into
play only if Insulza does not reach the second round of
voting.
Chacon